In focus : Social welfare and labour supply by Cseres-Gergely, Zsombor & Scharle, Ágota
IN FOCUS
SOCIAL WELFARE 
 AND LABOUR SUPPLY
Edited by
Ágota Scharle
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely

social welfare provision
33
1. SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISION, LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS  
AND POLICY MAKING
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely & Ágota Scharle
The primary function of social welfare programmes is to redistribute incomes 
in the service of some social objective – such as the protection of certain basic 
human rights –, or to correct market failures. Pension or unemployment in-
surance, for instance, could not function, or would not function well under 
pure market conditions, which justiﬁes state intervention.
The eﬀectiveness of welfare provisions in reducing income inequalities has 
been investigated by several studies in Hungary, using a wide array of data sources 
and research methodology. Their conclusions are not equivocal but all of these 
studies reveal some ineﬃciencies in the system (see for instance Darvas & Tausz, 
2002; Ferge & Tausz, 2002; Havasi, 2005; Lelkes, 2006b; Szalai, 2007; Tóth, 
1997, 2005), which suggests that the welfare system in general – and some ele-
ments in particular – does not fulﬁl its primary function adequately.
Welfare programmes function well provided that they reach the groups 
they are intended to support, increase their welfare and do this in an eﬃcient 
manner, i.e., if they do not reduce total welfare more than absolutely neces-
sary. Thus a social transfer, for instance, functions well if those in need have 
access to it, and only those have access to it; they are given as much as they re-
ally need; the costs of identifying those in need are kept at a minimum; and 
the labour supply of recipients does not decrease to any great extent. That is, 
if the social transfer accomplishes its primary goal while keeping its direct 
costs as well as its indirect costs at a minimum.
Let us call attention at this point to the diﬀerence between eﬃciency and clas-
sic utilitarianism, the latter of which implies no redistribution. The reason why 
one should be concerned with eﬃciency is that it can increase the resources to 
be redistributed. This does not imply that one should take a utilitarian approach 
to the distribution of resources and consequently object to providing support 
to the poor on grounds of solidarity. On the contrary: the eﬃcient allocation 
of public money makes it possible to give more to those in need.
Unintended side eﬀects of social assistance reduce overall welfare and may 
in the long run constitute a burden which endangers the sustainability of 
the system and may also reduce the subjective (non-material) well-being of 
welfare recipients. The indirect costs of social transfers include consequences 
such as the recipient of the transfer feeling humiliated or deciding to delay 
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job search or not seeking to enter employment at all so as not to lose eligibil-
ity. It also constitutes a cost if a prolonged period of staying at home results 
in a heavier reduction in work capacity than would otherwise be expected or 
if the children in the household never see their parents go to work with the 
problem consequently being passed on to the next generation.
This volume looks into the indirect costs of major types of social support. 
Speciﬁcally, the focus is on the indirect costs arising from the labour supply 
eﬀects of transfers: their magnitude and possible ways of mitigating them.
There are compelling reasons for paying distinguished attention to labour 
supply eﬀects. In Hungary, 57 per cent of the population aged 15 to 64 years 
are in employment, while the average employment rate is 64 per cent in the 
EU 27 member states and over 70 per cent in Scandinavian countries. Only 
Poland fares worse than Hungary among the former socialist EU members 
(with 54.5 per cent of 15 to 64 year-olds at work). Employment in Hungary 
started decreasing slowly in 1980 and plummeted between 1990 and 1993, 
reaching its lowest level at 52.4 per cent in 1996. The situation subsequently 
started improving but the 58 per cent employment rate measured in 1992 has 
still not been achieved 15 years on. Figure 1.1 also shows that the employment 
gap is especially large for the low educated.
0
20
40
60
80
100
WomenMen
Slo
vak
ia
Hu
nga
ry
Po
lan
d
Cze
ch 
Re
pu
bli
c
Ge
rm
an
y
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Fin
nla
nd
Be
lgiu
m
Aus
tria
Fra
nce
Ca
na
da
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
No
rwa
y
De
nm
arkIta
ly
Sw
ed
en
Ire
lan
d
Aus
tra
lia
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Tur
key
Ne
w Z
eal
an
d
Sp
ain
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Gre
eceKo
rea
Po
rtu
gal
Ice
lan
d
Me
xic
o
Figure 1.1: Employment rate for those with less than upper secondary education, 2004
Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2004.
GDP has increased by 1 to 5 per cent a year since 1994 but the employment 
rate did not start rising until after 1996, and its subsequent average annual 
growth has remained below 1 per cent. Close to a quarter of the working-age 
population live on some kind of social beneﬁt; the majority of recipients are 
inactive and most of them remain absent from the labour market for extended 
periods or permanently. These simple facts indicate that the welfare system 
has oﬀered a superﬁcial solution to the labour market shock of the regime 
change and has only alleviated social tensions.
The consequences are grave and far-reaching. Welfare payments, in combi-
nation with the wider system of redistribution, contribute greatly to the per-
sistence of a low equilibrium characterized by a low employment rate and high 
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burden of taxes and contributions. High tax rates curb economic performance 
and thus impede economic growth. Long-term unemployment or inactivity 
among the working-age population in turn leads to long-term poverty, the 
propagation of poverty from generation to generation, social exclusion and a 
high risk of old-age poverty. And thus the vicious circle closes, in as much as 
these social disadvantages generate the need for further welfare spending.
Chapters 2 to 5 of this volume investigate the labour supply eﬀects of four 
types of beneﬁt: parental leave beneﬁts, means tested unemployment assis-
tance, disability pension and old-age pension. The labour market tensions 
accompanying the regime change did not only create new forms of support 
– which is natural to some extent, since unemployment beneﬁt, for instance, 
is speciﬁcally targeted at relieving them – but also altered existing welfare 
programmes to assume similar functions. When a welfare programme does 
not, or does not exclusively fulﬁll the role it was originally created for, costly 
side-eﬀects can be expected: this issue is discussed in the chapters on disabil-
ity pension and parental leave beneﬁts. Unemployment beneﬁt also consti-
tutes a major form of support but will not be discussed here for the simple 
reason that a number of very thorough studies have recently been published 
on the subject (see, for instance, the “In Focus” section of 2001 volume of The 
Hungarian Labour Market or Bódis et al [2005]). The chapters of this vol-
ume are supplemented by short sections: these scrutinize social eﬀects other 
than those associated with labour supply and questions regarding the success 
of welfare programmes in fulﬁlling their primary functions.
The rest of this chapter gives an overview of the relationship between the 
labour market and welfare programmes and discusses issues concerning the 
welfare system as a whole. We shall review the consequences that the various 
welfare programmes are in theory expected to have for labour supply and out-
line the causes which may interfere with eﬀorts to eliminate the disincentives 
buried in the current system. Finally, we shall summarise the results of the 
remaining chapters and the conclusions derived from them.
1.1. Who is inactive and who receives welfare payments?
Although welfare payments tend to reduce labour supply, employment prob-
abilities are jointly determined by supply and demand. Aggregate ﬁgures can-
not reveal causal relationships as they reﬂect not only the impact of provisions 
but also the composition of welfare recipients. The overview that follows, 
therefore, has the simple goal of describing the groups of workers which may 
in principle be the target of policies to boost employment.
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of the population aged 25 to 64 years 
– around ﬁve and a half million people – according to labour market status 
and welfare transfer based on the 2006 labour force survey of the Hungarian 
Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). The two largest groups are that of people in employ-
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ment not receiving transfers and that of inactive pensioners. The third larg-
est group, far below the previous groups in size, is that of inactive people not 
receiving transfers, who are immediately followed by the group of inactive 
people receiving some kind of parental leave beneﬁt. The table also reveals 
that the transfers investigated in this volume are the most signiﬁcant ones 
and that inactivity is higher among transfer recipients, except among those 
receiving unemployment beneﬁt.
Table 1.1: The distribution of the population aged 25 to 64 years  
according to transfer and labour market status, 2006 (%)
Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
No transfer 62.4 2.5 5.2 70.1
Unemployment benefit 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.6
Social assistance 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.3
Parental leave benefits (gyed, gyes, gyet) 0.3 0.1 4.0 4.5
Pension 2.5 0.2 19.3 22.0
Other transfer 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5
Total 65.3 4.5 30.1 100.0
Notes: A worker is classiﬁed here, and in what follows, as unemployed with refer-
ence to the ILO deﬁnition: if he or she actively seeks employment and is available 
to start work within the next two weeks. The three main parental leave beneﬁts 
include an insurance based beneﬁt (gyed), a ﬂat rate beneﬁt (gyes) and an extended 
paid leave (gyet). See Table 1.5 for more detail.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force sur-
vey, weighted by the CSO weights.
Participation in individual welfare programmes is of course related to stag-
es in the life cycle: the years of education, followed by the period of activity 
(work and child raising), and ﬁnally the period of retirement. Economic ac-
tivity status and transfer status therefore diﬀer according to age and sex: these 
relationships are clearly displayed in Figure 1.2.
The relationship of activity, transfer status and age cannot all be shown in 
a two-dimensional ﬁgure; the strong eﬀects of age can be clearly seen, how-
ever, by comparing the four parts of the ﬁgure. The ﬁrst notable feature is the 
development of men’s and women’s employment rates. Both curves peak at 
around the age of forty, with a higher top value for men than for women. This 
is despite the fact that the great majority of women have at least one child at 
an earlier stage in their lives, which delays their careers – and thus the peak 
of their careers – in time and that the retirement age is still three years higher 
for men compared to women in 2006. What this suggests is that men are less 
active than women – not in absolute terms but relative to their circumstances. 
The data on women clearly show that their relatively lower level of economic 
activity at earlier stages of their lives coincides with the period of parental leave. 
We can also see that the increasing incidence of inactivity from about the age 
of 45 is accompanied by a sharp fall in unemployment for both sexes.
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Figure 1.2: Economic activity by sex, transfer status and age
Note: Age in the week of observation, measured in years.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on individual level data provided by the CSO 
labour force survey, weighted by the CSO weights.
We have seen in Table 1.1 that over half of the unemployed population does 
not receive unemployment beneﬁt. The ﬁgures further reveal that primarily 
younger age groups are aﬀected: the likelihood of unemployment is highest 
among 30 to 40 year olds, while beneﬁts (most people in the “other” transfer 
category are on unemployment beneﬁt) have a high incidence among people 
over 40. The proportion of job seekers quickly decreases with age over the age 
of 40 – the majority of those who receive unemployment beneﬁt but are in 
fact inactive are found in this group.
Looking at economic activity and transfer status as a function of educational 
attainment, we ﬁnd that those with less than upper secondary education are 
especially disadvantaged with respect to labour market prospects (Table 1.2). 
Barely half of the people in this group are in employment, a ﬁfth of them receive 
some form of pension-like support and a tenth of them are unemployed.
Finally, let us examine mobility between labour market states. Are the same 
people stuck in each status over time or is it that diﬀerent people are entering 
unemployment or inactivity at diﬀerent time periods? The data in Table 1.3 
indicate a low likelihood of exit from employment or from inactivity with pen-
sion-type support not subject to strict re-assessment procedures. We ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant and approximately equal degrees of mobility among the unemployed 
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and among people claiming means tested social assistance but their destinations 
diﬀer greatly. While the clear majority of those leaving unemployed status en-
ter employment, almost half of those leaving the social assistance programme 
become inactive with no social transfers (none recorded by the LFS).
Table 1.2: Activity and transfer status by level of education for people aged 25 to 64 in Hungary, 2006 (%)
Education
Activity and transfer status
Working Unem-ployed
Inactive  
+ SA
Inactive  
+ PLB
Inactive  
+ Pension
Inactive, 
other transfer
Inactive,  
no transfer Total
Primary or less 47.7 8.9 2.3 6.5 21.0 1.0 12.5 100.0
Lower secondary 73.9 5.9 0.5 4.0 10.0 0.5 5.2 100.0
Upper secondary 77.9 4.0 0.2 5.1 6.4 0.3 6.1 100.0
Higher education 87.5 2.0 0.0 5.0 2.4 0.0 3.0 100.0
Total 72.7 5.2 0.7 5.0 9.6 0.4 6.4 100.0
SA = Social assistance, PLB = Parental leave beneﬁts (gyes, gyed, gyet).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force survey, weighted by the origi-
nal CSO weights.
Table 1.3: Distribution of status changes according to combined activity and transfer status  
over two consecutive quarters of 2006 (%, relative to a given initial status)
Activity in first period
Activity in second period
Working Unem-ployed
Inactive  
+ SA
Inactive  
+ PLB
Inactive  
+ Pension
Inactive, 
other transfer
Inactive,  
no transfer Total
Working 98.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 100.0
Unemployed 14.1 79.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 4.5 100.0
Inactive + SA 10.1 8.2 64.3 0.0 0.1 0.9 16.3 100.0
Inactive + Family 3.6 0.8 0.0 94.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 100.0
Inactive + Pension 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 97.3 0.1 0.2 100.0
Inactive + other transfer 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 97.8 0.8 100.0
Inactive + no transfer 6.8 4.8 2.1 1.5 0.3 0.5 84.0 100.0
SA = Social assistance, Family = Parental leave beneﬁts (gyes, gyed, gyet).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force survey. Stock-ﬂow consistent 
weights as in Cseres-Gergely (2007) and Frazis et al (2005). Respondents entering or leaving the sample 
were disregarded. Total percentages may diﬀer from 100 for this reason.
1.2. Main welfare programmes
The welfare system of Hungary aﬀects a substantial proportion of the work-
ing-age population and distributes a signiﬁcant proportion of the GDP. As 
shown in Table 1.4, the coverage of main welfare programmes (including pen-
sion but excluding health care, education and beneﬁts in kind) is extensive 
both in terms of GDP and the share of the population aﬀected, with pension 
transfers being the largest category over the whole period. This in part simply 
reﬂects the chosen age frame, i.e., population aged up to 64 years, which is ﬁve 
or three years over the statutory retirement age, but the ranking of the trans-
fers would remain the same were the upper age limit a few years lower.
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Table 1.4: Major welfare programmes in Hungary in proportion  
to population size and expenditure, 1990–2005
Year
Percentage of population over 15 Total expenditure relative to GDP
Unemploy-
ment benefit 
and social 
assistance
Pension and 
pension-
type  
transfers
Parental 
leave 
benefits
Unemploy-
ment benefit 
and social 
assistance
Pension and 
pension-
type  
transfers
Parental 
leave  
benefits
1990 1.08 30.57 3.03 0.02 9.67 0.64
1995 4.77 36.14 3.63 0.78 10.37 0.66
2000 3.83 37.27 3.60 0.48 9.08 0.51
2005 2.97 35.64 3.47 0.50 10.40 0.57
Note: Social assistance does not include regular child protection beneﬁt (rgyt).
Source: CSO Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2005; The Hungarian Labour Market 
2006, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
These main welfare programmes – with the exception of the means tested 
social assistance (replacing the previous unemployment assistance scheme in 
2000) – are universal or insurance-based – as in the case of unemployment 
beneﬁt, maternity beneﬁt (Gyed) and pension. The current regulations rel-
evant to labour supply are summarised in Table 1.5.1 All major beneﬁts are 
cash beneﬁts and, with the exception of the social assistance, grant a monthly 
income that is stable in time. The value of social assistance depends on house-
hold income and may change depending on other incomes (e.g., labour in-
comes) of household members.
Table 1.5: Regulations on major social welfare programmes
Programme
Can be claimed while 
in employment? Tax allowances
Gyed: paid to families with children up to the age of 
two, in proportion with previous wages. no
Gyes: flat rate, may be claimed by families with chil-
dren up to the age of three.
yes (after child reaches 
the age of 1)
yes (lower health insurance 
contribution)
Gyet: support for parents raising three or more chil-
dren, where the youngest child is eight or younger. yes (4 hours a day)
Unemployment/job seekers’ allowance: Entitlement is 
tied to registration and regular contact with the job 
centre. Maximum period of claim is 91 + 179 days.
no (availability for work 
must be proved)*
Social assistance: means tested income support for 
the long-term unemployed.
no (availability for work 
must be proved)*
Disability pension yes
Old-age pension yes yes (lower health contribution and personal income tax)
* Claimants are required to accept suitable job oﬀers or community work as proof of 
availability for work. Support may be denied if the claimant does not co-operate.
1 The table includes secondary 
eﬀects as well. The health con-
tribution allowance for pension-
ers, for instance, belongs to this 
category, as it does not follow 
directly from pensioner status 
(i.e., from the regulations on 
pensions) but it follows from 
the tax treatment of pension-
ers’ incomes. The Regular Child 
Protection Beneﬁt (which was 
abolished in 2005) and the 
lump sum Child Beneﬁts are not 
shown in the table. The former 
had an eﬀect similar to that of 
unemployment assistance, while 
the latter is similar to Gyes in its 
eﬀect except that more families 
are involved, as Child Beneﬁt is 
paid until the child reaches the 
age of 20.
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1.3. The eﬀects of welfare programmes on labour supply
According to the standard model of economics, a worker will consider two 
questions in deciding whether, and how much, he or she should work: one is 
the income to be expected as the return for a given number of hours of work 
and the other is the subjective value of leisure as compared to the value of con-
sumption.2 If the worker takes on employment, the income thus earned can 
be used for consumption but the worker will have less free time. The limits of 
consumption are determined by the amount of wages earned and the amount 
of income from other sources. In most cases the resulting constraints leave 
several viable options, so that a person can choose the one best suited to their 
individual preferences, i.e., their personal assessment of the relative utility of 
free time and consumption. The individual in the model strives to maximize 
utility, i.e., to ﬁnd the point on the margin of his or her possibilities where 
utility cannot be further increased by increasing either consumption or lei-
sure time. Figure 1.3a displays the default situation: the curves show indi-
vidual preferences, while the straight line represents the budget constraint 
determined by the given market wage.
Figure 1.3: Consumption and labour supply trade-off  
a) in the default case, b) with fixed costs and c) with a wage disadvantage
 a) Default b) Fixed costs c) Low wages 
Labour supply decisions and the negative eﬀects of welfare programmes on 
labour supply are plotted in Figure 1.3. A precise formal mathematical de-
scription is also given below but we shall attempt to discuss each ﬁgure in 
simple language accessible to readers unfamiliar with economic theory. The 
worker is characterised in the formal model as an individual seeking the opti-
mal combination of labour and consumption. Let us deﬁne this preference as 
a well-behaved utility function U(C, l) which is to be maximised by the indi-
vidual given a budget constraint N + w(T – l) = C, where N is non-labour in-
come, w is the wage, T is the total available time, l is leisure time and C is con-
sumption. A basic welfare programme provides income B = G – t(wH + N), 
where B is the net beneﬁt, G is the minimum income guarantee, t is the tax 
rate and H is the number of hours spent working. If we add G to the left side 
of the budget constraint and simplify the equation we get disposable income 
2 The description of the labour 
supply decision is based on 
Moﬃtt’s (2002) chapter in the 
Handbook of Public Economics, 
a classic piece of the vast litera-
ture on the subject. Empirical 
estimates on labour supply in 
Hungary are summarised in 
Galasi (2003).
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w(1 – t)H + G – tN = Y. The tax rate reduces both labour income and non-
labour income. The tax rate on labour income also modiﬁes the relative values 
of consumption and leisure time: since the net wages gained from the same 
amount of work are reduced, the income lost by spending time not working 
(i.e., the value of leisure time) will also be lower.
Figures 1.3 to 1.5 display labour supply choices in three scenarios where no 
welfare beneﬁt is received and under six scenarios of diﬀerent welfare pro-
grammes. It is useful to consider these simpliﬁed situations and the labour 
supply eﬀects they are expected to induce because each of the welfare pro-
grammes under scrutiny in this volume either directly corresponds to one of 
these simple cases or can be constructed by combining some of them. Figure 
1.3 shows three variations on labour supply with no welfare support: the de-
fault case, the eﬀect of ﬁxed costs discouraging labour supply and the eﬀect 
of low productivity. Part a) displays the budget constraint line and three in-
diﬀerence curves. Unearned income is assumed to be zero here for the sake 
of simplicity. The budget constraint shows the substitution rate between lei-
sure time and consumption given the wages: the slope of the line is deﬁned 
as w(1 – t), i.e., higher wages result in a steeper constraint, while lower wages 
give a ﬂatter line. The indiﬀerence curves represent individual preferences, that 
is, the individual’s relative assessment of the utility of leisure time and that 
of consumption. Curves further away from the origin indicate increasingly 
higher levels of utility. The point of optimization is where the indiﬀerence 
curve meets the budget constraint: it is this point that provides the greatest 
level of utility for the individual under the given circumstances.
Part b) in Figure 1.3 shows a scenario where the worker earns a wage cor-
responding to the market value of his/her abilities (training, age, etc.) but 
has to bear a ﬁxed cost, independent of hours worked. Such ﬁxed costs may 
include travel expenses, clothing, or child care costs. This cost is represented 
by F: the budget line shifts downwards by this amount. The cost has the con-
sequence that labour supply will not be worth the worker’s while below a cer-
tain number of hours of work because his/her income gain might be reduced 
to a point where it becomes negative, which is clearly worse than zero. Under 
these circumstances part time employment with average market wages, for 
instance, will not be proﬁtable. We can see that a signiﬁcant amount of work 
is needed simply to cover the ﬁxed expenses and it is not worth working un-
less these costs can be paid.
The scenario in Part c) of Figure 1.3 assumes no signiﬁcant costs of labour 
supply but the individual’s wage w’ is below the market wage (w). This situ-
ation characterises those whose productivity is below average (due to their 
education, skills or state of health). Labour supply does not necessarily de-
crease in this case (unless some cost or other income acts as a disincentive) 
but the level of income gained from work may be very low. A situation where 
in focus
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the above problems add up is not only conceivable but is in fact frequently 
observed: uneducated people living in isolated rural communities in disad-
vantaged geographical regions is an example.
Both of the above problems may be counterbalanced by providing welfare 
support on grounds of solidarity and eﬃciency. The ﬁrst solution is to grant 
a beneﬁt of a ﬁxed amount in the form of, say, a travel allowance. A solution 
of this kind is shown in Part a) in Figure 1.4, where T stands for a lump sum, 
unconditional transfer. The transfer shifts the budget constraint upwards, 
thus the individual in the model will work less (have more leisure time) and 
spend more.
Figure 1.4: The decision to work with a fixed amount benefit and with wage subsidy
 a) Lump sum benefit b) Wage subsidy/Tax allowance
The second way of providing support is wage subsidy or equivalent tax al-
lowance, intended to compensate for low productivity. This is shown as w’’ 
in Part b) of Figure 1.4. The labour income of the recipient may increase as a 
result. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two scenarios is that a wage sub-
sidy decreases labour supply to a lesser extent than an unconditional trans-
fer, if at all.
Part a) in Figure 1.5 displays a welfare programme which provides support 
conditional on unemployment. Even short-term employment results in loss 
of eligibility and leaves labour wage as the sole income. Holding preferences 
and wages constant, the individual in our model will choose not to work and 
will only reconsider his/her decision if wages increase substantially. Should 
this be the case, labour supply will be nevertheless reduced compared to the 
default, unsupported situation.
The programme presented in part b) of Figure 1.5 allows employment but 
eligibility is dependent on income level. This results in a high marginal tax 
rate on the extra income at point l* – a few hours of increase in labour supply 
eﬀects an almost ﬁfty per cent reduction in income in our example. Since this 
threshold typically sets in at a low income level, the individual in the model 
will fall into a poverty trap. Although in employment, s/he works short hours 
and therefore earns little.
The third solution is a tax allowance with an upper limit of income for 
eligibility (Part c) in Figure 1.4). This method also generates a trap, which is 
social welfare provision
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diﬀerent in its details, but essentially the same as before. At the point where 
the worker ceases to be eligible, his/her disposable income suddenly drops, 
which has the eﬀect of discouraging small increases in labour supply.
Figure 1.5: Consumption – labour supply trade-off  
with conditional welfare programmes
 a) Fixed transfer for the unemployed b) Fixed transfer with income threshold
 c) Transfer with tax allowance d) Transfer with leisure time reduction
A fourth solution consists in tightening the conditions on eligibility.3 These 
regulations ensure that support is given only to those in genuine need: un-
employment beneﬁt, for instance, is granted only to those who are genuinely 
unemployed (that is, who are seeking employment and are available for work) 
and are willing to co-operate with the employment services in an eﬀort to 
ﬁnd employment. Unemployment beneﬁt may thus be conditional on active 
job search or regular visits to the job centre, and failure to comply may draw 
sanctions (such as the suspension of the beneﬁt). This is illustrated in Part d) 
of Figure 1.5. The eligibility condition essentially has the eﬀect of increasing 
the cost of claiming beneﬁt by reducing leisure time: the programme eﬀec-
tively constrains the availability of free time while providing support. Giv-
en the recipient’s competences and wage structures, the level of time burden 
can be set such that it reduces utility by exactly the same amount as the cash 
support increases it. Since the availability of leisure time and income will in 
this case be similar to a situation where the individual works, there will be 
no disincentive to labour supply.
The same indiﬀerence curve is used throughout our examples; that is, the 
levels of utility assigned to free time and consumption by the individual are 
the same in each of the models. In real life, there may be signiﬁcant variation 
across individual preferences and thus the eﬀects of the same welfare pro-
3 This is not the same as the 
rules of entitlement, which specify 
the set of hardships which are 
intended to be alleviated by a 
given welfare programme: e.g. 
that the claimant has exhausted 
insured unemployment beneﬁt 
but has not found work.
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gramme on individual worker’s labour supply may vary greatly. These eﬀects 
cannot be assessed on the basis of theoretical arguments: empirical research 
is needed to investigate labour supply eﬀects based on data on workers af-
fected by the programme.
In real life, the labour supply eﬀects of welfare programmes are inﬂuenced 
by several factors which cannot be modelled in our simple theoretical frame-
work. Most of these deviations come from the facts that the eﬀects of this 
decision extend beyond the current period and that people other than the 
transfer recipient are also aﬀected.
1. Rather than make separate decisions, couples often plan their labour sup-
ply together with consideration, for instance, to their preferences in sharing 
housework or because they wish to spend their leisure time together.
2. As a general rule, means testing considers per capita income within the 
household. Unemployment assistance aﬀects the budget constraint of the en-
tire household and it may reduce not only the recipient’s but also other house-
hold members’ labour supply.
3. The basic model cannot account for the long-term security of a given job 
or the costs of reapplying for the beneﬁt – which is an important issue with 
regard to unemployment beneﬁt and social assistance.
4. The model also disregards the rehabilitation services accompanying dis-
ability pension and unemployment assistance programmes, which are impor-
tant in that they may increase the level of subsequently expected earnings.
5. With respect to programmes targeting families with children, the mod-
el needs to be enhanced by taking an additional preference parameter into 
consideration: the fact that parents regard the well-being of their children as 
a priority as well.
6. With regard to old-age pension, the neglected time factor and the irrevers-
ibility of welfare participation introduce signiﬁcant deviation from the basic 
model. Because of its irreversibility, pension constitutes a welfare programme 
which covers a signiﬁcantly longer period and gives more security than oth-
er types of support. As long as the long-term income received in retirement 
is not accompanied by any disadvantages, early exit may be a sensible choice 
even if the decision seems irrational in view of the immediate costs. The regu-
lations on pensions, however, forbid or sanction labour supply in retirement 
in several countries, which make it costly to supply labour while receiving a 
pension (OECD, 2005). The signiﬁcance of irreversibility follows from the 
importance of the time factor. While simple models of entering the pension 
programme can be constructed as a series of static decisions, these decisions 
are not independent of time, the accumulation of entitlement or the eﬀects of 
earnings on the amount of pension received. As a result, strategies concerning 
the timing of retirement aﬀect labour supply preceding the period of retire-
ment as well as human capital investment.
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Finally, we need to point out that the considerations listed above concern 
labour supply in general and are not restricted to formal (reported) employ-
ment. The chapter on disability pensions brieﬂy returns to this issue but, on 
the whole, we assume that the choice between black labour and formal em-
ployment is not governed by welfare programmes but by a willingness to avoid 
risk taking, the social acceptability of black labour and the risks and costs of 
being caught. Thus, while black labour is undoubtedly a problem that calls 
for a lot of attention, it is not of pivotal signiﬁcance in the context of welfare 
programmes.
1.4. The causes of low eﬃciency in the welfare system and 
possible directions for reform
In response to the initiative of policy experts, crisis situations and the persist-
ent calls of international organisations, some attempts have been made to re-
duce disincentives and ﬁnancing pressures in the welfare system, such as the 
repeated tightening of entitlement conditions on unemployment beneﬁt, the 
introduction of compulsory community work, or the pension reform of 1997. 
The reforms implemented so far, however, have not addressed all of the prob-
lems and have proved to be largely unsuccessful or even detrimental.
Existing regulations, the functioning of institutions and procedures of de-
cision making in many respects still reﬂect the forced choices of the regime 
change or even earlier patterns from before the transition. Risking the charg-
es of superﬁciality and subjectivity, we shall sketch the major aspects of this 
unfortunate inheritance, since the feasibility of the strategies recommended 
in the chapters of this volume is heavily dependent on these surviving insti-
tutional conditions.
The current shortcomings of the welfare system follow from distortions in 
both the setting of objectives and in errors of implementation. The process 
of identifying targets of social policy may be inﬂuenced by a number of fac-
tors diverting it from the social optimum. The strongest of these inﬂuences is 
inertia, sometimes called the status quo bias, which comes from a tendency 
of decision makers and voters to perceive the losses resulting from changing 
the system to be higher than either the costs of no change or the expected 
gains of change.
Even those would often object to reforms who could otherwise hope to 
beneﬁt from them, for the simple reason that they are not aware of the ac-
tual costs of the welfare system and consequently underestimate how much 
would be saved by the change. This ﬁscal illusion was likely to be cultivated 
by the complex Hungarian taxation system and the myth of cost-free welfare 
provision (Csontos, 1995).4 Furthermore, the regime change magniﬁed the 
uncertainties of future expectations: people could not predict the precise 
consequences of any individual reform, let alone the outcome of a complete 
4 The theoretical discussion in 
Csontos (1995) was followed by 
an empirical study of ﬁscal illu-
sions: see Cserne (2001) for re-
sults and the ensuing debate.
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overhaul, in relation to their personal circumstances, which created a barrier 
to co-operation between groups which could in principle proﬁt from the re-
forms (Köllő & Nacsa, 2005, p. 9).
Besides information and cognitive barriers, individual interests also exert an 
especially strong distorting inﬂuence. Reforms aimed at enhancing eﬃcien-
cy involve measures eliminating expenses not justiﬁed by either productivity 
or need, which oﬀends the interests of all those who have in some way prof-
ited from these. Former beneﬁciaries are many, since pre-transition welfare 
redistribution exceeded national income and access to privileges depended 
as much on loyalty, party connections and good luck as on genuine merit or 
need (Hankiss, 1986, p. 46; Kornai, 1983).
The phenomenon that competing political parties attach the highest prior-
ity to the preferences of the median voter and thus tend to rate the interests 
of the middle classes higher than those of the poor is, far from being unique 
to Hungary, by now a classic tenet in the literature on democratic political 
systems (Downs, 1957). But this eﬀect is augmented by the pre-war middle 
classes’ reviving reﬂexes of self-defence5 and by the impatience and selﬁsh-
ness engendered in Hungarian society by the dysfunctions of the previous 
regime.6
In an eﬀort to avoid an escalation of political tensions, the Hungarian gov-
ernment of the regime change tried to compensate those on the losing side. 
This eﬀort, however, was guided by political rather than economic consid-
erations (which is not unique to Hungary either), and compensation thus 
tended to reﬂect the number, political voice, and self-organising skills of the 
losers, rather than their needs. The gap between the actual loss and compen-
sation was further widened by two other factors: 1. the practice inherited 
from the Kádár era where the needs of social groups are assessed by methods 
that make allowances for group interests rather than in an open bargaining 
process and 2. the poor bargaining power of certain groups of losers follow-
ing precisely from this practice.
A further source of errors is that policy makers often opt for a less than per-
fect means to achieve their objectives. This can also be traced back to the pre-
vious regime: the distorted role perception of politicians that implies control 
over choosing the means (not only the objectives) and a culture of political 
regulation which attempts to shape and patch the system to suit presumed 
needs on the basis of inside information rather than derive rules from mod-
els construed with reference to interests and aims openly negotiated in pub-
lic fora. The single minded focus of politicians on increasing gross output is 
conserved in the practice of the government acting on the advice of macro-
economists concerning issues which require expertise in micro-economics or 
sociology. Finally, it is equally important that Hungarian state administra-
tion has been barely touched by the change of government style observed in 
5 “... the debased upper and 
middle classes put all their ef-
forts into maintaining their old 
standards and their separate 
sense of class” – wrote István 
Bibó in 1947 (Bibó, 1990, p. 65.). 
See Wittenberg (1997) on the 
reality and measurability of 
continuity.
6 Hankiss (1986) argues that 
the lack of trust (social capital) 
essential for the proper func-
tioning of collective norms 
engenders selﬁshness, the su-
pression or dysfunction of local 
democracy and of the rules of 
social interaction gives rise to 
mistrust, while excessive eco-
nomic and political centraliza-
tion leads to “individualism 
beyond control”.
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most countries in Western Europe, where the emphasis of decision making 
has shifted from expert opinion towards empirical evidence and impact analy-
ses and where accountability and transparency are seen as the key to govern-
ment legitimacy and success (Verheijen, 2006).
The occasional reform intitative can easily run aground either on the weak 
autonomy of institutions inherited from centralized administration or on 
the absence of horizontal co-operation. Also, civil society and the media do 
not appear to be powerful or autonomous enough to provide suﬃcient im-
petus for change.
What the government can do
Relatively little funds would be needed to ease the barriers created by the in-
suﬃciency of information. Several thorough evaluations of the costs of delay-
ing reform have been made by international organizations: the government 
could gain support for the reforms by the widespread dissemination of these 
results. Fiscal illusions could be dispelled by publishing easy to follow infor-
mation on budget revenues and expenditures on a regular basis.
The task of improving the availability of expert advice is undoubtedly more 
diﬃcult – as it may oﬀend interests and sensitivities – but not impossible: 
more micro-economists and sociologists are needed among government ad-
visors, and evidence-based policy making should be introduced. It could be 
fruitful to reform the recruitment, motivation and evaluation system apply-
ing to the body of civil servants, the ﬁrst diﬃcult steps of which have already 
been taken.
What social policy can do
Perhaps the most practicable step for social policy is to monitor results. It 
is somewhat more diﬃcult – because it requires more complex action and a 
longer period of adjustment – to improve horizontal co-operation within the 
government administration, to develop a system of output-oriented incentives 
in regulations and to build an expert knowledge and information base neces-
sary for evidence-based decision making. Until this is achieved, it is diﬃcult 
to imagine how politicians could relinquish the illusion of infallibility and 
assume responsibility for correcting mistakes.
No single, uniﬁed solution is likely to exist for individual problems. It is gen-
erally true, however, that a policy can only succeed in the long term if it can 
rely on mechanisms that systematically ensure that the goals can be achieved. 
This is contingent on a clear statement of the objectives and the regular mea-
suring and monitoring of the results – making results available for scrutiny 
by academic communities and civil society.
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1.5. Brief summary of the conclusions of the analysis of labour 
supply eﬀects
The remaining chapters of “In Focus” look at the main welfare programmes in 
Hungary with the aim of highlighting problems aﬀecting the labour market.
Chapter 2 explores the labour supply eﬀects of parental leave beneﬁts using 
individual level data. Although it is often hailed as an achievement, the cur-
rent support system is very costly and it allows paid absence from work for a 
substantially longer period than is usual in the western world. While there is 
no convincing evidence for the positive eﬀects of an average absence of four or 
ﬁve years on either fertility or the development of the child, the system keeps 
the employment rate of mothers at a very low level – as a forced choice, in 
some cases. The receipt of parental leave beneﬁts has increased over the past 
15 years. There is a growing number of participants with no previous work 
experience and poor levels of education, while the likelihood of employment 
among Gyes or Gyet recipients has fallen. Women who work while receiving 
parental leave beneﬁts earn less than their peers. These facts suggest that the 
human capital of women is substantially devalued over the years spent rais-
ing children, which is an important and previously neglected factor in eval-
uating the social utility of parental leave beneﬁts. A policy allowing a more 
balanced choice between family and work would be one which oﬀers a cash 
beneﬁt ﬁnancing a shorter period of staying at home and provides more work 
related support (child care voucher, travel allowance, retraining opportuni-
ties), possibly supplemented with subsidies supporting ﬂexible working hours 
for parents returning from Gyes.
The results of the study on unemployment assistance discussed in Chapter 
3 indicate that this programme appears to function in practice as income sup-
port for the long-term unemployed, and neither the activation rules nor the 
community work schemes attached to the programme achieve their goal of 
encouraging re-employment. This could be improved by introducing radical 
changes in four areas: eligibility conditions should be deﬁned more precisely 
and enforced with greater rigour; the incentives of organizations administer-
ing the programme should be realigned too in such a way as to reward eﬀorts 
to help the unemployed return to the primary labour market and discourage 
the provision of transfers; capacity building to provide the necessary range 
of rehabilitation and social services. The fourth component of the reform is 
the division of the programme into two schemes: a means tested income sup-
port for those unable to work (with no work test), and an unemployment as-
sistance including availability tests and rehabilitation services for the long-
term unemployed.
Chapter 4 is concerned with disability pension and investigates the ex-
planatory value of labour market causes in the rapid rise in the incidence of 
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disability pension claims. An analysis of county level aggregate data indicate 
that a high incidence of claims is not restricted to regions with poor health 
indicators but also occurs in counties with relatively low employment rates 
and more opportunities for informal employment. The recently amended 
regulations on disability pension still fail to provide appropriate incentives 
to rehabilitation and returning to work. The incentives could be improved by 
introducing three essential changes. First, the maximum rate of cash beneﬁt 
claimable without rehabilitation attempts or before the statutory retirement 
age should be signiﬁcantly smaller than the expected rate of old-age pension. 
Second, a wide range of eﬃcient rehabilitation services should be available to 
help those who would like to regain their work capacity. Third, the organisa-
tion providing the services should proﬁt from encouraging the claimant to 
choose rehabilitation over pension.
Chapter 5 examines the motivations behind claiming old-age or disability 
pension with the objective of quantifying the eﬀects of incentives of a ma-
terial nature. Disability pension and old-age pension are taken together as, 
while clearly not equivalent, they are suﬃciently similar from the perspective 
of labour supply incentives. The investigation is based on individual level data, 
which allows a longitudinal analysis of the behaviour and income positions 
of people under observation. Using income expected as a pensioner and in-
come expected as a non-pensioner in an econometric model of the decision 
to retire, it is found that those who can expect a higher than average income 
in retirement and a lower than average income without retirement are more 
likely to choose to retire – this also holds for people below retirement age 
and is independent of the length of time left until retirement age. The results 
suggest that low-income groups ﬁnd a way to escape the challenges of the la-
bour market and we have evidence that the pension programme functions 
as some kind of automatic and permanent labour market refuge. Changing 
this practice will require not only the tightening of pension rules but also an 
increased awareness of labour supply eﬀects and appropriate measures to re-
duce these eﬀects.
A possible strategy is presented in the ﬁnal chapter of this volume through 
an example from abroad. The programme Pathways to Work is targeted at 
increasing employment among workers with reduced work capacity and has 
proved to be highly successful in Great Britain. The chapter shows that the 
success of the programme is not only due to its carefully designed structure 
but also to the way it was introduced: a carefully constructed process, where 
the ﬁrst pilots were followed by gradual expansion with thorough impact as-
sessment – and correction, if necessary – after each step. The chapter closes 
by describing some of the barriers to the successful implementation of poli-
cies in the Hungarian welfare system.
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WELFARE RECIPIENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH THEIR LIVES AND INCOME POSITION7
György Molnár & Zsuzsa Kapitány
The primary goal of welfare provision is to secure 
subsistence for people with no access or substan-
tially reduced access to market incomes. This may 
be supplemented by the objective to improve access 
to employment and other assets necessary for well-
being, or to promote equal opportunities. In short, 
welfare programmes provide both income (and 
thus consumption) and security. They improve an 
individual’s prospects but may also cause depend-
ence, especially if the support is only accessible to 
those who are unemployed. Also, means tested ben-
eﬁts may be perceived as humiliating.
As these factors have an impact on the subjective 
wellbeing of welfare participants, an analysis of 
their perceptions of their lives can provide indirect 
evidence as to the success of the programmes.
Wellbeing and satisfaction (especially satisfaction 
with one’s ﬁnancial situation) are related to income, 
but it is not the level of income but its – actual or 
subjectively perceived – relative value that is decisive, 
i.e., the actual or perceived diﬀerence between an in-
dividual’s income and the incomes of other people 
or his/her previous income (Molnár & Kapitány, 
2006). Subjective wellbeing is also determined by 
several other factors which lend themselves to mea-
surement with greater or lesser ease.8 Factors which 
are easy to measure include family structure, educa-
tion, health and labour market status. More elusive, 
nevertheless signiﬁcant factors are ﬁnancial circum-
stances, expectations for the future, security, pres-
tige, social relationships and self-fulﬁlment. Also 
diﬃcult to measure is whether an individual ﬁnds 
pleasure in work activities or whether a welfare re-
cipient perceives the support as humiliating.
Satisfaction may be viewed as corresponding to 
the utility function of the simple labour supply 
model discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume: what 
the individual seeks to maximise.9 The model is 
augmented here by considering sources of utility 
other than leisure time and consumption, such as 
social relationships, security, self-fulﬁlment and 
other subjective factors which may enhance an in-
dividual’s wellbeing.
This section discusses some factors aﬀecting the 
subjective wellbeing of welfare recipients based on 
Molnár & Kapitány’s (2006) results. Our data, as in 
the reference paper, come from the Household Bud-
get Survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce.
Table K1.1 shows the average values of subjec-
tive wellbeing for groups of people with diﬀerent 
sources of income. Unemployed people, disability 
pension recipients, people living on casual labour 
incomes and welfare participants are far more dis-
satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial circumstances and 
their lives in general compared to other groups.10
The average values in Table K1.1 reﬂect the com-
bined eﬀects of labour market status, welfare provi-
sion and diﬀerences in group composition. To iso-
late the various eﬀects, a logistic regression model 
was used to control for age, education, health sta-
tus and level of income (or mobility): the results 
are displayed in Table K1.2.
7 This section is based on research by György Molnár and Zsuzsa 
Kapitány supported by the EU-COMPPRESS (HPSE-CT-2002-
00149) programme. For further details of the data and the analysis, 
see Molnár & Kapitány (2006).
8 The strength of these eﬀects is dependent on an individual’s 
personal values, see Lelkes (2006a) for estimations based on 
Hungarian data, which show, for instance, that religious beliefs 
decrease the utility attached to income.
9 There is a large literature on the issue; see, for instance, Frey & 
Stutzer (1999), (2002), Layard (2005), Senik (2005).
10 The category of unemployed status used here is based on self-dec-
laration, i.e. it does not correspond to the ILO deﬁnition because 
the necessary information is not all available due to the structure 
of the Household Budget Survey. The category of unemployed 
people with no support includes those who do not receive any kind 
of welfare support and consider themselves to be unemployed 
(rather than home-makers, for instance). The classiﬁcation is 
based on the status reported at the point of data collection each 
month; note that often the same person is sometimes unemployed 
and sometimes engaged in casual labour over the year, so that 
the two categories are very close to each other.
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Table K1.1: Average satisfaction with financial circumstances and life according to activity status, 
in order of level of satisfaction with financial situation (N = 3398)
Activity
Satisfaction
Financial situation Life
Pensioner in employment 2.96 2.97
Student 2.78 3.24
Employed, self-employed 2.63 2.86
Old-age pensioner 2.63 2.77
Other inactive 2.36 2.68
Widow’s or orphan’s pension recipient 2.36 2.57
Receiving parental leave benefit (gyes, gyed, gyet) 2.22 2.59
Unemployed on insured benefit 2.13 2.65
Disability pension recipient 2.09 2.43
Casual labourer 1.96 1.73
Unemployed with no support 1.85 1.98
Unemployed on means tested benefit 1.65 1.86
Receiving nursing benefit* or other benefit 1.46 1.75
Notes: The following questions were asked: “How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed would you say you are 
with your life on the whole?” and “How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed would you say you are with the 
ﬁnancial situation of your household?” Average values were calculated by assigning values on a 
scale of 1 (very dissatisﬁed) to 5 (very satisﬁed) to respondents’ answers.
* A cash beneﬁt available to those looking after an ailing family member.
Table K1.2: Financial and general satisfaction in Hungary in 2002  
(ordered logit estimation with objective variables, N = 3398)
Activity
Financial General
Satisfaction
Casual labourer –1.06 (0.30)** –2.06 (0.27)**
Other welfare participant or nursing benefit recipient –1.40 (0.42)** –1.30 (0.39)**
Unemployed with no support –1.10 (0.38)** –1.38 (0.35)**
Unemployed on means tested benefit –0.87 (0.24)** –1.15 (0.28)**
Unemployed on insured benefit –0.30 (0.49) 0.11 (0.42)
Disability pension recipient –0.51 (0.18)** –0.28 (0.18)
Adult family members of people with marginal activity statusa –0.55 (0.17)** –0.61 (0.15)**
In 2nd or 3rd income quintile in 2002 0.92 (0.18)** 0.51 (0.17)**
In 4th income quintile 1.00 (0.21)** 0.59 (0.19)**
In 9th income decile 1.36 (0.26)** 0.68 (0.23)**
In 19th income ventile 1.98 (0.29)** 1.32 (0.30)**
In 20th income ventile 2.32 (0.38)** 1.84 (0.32)**
Young (18–39 years) 0.54 (0.12)** 0.65 (0.13)**
Elderly (55 years and over) 0.54 (0.12)** 0.48 (0.12)**
Student (in full-time higher education) 0.32 (0.28) 1.16 (0.25)**
Completed university degree 0.39 (0.15)* 0.67 (0.15)**
Couple in household (married or co-habiting) 0.37 (0.12)** 0.42 (0.12)**
Child aged 0–3 years in household –0.71 (0.22)** –0.46 (0.21)*
Person with long-term health condition in household –0.27 (0.12)* –0.28 (0.12)*
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.086
* Coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level, ** coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level.
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a Adult members of households that include a casual 
labourer or a member receiving disability pension or 
social beneﬁt, who themselves do not belong to any 
of these groups. Reference groups: employed, in the 
poorest income quintile, middle aged (40–54 years).
Note: The equations included variables of wealth and 
mobility, which are not shown above. Standard er-
rors of robust estimates clustered for households are 
shown in brackets.
The coeﬃcient of welfare programmes only shows 
subjective eﬀects in this estimation: those of relative 
security, income ambitions (relative to previous in-
come and to the incomes of others), a feeling of being 
stigmatised, idleness and future hopes. As the stigma 
eﬀect does not apply to insurance-based welfare par-
ticipation and there is likely to be less motivation to 
supply labour, so the eﬀects of these factors mainly 
reﬂect the value of security and ambitions.
We shall focus on the results which are important 
with respect to the success of welfare programmes. 
As can be seen in Table K1.1, people in relatively 
low income groups are less satisﬁed with their ﬁnan-
cial situation and with their lives in general, which 
corresponds to our expectations. Controlling for 
income (and some other variables), certain welfare 
programmes cease to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on con-
tentment: the satisfaction of people receiving old-age 
pension or parental leave beneﬁts do not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly from that of the employed. This suggests 
that the security oﬀered by old-age and widows/or-
phans’ pension or parental leave beneﬁts compensate 
for low income as well as for the loss of the possible 
subjective utility of labour supply. People receiving 
disability pension are on the whole as satisﬁed with 
their lives as old-age pensioners and working people 
but are less satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial circumstanc-
es (with the eﬀects of poor health controlled for). 
However, if we look at the subgroup of people on 
disability pension who presumably chose disabled 
status to escape unemployment rather than due to 
poor health, we ﬁnd a perceptibly lower level of sat-
isfaction with life as well.11
That welfare participation is perceived to be stig-
matised is indicated by the ﬁnding that in contrast 
to insured beneﬁt, means tested beneﬁt has a stron-
ger negative eﬀect on general satisfaction than on 
ﬁnancial satisfaction. The negative perceptions of 
people on subsistence beneﬁt are not only related 
to the stigma, however, but presumably to their 
insecure prospects as well, since the groups most 
similar to them, unemployed people with no sup-
port and people doing casual work, report the low-
est levels of satisfaction.
The satisfaction index of casual workers, unsup-
ported unemployed people, means tested beneﬁt 
recipients and people on other beneﬁts continues 
to remain the lowest even after controlling for the 
level of income: we believe that this result is related 
to the insecurity of their status. People on unem-
ployment beneﬁt do not display this eﬀect, which 
suggests that insecurity increases and future hopes 
decline with the duration of unemployment.
The results therefore indicate that long-term un-
employment or insecure employment prospects cre-
ate a position where the growth of personal welfare 
is greatly hampered. In other words, it is a situation 
where there are strong constraints to maximising util-
ity, and welfare support is not the best but the least 
bad solution: given their education, skills, age and 
health status, living on welfare support is not an op-
tion but a forced choice for the majority of people.
Our results also provide indirect evidence for the 
hypothesis that the majority of unemployed people 
and disability pension or means tested beneﬁt recipi-
ents are not motivated by a prospect of ancillary black 
labour in claiming welfare support. If black labour in-
come had a substantially greater weight for this group 
compared to the unreported incomes of other social 
groups, and if it could counter-balance the negative 
eﬀects of unemployment (or quasi unemployment), 
there would be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between lev-
els of satisfaction. Our conclusions are further sup-
ported by the fact that lower satisfaction also applies 
to other adult members of these households.
11 The relatively small sample size and the scarcity of information 
on health status do not allow for more speciﬁc conclusions.
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2. THE LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF MATERNITY BENEFITS
Mónika Bálint & János Köllő
On returning from their regular yearly visit to Hungary in May 2007, the 
OECD delegation made a recommendation on the reform of the Hungarian 
maternity leave system and its implications for the labour market. The rec-
ommendation was expressly rejected by the Minister of Finance in the name 
of the Hungarian government. The ﬁrm reaction was unusual in the general 
context of Western practice and it was downright astonishing in the speciﬁc 
context of this issue considering the statistical data on which the recommen-
dations were based. As shown by the OECD Family Database,12 a) Hungary 
spends more than any other member country on beneﬁts supporting parents 
staying at home with young children, measured by the amount of beneﬁt 
per child as a proportion of GDP per capita. Hungary spends three times as 
much as the OECD average, almost twice as much as Austria and one and 
a half times as much as Sweden. b) A very low proportion of children under 
the age of 3 attend childcare institutions (similarly to children in Eastern and 
Southern Europe, Turkey and Mexico). The generosity of provisions is also 
reﬂected in low employment rates. c) While the employment rate of women 
is only slightly behind the OECD average,13 that of mothers is lower than in 
any other member country. d) The Hungarian rate of employment among 
mothers with children aged 0–2 years is the lowest in the OECD and the 
rate among mothers with children aged 3–5 years is the second lowest (after 
Slovakia). Hungary also has the largest gap between the employment rate of 
mothers with children of 0–2 years of age and that of mothers with (their 
youngest) child aged 6–16 years.14
It is unlikely that the ﬁrm rejection by the Minister was motivated by pro-
fessional convictions or that any expert on family policy would consider the 
current family support system to be an exceptionally eﬃcient and extremely 
promising solution to the problem of balancing the objectives of population 
policy, child welfare and employment policy which deserves a ﬁnancial in-
vestment two or three times greater than what is usual in the West. The fam-
ily support system is a legacy from the Kádár era and its major reforms after 
the regime change (1995, 1999–2000) were clearly motivated by ideological 
considerations, as convincingly argued by Ignits & Kapitány (2006) and Sza-
kolczai (2005). None of the interested parties – including those in favour of 
12 OECD Family Database 
2007, http://www.oecd.org./
dataoecd/46/13.
13 It is substantially higher than 
in Southern Europe but signiﬁ-
cantly lower than in Western 
Europe.
14 See Figures PF7.2, PF11.1., 
LMF2.1. and LMF2.2. in the 
OECD database for statements 
a) to d).
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regarding child beneﬁts as a social transfer, those who prefer to view it as a 
means to supporting reproduction and families, those who are engaged in the 
practice of pragmatic policy making (nor the authors of this chapter) – have 
a good idea or, indeed, even a rough idea of the eﬀects of this unique system 
has on population growth, child welfare or the labour market: whether fam-
ily beneﬁts paid in cash increase fertility, whether raising children in their 
3rd or 4th year of life at home has additional beneﬁts – beyond those oﬀered 
by nursery schools – with respect to their cognitive and emotional develop-
ment or what individual and social consequences may be expected from the 
mother’s prolonged absence from the labour force (which is a forced choice 
to some extent as the provision of day care in nursery schools has greatly de-
clined). These questions could not, and still cannot, be investigated – with a 
few exceptions – because no data have been available.
This chapter looks at the system from the perspective of the labour market; 
population and child welfare issues will only be discussed brieﬂy.
2.1. The eﬀects of family support schemes
A simple visual inspection of the time series data on fertility gives the im-
pression that the introduction of the universal ﬂat rate parental leave beneﬁt 
(Gyes, 1967) and later, the insurance-based beneﬁt (Gyed, 1984, 2000) acted 
as incentives to childbirth (Tárkányi 2006) or, at least, had an eﬀect on the 
timing of childbirths.15 Ignits & Kapitány (2006, p. 388) argue that “there 
is well-founded empirical evidence indicating that both general transfers and 
income support compensating for loss of income have a positive eﬀect on fer-
tility.” This claim would, however, be diﬃcult to defend in front of a researcher 
specialising in the cause and eﬀect analysis of time series data. A “visual in-
spection” cannot tell whether there is a cause and eﬀect relationship behind 
the correlation between measures of family policy and fertility or they are 
both explained by some common factor (e.g., good economic prospects have 
a positive eﬀect on birth rates and create resources for ambitious measures 
of population policy at the same time, while the threat of a recession leads to 
the postponement of childbearing and also to a tighter budget). Neither can 
a visual inspection tell whether the eﬀects of measures of population policy 
are statistically signiﬁcant or robust.
More reliable conclusions may be drawn from econometric analyses. The 
Granger cause analysis of macro-time series in Gábos (2003) and Gábos, Gál 
& Kézdi (2005) indicate a statistically signiﬁcant long-term positive eﬀect 
on birth rate: a one per cent increase in cash beneﬁts has led to an increase 
of 0.2–0.25 per cent in total fertility in Hungary over the past four decades. 
This result is important but not decisive since direct evidence could only be 
provided by an analysis of the eﬀects on completed fertility, which is await-
ing further research.16
15 Even demographers them-
selves are divided as to the 
question of whether family sup-
port had an enduring or only a 
transient eﬀect on fertility. The 
latter opinion later “... became 
independent of its professional 
roots, lost its support among 
demographers but continues to 
pop up in places today. Its cur-
rent supporters – most of whom 
are not demographers – often 
use this practical argument to 
implicitly call the legitimacy 
of the pronatalist population 
policy itself into question while 
avoiding open ideological con-
ﬂicts.” (Ignits & Kapitány, 2006, 
p. 388.) We shall here refrain 
from ideological criticism and 
present strictly methodological 
doubts only.
16 The indicator of total fer-
tility rate captures the num-
ber of births per reproductive 
woman in a given year, while 
the indicator of completed fer-
tility rate shows the number of 
children born to a woman up 
to the end of reproductive life. 
The Gábos–Gál–Kézdi model 
uses the immediate eﬀect on 
total fertility and the effects 
appearing with a one year lag 
to draw conclusions as to long 
term eﬀects.
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The magnitude of the eﬀect indicated by the model also suggests that the 
results should be treated with caution: it would follow from the estimated 
elasticity that the current birth rate of 1.3 children would not increase fur-
ther than 1.6 even if the cash beneﬁts were doubled in value.
Furthermore, there is – of course – no way of judging whether another 
beneﬁt of shorter duration or of a diﬀerent kind would have had the same 
impact on fertility. It is not the case that birth rates can solely be encouraged 
by schemes ﬁnancing a prolonged absence from the labour market. Sweden, 
for instance, successfully achieved a turn in demographic trends by imple-
menting a policy of precisely the opposite nature: it focuses on supporting 
working women in child raising by providing a carefully planned network 
of childcare facilities, introducing the requirement to share home childcare 
between the parents (a condition of claiming child beneﬁt), supporting indi-
viduals rather than families and emphasising the equality of the sexes (rather 
than the traditional roles of wives and mothers) in public communications 
(Hoem, 2005).17
The impact of mother and child support on child development has not been 
investigated by quantitative empirical research in Hungary. The international 
experiences are summarised in the literature review by Dóra Benedek in the 
next section of this volume. The studies discussed there as well as other re-
lated studies highlight the risks of returning to work too early. This problem 
concerns the United States ﬁrst of all, where around a third of mothers with 
young children return to work within three months of childbirth. This con-
trasts with the practice in developed European countries (Germany, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom), where barely ﬁve per cent of mothers enter employ-
ment after such a short period of maternity leave (Berger, Hill & Waldfogel, 
2005). Research results suggest, on the other hand, that the negative eﬀect of 
returning to work on the cognitive development and the emotional stability 
of children is substantially reduced if the parent enters ﬂexible or part-time 
employment after the child has reached one to one and a half years of age or 
even earlier. There are no quantitative studies, however, on how the well-being 
of children or mothers is inﬂuenced by the exceptionally long leave character-
istic of the Hungarian family support system (and in the absence of systems 
similar to the one in Hungary, there can be no such studies).18 In Hungary, 
only 14 per cent of mothers with children in their third year of life are in 
employment and this ratio still remains below 45 per cent among mothers 
with their youngest children in their fourth year of life (average ﬁgures for 
1993–2005 from the labour force survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce 
[CSO]). Although there is no consensus among professionals with respect to 
the “optimum” duration of staying at home with the child (Herczog, 2007), 
available data and expert opinions both suggest that the positive marginal 
eﬀect of the third and fourth years spent at home on the development of the 
17 These include symbolic 
gestures – those which are not 
motivated by ﬁnancial reasons 
but are meant to emphasise the 
equality of the sexes – such as 
the elimination of the institu-
tion of widow’s pension.
18 The full-time equivalent 
parental leave (the number of 
weeks multiplied by the re-
placement rate) is highest in 
Hungary among the OECD 
countries. See Figure PF7.1./C 
in the OECD database cited 
above. The Hungarian system 
of maternity leave is closest to 
the one in Romania.
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child is much smaller than that of the ﬁrst two years. The returns to profes-
sional institutional care are at the same time much higher in this period than 
in the child’s earlier years.19
The accurate assessment of labour supply eﬀects would require a survey 
recording the child’s date of birth; whether the mother was in employment 
prior to birth; if so, the date of leaving employment; the type of support re-
ceived by the mother or the father and the period of receipt; the date when 
the claimant returned to work; if the parent has not returned to work, the 
reasons for this decision and the current activities of the parent; whether the 
parent returned to the same job he or she left before birth; how much they 
earned before and after the leave; who took care of the child while the par-
ent was on maternity leave and thereafter, and so on. Decision makers and 
researchers in a mature democracy would probably ﬁnd it diﬃcult to believe 
– but it is true: not one survey of this kind has been made in the forty years 
of operation of the parental leave system annually serving a quarter of a 
million people. The Hungarian budget has conferred approximately a hun-
dred and twenty million monthly maternity leave transfers amounting to 
thousands of billions of Hungarian forints but has failed to allocate, say, ﬁf-
teen million forints for a survey allowing researchers to carry out an impact 
analysis. The cost would be roughly equivalent to the amount of maternity 
leave beneﬁt paid every hour.
The analysis presented below is based on the labour force survey data of 
the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). The survey was designed to assess 
labour market participation and its applicability to a study on maternity 
leave is therefore limited.20 It is diﬃcult to establish with reasonable accuracy 
whom each child belongs to in a given family and with which child a parent 
is staying at home. Answers to questions on the type of parental leave beneﬁt 
received (Gyes, Gyed or Gyet) are obviously imprecise. There is no informa-
tion on the starting date of beneﬁt receipt. The year and month of leaving the 
last employment before the survey is recorded rather than the date of leaving 
the last job before child birth. The sample is also too small for our purposes 
and there are several other problems. Nevertheless, we believe that, given our 
current complete collective ignorance, even the limited information supplied 
by the labour force survey may prove to be useful.
2.2. Parental leave beneﬁt as a labour market institution
The ﬂat rate beneﬁt (Gyes), the insurance based beneﬁt (Gyed) and the extended 
paid leave (Gyet) are not simply schemes to assist parents in child raising but 
constitute by far the most signiﬁcant form of support for inactive women under 
the age of 40. This is shown in Figure 2.1, which displays the distribution of 
the non-employed (unemployed or inactive) female population across various 
mutually exclusive social transfers as a function of age in 2003. It can be seen 
19 “... from approximately 18 
months of age, children need 
social interaction with peers as 
well as professional care from an 
adult teacher. The reason being, 
that learning and development 
processes require support and, 
occasionally, guidance, which 
need to be given by a trained 
teacher. This cannot be provided 
by parental care, love and at-
tention,” write Bass, Darvas & 
Szomor (2007) in their as yet 
unpublished study.
20 This statement does not apply 
to occasional complementary 
surveys targeting mothers with 
young children, which provide 
information on labour supply 
intentions and labour market 
expectations. The complemen-
tary surveys have given rise to 
a series of detailed analyses: 
Lakatos (1996), Frey (2001, 
2002). These, however, cannot 
replace research on maternity 
pay claims and actual labour 
market consequences.
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that maternity leave – and later disability pension – is a far more signiﬁcant 
form of support than unemployment beneﬁt or unemployment assistance.
Figure 2.1: Non-employed women aged between 15 and 62  
by transfer receipt and age
* Respondents in this category may have received other types of support not 
recorded in the LFS.
Note: Curves in the ﬁgure were smoothed by using a multinomial logit func-
tion with support type on the left hand side (six outcomes) and age and 
squared age on the right hand side.
Source: Based on CSO LFS of 2003 last quarter.
The well known disincentive eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt come into play 
in the case of paid maternity leave as well. The returns to caring for a child 
at home immediately after birth obviously exceed the beneﬁts expected from 
employment but the joy, contentment and ﬁnancial advantages associated 
with staying at home to raise a child gradually diminish with time. A gen-
erous system of maternity leave delays the point in time where the utility of 
remaining at home equals the utility of returning to work for a mother pre-
viously “habituated to employment.”
The optimum period of receiving maternity beneﬁt depends not only on the 
amount and duration of beneﬁt entitlement but also on factors inﬂuencing 
the returns to work: wages, the ﬁxed costs of employment and non-material 
beneﬁts of employment. The net beneﬁt to employment is also reduced by fac-
tors such as insecurity over the employer’s attitude towards any absences due 
to child sickness; worries about whether the mother risks her job by returning 
“too early”; doubts over the employer’s general attitude towards mothers with 
young children. Assistance may also be provided to mothers by reducing the 
costs of returning to work: in the form of nursery schools, home care, travel 
subsidies and income support. It is important to recognise that the types of 
support available both to parents staying at home and to working parents (such 
as family allowance, childcare assistance, child protection assistance and Gyes 
since 2006) enhance the value of staying at home: similarly to other non-la-
bour incomes, they reduce the optimum supply of hours of work.
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As far as we are aware, empirical studies on the labour market impact of ma-
ternity leave systems allowing prolonged paid absence – in accordance with 
expectations – uniformly ﬁnd a negative eﬀect in the sense that relatively 
longer and more generous maternity leave schemes result in longer absences 
from the labour market. In kind provisions – typically allaying the costs of 
employment – are expected to exert the opposite eﬀect and international com-
parative data corroborate this expectation: while cash beneﬁts reduce labour 
market participation, beneﬁts in kind increase it (Scharle, 2007).
Cash beneﬁts may also have positive eﬀects on the labour market which are 
diﬃcult to measure empirically. Similarly to other types of unemployment 
beneﬁt, it is justiﬁed to ask whether parental leave beneﬁts improve the qual-
ity of match between employer and employee: through allowing workers to 
devote more time and eﬀort to job search, beneﬁts have the eﬀect of crowding 
out less productive jobs (Mortensen–Pissarides, 1999; Acemoglu–Shimer, 
1999; Pissarides, 2000). As we shall see, however, in Hungary, mothers re-
turning to work after Gyes receive signiﬁcantly lower wages than other work-
ers with similar observable characteristics (and this still holds when endog-
enous selection is taken into account). We therefore believe that the negative 
eﬀects of the amortisation of human capital outweigh the positive eﬀects of 
a (potentially) longer job search period on productivity and wages.
The Hungarian system of maternity leave was ﬁrst introduced with the 
aim of giving mothers the option of a long period of economic inactivity. 
The frequent changes to the system primarily aﬀected coverage rather than 
the conditions of receipt. Gyed has always been tied to employment before 
childbirth but the entitlement regulations on Gyes and Gyet have been modi-
ﬁed on a number of occasions. The most important changes occurring with-
in the period under study are summarised in Table 2.1 (based on Table 2 in 
Ignits–Kapitány, 2006).
The Bokros austerity package tightened entitlement by abolishing Gyed 
and introducing means testing for Gyes on the one hand, and substantially 
extended entitlement by revoking the requirement of employment before 
childbirth. Over the period from 1996 to 1998, the government essentially 
treated maternity leave as a social assistance scheme. The Orbán adminis-
tration ﬁrst made entitlement to Gyes and Gyet universal (1999) and later 
re-introduced the insurance based Gyed (2000). These rules of entitlement 
have been left untouched by the current socialist-liberal coalition which came 
into power in 2002.
Recent government administrations have at the same time tried to ease 
the tension of the forced choice between employment and staying at home. 
Employment while claiming Gyed has always been ruled out but part-time 
employment has been permitted – since 1990 – for Gyes recipients after the 
child has reached the age of 18 months. The prohibition on full-time employ-
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ment has also been gradually relaxed: working full-time from home has been 
permitted since 1999 and in January, 2006 all restrictions on employment 
were lifted. The latter measure has eliminated Gyes in an economic sense, as 
the family allowance and Gyes are now only diﬀerentiated in a legal sense, 
and thus the reform has eﬀectively created a front-loaded family allowance, 
which provides more generous support up to child’s third birthday than in 
subsequent years. The only remaining schemes speciﬁcally targeted at ﬁnanc-
ing a temporary absence from the labour force are Gyed and the childbirth 
beneﬁt (which is not investigated here).
Table 2.1: Rules of entitlement to Gyes, Gyed and Gyet between 1992–2005
Year Gyed Gyes Gyet Regime*
1992 I I – 1
1993 I I I, T 1
1994 I I I, T 1
1995 I I I, T 1
1996 – T I, T 2
1997 – T I, T 2
1998 – T I, T 2
1999 – U U 3
2000 I U U 4
2001 I U U 4
2002 I U U 4
2003 I U U 4
2004 I U U 4
2005 I U U 4
I: insurance based (tied to employment before childbirth); T: means tested; U: uni-
versal; –: not applicable.
* The period under study is divided into four sub periods of substantially diﬀerent 
systems – indicated in the last column of the table – which we refer to as regimes.
As was mentioned before, unfortunately no appropriate data are, or have ever 
been, available allowing the individual assessment of the eﬀects of the above 
changes in regulations. The following sections therefore have far less than 
that to oﬀer. Using the crude data of the CSO labour force survey, we draw 
attention to the fact that as a result of changes in regulations, maternity leave 
claims have become ever greater in number and ever longer in duration over 
the period from 1993 up to the present. The number of claimants with low 
levels of education and no work experience has multiplied. The current system 
of maternity leave is only partially designed to support a temporary absence 
from the labour market. An increasingly smaller portion of claimants earn an 
income through work regardless of the changes in regulations to encourage 
labour supply. A prolonged – over four and a half years on average – absence 
from work is accompanied by a substantial loss in human capital for those 
having close ties to the labour market. The length of the actual period of ma-
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ternity leave is heavily inﬂuenced by the labour market prospects of women 
with young children and the costs of employment. This suggests that a reduc-
tion in the costs could have the eﬀect of shortening claim periods and thus 
decreasing losses generated by prolonged economic inactivity.
2.3. Childcare transfers in the labour force survey of the 
Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce
A great advantage of the labour force survey over administrative data is that it 
provides information on the whole population, not only claimants, and pro-
vides detailed information on respondents and their environments. The sam-
ple analysed here includes women aged 15 to 40 years who were observed in 
the CSO labour force survey from 1993 to 2005. Each individual is included 
in a maximum of six waves of the survey, i.e., an individual may be followed 
for 18 months at the most. The panel comprises 678,420 quarterly observa-
tions of a total of 102,737 individuals (see Table 2.2). For each respondent 
we have information on her age, level of education, marital status, place of 
residence, labour market status and whether she received Gyes, Gyed or Gyet 
in the given quarter of the year. The number and ages of children living in the 
household were established in an indirect way. The structure of the panel al-
lows us to establish whether the respondent quit the maternity leave system 
between quarter t and quarter t + 1 and whether she entered employment 
after quitting. We have investigated three questions: the take-up of mater-
nity beneﬁts, work activities in parallel with beneﬁt receipt and the return 
to work after maternity leave (Gyes).
Table 2.2: Quarterly observations of women aged 15–40 years  
in the CSO labour force survey
Year of observation
Receives Gyes, Gyed or Gyet
Total
No Yes
1993 38,636 6,065 44,701
1994 36,494 5,939 42,433
1995 39,979 7,066 47,045
1996 38,778 6,669 45,447
1997 37,275 6,551 43,826
1998 51,006 9,224 60,230
1999 50,762 8,833 59,595
2000 47,969 8,819 56,788
2001 47,222 8,782 56,004
2002 46,556 8,358 54,914
2003 50,500 9,481 59,981
2004 46,418 8,850 55,268
2005 44,088 8,100 52,188
Total 575,683 102,737 678,420
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Take-up
The proportion of women living with children under the age of four among 
the female population aged 15–40 years sharply decreased between 1993 and 
2005. This proportion is around 16 per cent among women with a second-
ary or higher education and around 19 per cent among women with lower 
levels of education; the corresponding ﬁgure is just over 17 per cent for the 
total population (Figure 2.2). The ratio of mothers receiving maternity ben-
eﬁt steadily increased within this group, from about 65 to 75 per cent. The 
increase was particularly steep after the introduction of the Bokros package 
and then again following the changes in regulations introduced by the Or-
bán administration at the turn of the millennium. The Bokros package re-
sulted in a large scale increase in the number of women with weak ties to the 
labour market and low incomes entering the system (the resulting expansion 
exceeded the decline caused by the abolishment of Gyed and the introduc-
tion of means testing for Gyes). The subsequent re-introduction of Gyed and 
the cancellation of means testing led to another spell of increase in the pro-
portion of claimants. While the use of the maternity leave system was most 
frequent among educated women before 1995, between 1995 and 2004 the 
proportion of claimants was highest among women with less than secondary 
education. The eﬀects of the tighter regulations of the Bokros package and 
the relaxed regulations of the Orbán reforms can be clearly recognised in the 
curve representing the educated section of the population.
Figure 2.2: Proportion of women with children aged 0–4 years to all women aged 15–40 years  
(panel A), and the proportion of those receiving Gyes, Gyed or Gyet within that group (panel B)
 (A) (B)
While there is only a small diﬀerence between women with various levels of 
education in the likelihood of using the system of maternity leave, there are 
substantial diﬀerences in the type of beneﬁt claimed. This phenomenon is 
illustrated in Table 2.3 showing the average ﬁgures for the current system 
beginning with 2000.
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Table 2.3: Distribution of maternity benefit recipients by benefit type, 2000–2005
Youngest child
under 12 months  
of age
between 12  
and 23 months
between 24  
and 35 months
Educational level*
high low high low high low
Gyed** 59.8 32.7 52.7 29.5 16.6 10.4
Gyes 38.3 63.3 45.6 66.5 80.7 84.5
Gyet 1.9 4.1 1.7 4.0 2.7 5.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives maternity benefit*** 80.4 81.2 92.1 88.8 82.6 84.2
* Highly educated: secondary or higher education.
** Gyed may be claimed up to the child’s second birthday. There may be two reasons 
explaining ﬁgures larger than zero for families with the youngest child in his or her 
third year of life. First, the person interviewed (who was not the target person in 
around half of the cases) may not have had the correct information on the type of 
support received. Second, if the parent received the transfer for the maximum pe-
riod of entitlement, it may be the case that although the child had reached his or her 
second birthday at the time of the interview, the last Gyed payment was transferred 
within the observation period.
*** Among mothers caring for children of the given age. The lower proportion of ma-
ternity leave in the ﬁrst year relative to the second year is presumably related to the 
relatively high number of mothers receiving childbirth beneﬁt (which is mutually 
exclusive with maternity leave beneﬁts).
Mothers with secondary education are approximately as likely to use mater-
nity leave as mothers with less than secondary education but while well over 
half of women in the former group receive Gyed, which is a large sum propor-
tional to their previous wages, less than a third of the uneducated group are 
in the same position. The diﬀerence only disappears after the Gyed period, 
when the child enters his or her third year of life. The likelihood of maternity 
leave use is still 83–84 per cent at this point.
Work while on maternity leave
Gyes and Gyet allow simultaneous part-time work and even full-time work 
(observing certain conditions from 1999 and without any restrictions in the 
case of Gyes since 2006). The CSO labour force survey, however, records not 
only legal, formal (reported) employment but also unreported labour, which 
constitutes around 15–20 per cent of total employment recorded in the labour 
force survey (Augusztinovics & Köllő, 2007, Köllő, 2007). The proportion 
of women in paid employment as deﬁned by the ILO and the OECD among 
the users of the maternity leave system has clearly decreased since 1993, from 
around 6 to 4 per cent. This is shown in Figure 2.3 displaying the proportion 
of mothers in paid employment while claiming maternity pay (those who re-
ceived support in the quarter of the observation and in the following quar-
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ter). The proportion of the employed decreased both among women with 
low levels of education and among women with high levels of education. The 
likelihood of employment was twice as high among women with secondary 
or higher education as it was among women with primary or vocational edu-
cation throughout the period.
Figure 2.3: Proportion of maternity benefit recipients  
in paid employment 1993–2005
Note: Excluding those who worked in parallel with maternity leave in quarter 
t but left the support system in quarter t + 1 while continuing to work. It may 
be the case in this situation that the formal Gyes period was over by the time 
the mother started work but payment was received later. This does not qualify 
as working in parallel with maternity leave but as employment following ma-
ternity leave.
The proportion of women with no work experience before childbirth steadily 
increased over the studied period, which is no doubt a major factor in the de-
clining trend of employment after childbirth. We are not in a position, how-
ever, to give detailed evidence of this process because the survey question ask-
ing whether the respondent previously worked refers to labour market status 
prior to the interview rather than prior to childbirth and only people who 
are inactive at the time of the interview are asked that question. Furthermore, 
data from before 1995 and data from after 2003 cannot be compared to data 
from the period in between. Figure 2.4 shows the development of the ratio of 
mothers with no work experience before childbirth as a function of the level 
of education within the period from 1995 to 2003.
The proportion of those with no previous job remained low at 5–7 per cent 
among women with secondary or higher education but it rose from 10 per 
cent to almost 30 per cent among women with less than secondary education; 
this accounts for the fact that the overall likelihood of inactivity approached 
20 per cent at the end of the period. It is no longer the case that the system 
of maternity leave is unequivocally a means of allowing women to temporar-
ily stay away from employment. It undoubtedly continues to have that eﬀect 
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among educated populations but its role in supporting young women with 
low levels of education who have never participated in the labour force has 
become increasingly stronger.21
Figure 2.4: Proportion of mothers who have never had a paid job, 1995–2003
Note: Inactive mothers in receipt of maternity pay at the time of the interview = 100.
The declining trend of work activities in parallel with maternity leave – which 
might seem surprising at ﬁrst sight given that restrictions on employment were 
gradually relaxed over the period – is probably explained by the growing pro-
portion of those with weak ties to the labour market. Factors that may have 
contributed to this process include the diminishing signiﬁcance of the sec-
ond economy in the traditional sense and of micro-businesses with low start-
up costs which could be based in a residential building (second-hand clothes 
shops, small garage shops selling wine by the litre, etc.).
It must be noted that over the entire period 60 per cent of respondents re-
ported “very irregular” hours of work or less than 40 hours of work per week, 
while the remaining 40 per cent reported full-time employment. This distri-
bution remained essentially constant throughout the period from 1993 to 
2005. In view of the regulations in eﬀect over the studied period, the 40 per 
cent likelihood of full-time employment seems to be unexpectedly high and 
the ﬁnding that the proportion of mothers in full-time employment did not 
increase following the changes in regulations in 1999 is also surprising. We 
do not have an explanation for this phenomenon.
Exit from the maternity leave system, return to work
The major indicators of the process of quitting the maternity leave system are 
summarised in Table 2.4. An average six weeks22 after quitting the beneﬁt, 
over half were in employment and the proportion of part-time workers was 
substantially lower after quitting the system than at the time of maternity 
leave. On average, ten per cent of those quitting were unemployed and slightly 
21 The average age of maternity 
pay claimants with no work ex-
perience before childbirth was 
24 years for the entire period in 
contrast with the overall average 
age of 28 years.
22 If the respondent received 
maternity pay in quarter t but 
not in quarter t + 1, it is reason-
able to assume that the period of 
maternity leave terminated half-
way between the two dates.
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over a third were inactive in the period between 1993 and 2005. The average 
length of the period between the respondent’s last employment and the date 
of quitting the maternity leave system was 4.7 years between 1997 and 2005. 
(No data are available for the period before 1997.) The absence from the la-
bour market was shortest among women entering full-time employment (3.7 
years) and longest among women becoming inactive (5.5 years). The period 
of absence was 5.3 years for mothers with two children, 7.5 years for mothers 
with three children and 10.8 years for mothers with four children. Only 12 
per cent of mothers quit the system before the child’s second birthday and 59 
per cent quit before the child’s third birthday.23
Table 2.4: Exit from the maternity leave system as a function  
of educational attainment
Total
Level of education
high low
1. Status after quitting, 1993–2005  (%)
Full-time employment 47.8 60.8 37.6
Part-time employment 5.5 7.1 4.3
Unemployment 10.1 7.8 12.0
Inactivity 36.6 24.3 46.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
2. The period between last employment and quitting, 1997–2005
Status after quitting*  
Full-time employment 3.7 (2.4) 3.3 (1.8) 4.2 (2.9)
Part-time employment 4.5 (3.9) 5.6 (4.7)** 3.4 (2.4)**
Unemployment 4.8 (3.2) 4.0 (2.1) 5.1 (3.5)
Inactivity 5.5 (4.7) 4.3 (3.0) 6.1 (4.2)
Total 4.7 (3.4) 3.8 (2.6) 5.3 (3.8)
3. Age of youngest child at the time of quitting, 1993–2005  (%)
Up to 11 months 4.3 4.6 4.1
12 to 23 months 8.2 10.1 6.6
24 to 35 months 46.9 49.4 44.8
36 to 47 months 33.0 30.6 35.2
4 years or older 7.6 5.4 9.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
4. The period between last employment and quitting, 1997–2005
Number of children aged 0–7 in household***
One 3.7 (2.7) 3.2 (1.9) 4.2 (3.0)
Two 5.3 (2.5) 4.6 (2.2) 5.9 (2.6)
Three 7.5 (3.8) 6.3 (0.8) 7.9 (4.3)
Four 10.8 (0.7) – 10.8 (0.7)
* Average number of years, s.d. in brackets.
** Fewer than ﬁfty observations.
Let us now turn to the duration of labour market absence in cases where the 
mother started work at the time of quitting the maternity leave system. Exit 
23 We put the date of quitting 
at a date after the child’s third 
birthday if the mother stayed 
in the system for the full period 
of entitlement, until the child’s 
third birthday, and started 
work sometime in the follow-
ing quarter. The period between 
two employment spells includes 
pregnancy leave and the period 
of childbirth beneﬁt as well as 
unemployment or inactivity 
prior to childbirth. The diﬀer-
ent types of absence cannot be 
distinguished.
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probabilities are estimated with the help of a binary choice model based on a 
pooled sample of data for the years 1993–2005, where exit probabilities are 
dependent on personal and environmental characteristics, the ages of children, 
time and the system of maternity leave in eﬀect at the time of the child’s birth 
(the latter information is shown in the last column of Table 2.1 above).
A few comments of a technical nature are in place before we discuss the re-
sults of our estimations (Table 2.5). A methodologically correct analysis of 
exit probabilities would require information on the duration of maternity leave 
and whether entitlement had expired at the time of quitting; labour market 
status should be recorded after a uniform, pre-speciﬁed period of time from 
the date of quitting; and a suﬃcient number of observations should be avail-
able to compute estimates for each year, beneﬁt regime and beneﬁt type. In 
the absence of necessary data, our model measures the period of time spent 
among the at-risk population by the age of the child. In the following esti-
mates, observations where the respondent became unemployed or inactive 
after quitting are treated as censored, i.e., of an unknown outcome. This is 
because the time period between quitting and the date of the interview was 
in several cases too short to be reasonably satisﬁed that the lack of employ-
ment should be viewed as permanent. The analysis was also performed ap-
plying multinomial logit and probit models (outcomes: respondent stayed on 
maternity leave, quit and found a job, quit and did not ﬁnd a job), yielding 
qualitatively the same results as in the binary model.
The estimation is based on a pooled sample for 1993–2005 because the num-
ber of observed exits is not large enough. Our attempt to separate the time 
trend from the eﬀect of the beneﬁt regime is based on the assumption that the 
reforms broke up a smooth trend reﬂecting labour market developments and 
pushed the appropriate sections of the function upward or downward.24
Finally, the very small values appearing in the column of marginal eﬀects 
may be deceptive: the mean value of the dependent variable of the model, the 
exit probability is 0.015 and the marginal eﬀects estimated by the model are 
to be interpreted relative to that very low value. A marginal eﬀect of 0.0075 
estimated for a binary variable, for instance, means that a change in the given 
variable (from 0 to 1) increases exit probabilities by half.
What do the results tell us about quitting the maternity leave system in 
general (ﬁrst and second columns) and about quitting the childcare support 
scheme of Gyes in particular (third and fourth columns)? The re-employment 
probabilities of the youngest and oldest age cohorts are lower than those of the 
intermediate age cohort among the population between 15 and 40 years of age. 
The exit probabilities of women with primary education, vocational training 
and secondary education are, respectively, 0.9, 0.6 and 0.4 per cent lower that 
those of women with higher education (2.8 per cent per quarter on average 
during the period). The probability of exit is highest when the youngest child 
24 Models assuming linear, 
quadratic and other kinds of 
time trends yielded similar pa-
rameters for the beneﬁt regimes. 
Table 2.5 shows the results of 
the model assuming a linear 
trend.
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is in his or her fourth year of life and declines steeply with the increase in the 
number of children aged 0–7 years living with the family. With the eﬀects of 
the children’s ages controlled for, exit probabilities are lower for Gyed than they 
are for Gyes. Estimates on the exit from the maternity leave system and speciﬁ-
cally on the exit from the ﬂat rate Gyes yield essentially the same results.
Table 2.5: Estimation of exit to employment probabilities (binary probit)
Gyes–Gyed–Gyet Gyes only Gyes-Gyed-Gyet
Marginal  
effects Z
*** Marginal  
effects Z
*** Mean s.d.
Age 0.00119 2.42 0.00189 2.56 28.13 5.026
Age squared –0.00001 –2.32 –0.00002 –2.39
Level of education
0–8 years of primary education –0.00894 –12.75 –0.01194 –11.31 0.3231
Lower secondary education –0.0055 –8.62 –0.00678 –7.09 0.2893
Upper secondary education –0.00355 –5.66 –0.00451 –4.79 0.2887
Number of children aged 0–7 years in household –0.00323 –7.36 –0.00421 –6.60 1.440
Age of youngest child
Up to 11 months –0.01108 –15.47 –0.01363 –11.89 0.2096
12 to 23 months –0.0098 –18.60 –0.01464 –15.89 0.3157
24 to 35 months 0.00849 10.78 0.01026 9.99 0.1010
36 to 47 months –0.003 –4.82 –0.00729 –6.19 0.1027
The house/flat is shared by more than one households 0.00284 2.85 0.00389 2.71 0.0736
Local labour market and facilities
Rate of registered unemployment* –0.02734 –5.16 –0.0402 –5.32 0.0870 0.0566
Good transport* 0.00365 2.89 0.00368 2.06 0.1287
Nursery schools/a thousand inhabitants 0.01010 2.92 0.01405 2.75 0.0393 0.0632
Permanent population –0.00001 –2.12 –0.00001 –1.54 150.8 462.1
Budapest 0.05085 1.93 0.04040 1.31 0.0733 0.2606
Type of support scheme
Gyes 0.00932 10.01   0.5831
Gyed 0.00816 5.88   0.3004
Linear time trend (years) 0.0005 3.14 0.00067 2.49 1999
System of maternity leave
1996–1998: gyed: –, gyes: T, gyet: I, T –0.00408 –4.80 –0.00557 –4.23 0.2475
1999: gyed: –, gyes: U, gyet: U –0.00459 –4.63 –0.00600 –3.88 0.0845
2000–2005: gyed: I, gyes: U, gyet: U –0.00478 –3.32 –0.00567 –2.50 0.3562
Observed exit probability 0.01518 0.02103
Estimated exit probability at sample mean 0.00696 0.00903
Number of observations 95,524 55,705
Number of quits 1450 1171
Pseudo-R2 0.1359 0.1367
At-risk population: received maternity beneﬁt in quarter t. Dependent variable: 1 = respondent quit mater-
nity leave and worked in quarter t + 1; 0 = respondent received maternity pay in quarter t + 1.
Censored = respondent quit maternity leave but did not work in quarter t + 1 or left the labour force survey.
I: insurance based (conditional on employment before childbirth), T: means tested, U: universal, –: not appli-
cable. Reference categories: higher education, child aged 3, gyet, ﬁrst regime (1993-95).
* Registered unemployed/working age population. ** There are at least four urban centres within 50 km that 
can be reached via public transport between 5.30 and 7.30 a.m. at a cost of 4000 HUF/month (at 1993 price 
levels), data for 1993, source: Köllő (1997). *** St errors are adjusted for the correlation between observations 
for the same individual.
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Exit probabilities would have increased with time if the changes in regula-
tions had not exerted their inﬂuence in the opposite direction. The average 
exit probability of those who entered the system at the time of the Bokros 
package were 0.4 per cent lower than the chances of those who entered earlier. 
The situation further deteriorated with the implementation of the reforms of 
the Orbán administration although this “deterioration” is probably a surface 
phenomenon: it is not the result of the system encouraging the same popula-
tion of women to remain on maternity leave for longer in 2005 than they did 
in 1993 but reﬂects the fact that the new rules of entitlement had the eﬀect of 
shifting the composition of claimants – towards populations with relatively 
weaker ties to the labour market.
The most important information from the point of view of social policy is 
carried by the factors indicative of the costs of returning to work and securing 
daytime childcare. The absence from the labour force is shorter if the place of 
residence is shared by more than one household; if the local unemployment 
rate is low; if local transport facilities are well-developed; and if there are 
one or more nursery schools in the local area. These relationships continue 
to hold when the eﬀects of settlement size are controlled for, which suggests 
that the length of maternity leave is reduced when the costs of job search and 
employment are lower.
2.4. Returning from maternity leave and loss of income
The loss of income resulting from time spent on maternity leave is estimated 
from data provided in the sample of April to June, 2001 of the labour force 
survey, which includes details of labour income. The sample is restricted to men 
and women under the age of 46 who had worked for a maximum of one year 
in their current job. What we are interested in is the size of the gap between 
the earnings of women who had been on maternity leave a year before obser-
vation and the earnings of other women and men in the ﬁrst year of employ-
ment. The sample size is small: the number of women who had received Gyes 
a year before is 2216, 1085 of whom had left the Gyes scheme by the time of 
the observation. The total number of new earners is 3204, 1467 of whom are 
women and 144 were returning to work from Gyes. The reliability of the data 
on wages is somewhat compromised by the circumstance that respondents 
could choose to give information on either net or gross wages. It is evident 
that high income groups were more likely to report gross wages than net wages 
and that the conversion between gross and net wage performed by the CSO 
is not entirely accurate. We introduce a dummy variable (gross wage reported 
= 1) to correct for this inaccuracy. Other than that, the usual variables used 
in wage equations (level of education, labour market experience, local labour 
market and ﬁrm characteristics) are included in the model.25
25 Functions applying to the 
population aged 15–40 years 
included only a linear term in 
labour market experience since 
this age group is at the rising sec-
tion of the age-wage curve. De-
pendent variable: the logarithm 
of monthly gross earnings.
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A comparison of estimates for all new entrants to young mothers shows 
the wage disadvantage of those re-employed after quitting maternity bene-
ﬁt to be around 8 to 10 per cent (compare parameters for non-gyes and gyes 
entrants in the ﬁrst and second column in Table 2.6.). Since we do not have 
any information on the duration of maternity leave,26 the estimate of wage 
disadvantage applies to a maternity leave of average length and to the time 
of returning to work. Since workers are not selected at random from the to-
tal population, estimates were also computed on a sample of non-student re-
spondents aged 15–46 years applying the Heckman model, which takes un-
observable eﬀects into account. The wage disadvantage of women returning 
from Gyes amounts to 10 per cent in this estimate.
Table 2.6: The gross wage disadvantage of women returning from Gyes in April–June 2001  
based on the CSO labour force survey – Regressions
Variable
Sample and method of estimation
new entrantsa new entrants with young childrenb
people aged 15–46 
not in education
OLS OLS Heckmanc
Education (years) 0.0634 (17.4) 0.0497 (8.94) 0.0722 (57.8)
Imputed labour market experience (years) 0.0252 (3.04) 0.0229 (1.12) 0.0063 (15.66)
Tenure in current job (years) – – 0.0064 (14.38)
Female who was not on maternity leave a year before –0.0786 (4.58) –0.1200 (4.48) –0.1435 (26.62)
Female who was on maternity leave a year before –0.1669 (4.44) –0.1963 (5.30) –0.2524 (11.22)
Female with children aged 0–7 years –0.0218 (1.15) – –
Male with children aged 0–7 years 0.0431 (2.13) – –
Highly varied working hours 0.6003 (6.98) 0.7592 (5.74) 0.5622 (24.82)
Weekly hours of work in main job (hours) 0.0153 (8.37) 0.0204 (8.23) 0.0133 (28.18)
Local unemployment rate (log) –0.1317 (11.52) –0.1343 (5.97) –0.0931 (21.49)
Budapest 0.0175 (0.49) –0.0268 (0.43) –
Trade union present at work place 0.0502 (2.59) 0.0444 (1.24) 0.0646 (11.29)
Employed by small business (L < 50) –0.0482 (2.50) –0.0621 (1.55) –0.0832 (11.25)
Gross wage reported 0.1358 (10.24) 0.1466 (5.86) 0.1517 (31.36)
Dummy variables of branch (10 items) yes yes yes
Number of respondents 3115 797 32,072
Number of working respondents 3115 797 14,697
R2 0.3450 0.4088 ..
ρ (Standard Error)   0.693 (0.018)
σ (Standard Error)   0.343 (0.004)
Dependent variable: logarithm of gross monthly wage.
a Respondent entered employment in the current or the previous year.
b Respondent entered in the current or the previous year and has children aged 0–7 years in the household.
c The variables of the selection equation: male with young child, female with young child, spouse in employ-
ment, four dummy variables of marital status, dummy variable of vocational education, squared imputed 
labour market experience, 20 dummy variables for the counties.
This 8–10 per cent disadvantage in wages (after an average absence of 3.7 
years) almost exactly equals the estimated returns to the same amount of 
26 There is information only of 
the length of the current employ-
ment spells and not of previous 
spells.
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work experience: 9.3 and 8.5 per cent based on the coeﬃcients of imputed 
labour market experience. This loss of income corresponds to the returns to 
1.5 years of education; it is twice as much as the amount of income gained 
from the presence of a trade union and also twice as much as the wage disad-
vantage of workers employed by small businesses. Approximately one hour 
of extra work per day would be needed to compensate for the loss of income 
(see the parameter of hours of work). These results suggest that the wage dis-
advantage must be regarded as substantial.
2.5. Conclusions
The system of maternity leave is only partly designed to support a tempo-
rary absence from the labour market. Disregarding the intermezzo of the 
Bokros package, the system has remained what it was before 1990 for edu-
cated women with labour market experience: the most generous cash support 
system (ﬁnancing absence from work) in the developed world. The majority 
of women with secondary and higher education receive a generous beneﬁt 
proportional to previous earnings for two years and over 80 per cent of these 
women remain on maternity leave with the Gyes scheme for an additional 
year. The system also fulﬁls functions of welfare and unemployment support 
among those with weak ties to the labour market and/or with poor labour 
market prospects.
Taking the conclusions of previous studies and the results of our analyses 
into account, we are in agreement with the criticisms voiced by the OECD 
and other international organisations.27 The system of maternity leave has de-
veloped in an ad hoc manner through a series of modiﬁcations motivated by 
political and ideological considerations, without any factual discussion of its 
objectives, costs, beneﬁts, or overall coherence. The current system provides an 
incentive for working women to leave the labour market for a (from the point 
of view of child welfare unnecessarily) prolonged period of time, while it fails 
to oﬀer appropriate assistance to women with poor labour market prospects 
in returning to work or entering the labour force for the ﬁrst time.
So far as the ﬁrst group is concerned, the results reinforce the hypothesis 
that the length of maternity leave could be shortened and the loss of human 
capital resulting from labour market absence could be mitigated by reducing 
the costs of entering employment, expanding daycare facilities for children and 
implementing schemes targeted at improving labour market prospects. The 
situation of those with good labour market prospects (and taxpayers) could be 
improved by a system which ﬁnances absence for a somewhat shorter period 
of time and oﬀers assistance in entering employment (daycare voucher, travel 
allowance, retraining schemes) in the third year of the child’s life, possibly 
in combination with subsidies supporting ﬂexible working hours for parents 
returning from maternity leave – from the resources saved by the withdraw-
27 The views of the World Bank 
(2007) are in accord with the 
OECD (2007): “Hungary has 
the most complex system, with a 
plethora of fragmented beneﬁts 
and programs, many of which 
have no connection with each 
other.”
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al of cash beneﬁts. An allowance system – available both to mothers and fa-
thers – compensating employers for lost working days due to child sickness is 
also worth considering in place of a general wage subsidy. The reallocation of 
resources to schemes facilitating employment would oﬀer a choice for women 
who are now compelled to stay at home for several years because of the lack 
of childcare facilities even though they do not wish to give up their careers. 
An eﬃcient solution would be one where the capacity of daycare institutions 
for 2 to 4 year old children (nursery schools, family-run daycare, kindergar-
tens) is substantially expanded and the quality of childcare is improved on 
the one hand and the availability of employment allowing ﬂexible working 
hours is increased on the other.
The lack of facilities is not the only feature of the current system that en-
courages or even forces a prolonged maternity leave. The system gives rise to 
practices further hindering mothers’ return to the labour market. The Hun-
garian system of maternity leave is, in principle, job-protected but the regula-
tions are diﬃcult to enforce given the actual duration of the leave: after nearly 
5 years the workplace may have closed down or been restructured, or the job 
requirements may have changed substantially. Older children of mothers on 
maternity leave with a younger child are often refused nursery or occasion-
ally even pre-school places on the grounds that the “mother is on maternity 
leave, anyway”.
So far as the other group of claimants is concerned, we have seen that the 
proportion of women on maternity leave with no previous employment has 
doubled, while the corresponding proportion among women with low levels 
of education has tripled. For them, and for those living in isolated villages 
with high unemployment rates, maternity leave is not a system of support for 
staying at home temporarily but a form of unemployment or welfare beneﬁt 
– increasingly so as the children grow older. We believe that their options 
are far from ideal. A cash beneﬁt which is not tied to any sort of eﬀort to 
ﬁnd employment – and which cannot oﬀer services enhancing labour mar-
ket prospects since claimants are not registered as unemployed28 – consti-
tutes yet another item in the line of institutions encouraging absence from 
the labour market.
28 Only 2 to 3 per cent of women 
on maternity leave are regis-
tered with local job centres as 
unemployed although, as we 
have seen, over 10 per cent are 
unemployed and almost 40 per 
cent are inactive when they leave 
the system (and it may be as-
sumed that an unknown but not 
negligible proportion remain 
jobless in the long term).
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THE EFFECTS OF MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AFTER CHILDBIRTH ON THE CHILD’S DEVELOPMENT
Dóra Benedek
A substantial proportion of developed countries 
maintain some sort of welfare system for parents 
after childbirth, but there is no consensus as to the 
optimum period of parental leave. According to 
one view, centrally regulated parental leave curbs 
employers’ freedom of decision and consequently 
impairs women’s employment prospects. Others 
argue, however, that an early return to work is det-
rimental to the child’s development.
Studies investigating the reasons behind low ac-
tivity rates among women – such as Chapter 2 of 
this volume – usually come to the conclusion that 
mothers’ employment chances deteriorate in pro-
portion to the length of staying at home. The moth-
er’s employment, however, aﬀects her child, since 
institutional childcare facilities (nursery schools or 
kindergartens) and parental care at home are likely 
to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the child’s cognitive and 
emotional development and thus on his or her sub-
sequent achievements. These considerations have 
led international organisations to encourage the ex-
pansion of maternity and child care provisions. The 
OECD, for instance, emphasises that individual 
care is the most beneﬁcial form of childcare in the 
ﬁrst year of life, and the countries of the European 
Union are required to oﬀer statutory parental leave 
of at least three months (OECD, 2006).
The only way of reconciling the two opposing 
views is to conduct a detailed analysis of both the 
labour market eﬀects and the eﬀects on children’s 
development. The timing of the mother’s return to 
work, the ﬂexibility and length of working hours 
and the choice of daycare (parent, other relative, 
trained nurse or institution) could all have an im-
pact on the child’s development – and may either 
decrease or increase the beneﬁts of labour supply.
This section gives an overview of empirical results 
shedding light on the eﬀects of the mother return-
ing to work after childbirth and those of daycare 
options for children between 0 to 3 years of age on 
the child’s development.
In one of the earliest analyses of the relationship 
between type of daycare and child development, 
Ruhm (1998) ﬁnds that infant and child mortality 
is lowest in countries where longer parental leave is 
granted. Ruhm analysed aggregate data from nine 
OECD countries over the period between 1969 and 
1994 to investigate the relationship between length 
of statutory parental leave and child health. Child 
health was measured by birth weight and mortality 
indicators, and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method 
was used to estimate the eﬀects of the length of pa-
rental leave controlling for country speciﬁc eﬀects. 
The main conclusion of the study is that extending 
the period of parental leave signiﬁcantly reduces the 
probability of death: an additional 10 weeks of leave 
reduces infant and child mortality by 1.6–2.6 per 
cent under various model speciﬁcations. A possible 
reason suggested by Ruhm is that mothers staying 
at home are more likely to breastfeed their children. 
The author estimates the costs and concludes that 
parental leave is a highly cost-eﬀective means of im-
proving child health. Tanaka (2005) uses a similar 
method of analysis and ﬁnds that only paid paren-
tal leave has these positive consequences, as unpaid 
leave is probably left unused by parents.
Aggregate data, however, are not suitable for the 
analysis of individual level relationships, such as the 
eﬀects of the time spent at home by the mother on 
the cognitive development and future achievements 
of the child. The ﬁrst studies based on individual 
data – typically from the United States – found 
negative eﬀects, i.e., the mother’s early return to 
work had a negative impact on the cognitive and 
social/behavioural development of the child, es-
pecially if the mother worked full-time in the ﬁrst 
year (Gregg & Waldfogel, 2005). These analyses, 
however, did not take the exact timing of the return 
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to work into consideration. The main reason for 
this is that the social welfare system of the United 
States grants 12 weeks of paid parental leave and 
research on the eﬀects of maternal employment has 
focused on entry to employment after exhausting 
beneﬁt entitlement.
Waldfogel et al (2002) looked at data from the 
US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to fol-
low the cognitive development of children of diﬀer-
ent social groups up to the age of 7 or 8 as indicated 
by ﬁve diﬀerent measures. The authors ﬁnd that 
white children whose mothers entered employment 
before their ﬁrst birthday had signiﬁcantly poorer 
developmental outcomes by the end of this relative-
ly long period, but the eﬀect was not signiﬁcant for 
African American or Hispanic children. A further 
ﬁnding of the study is that the negative eﬀect was 
much smaller for mothers who worked part-time 
(up to 20 hours a week) in the ﬁrst year compared 
to mothers in full-time employment.
Looking at long-term eﬀects, Ruhm (2004) ﬁnds 
that the mother’s early return to work has no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on secondary school achievements, 
which means that there is a possibility that the 
negative eﬀects shown by other studies are tran-
sient. Ruhm also points out that although labour 
supply in the ﬁrst year has an adverse eﬀect on the 
development of the child, this is counter-balanced 
by employment in the second and third years. Also, 
while early employment may be detrimental, fami-
lies where the mother does not work at all become 
disadvantaged in the long term.
The welfare system of the United Kingdom is 
somewhat closer to the Hungarian programme, 
as it is considerably more generous than the US 
system: mothers are entitled to six months of paid 
and a further six months of unpaid leave after child-
birth. As a result, only 8 per cent of new mothers 
return to work within three months of childbirth 
in the UK, while the corresponding ﬁgure is 40 
per cent for the US (Gregg et al, 2005). Gregg et 
al used a highly detailed database of children born 
in Avon in the 1990s (Avon Longitudinal Study 
of Parents and Children) to investigate wheth-
er previous ﬁndings would be replicated given a 
more generous welfare programme and broader 
availability of part-time work. The children’s de-
velopment was assessed at the age of 4–5 years and 
6–7 years with respect to reading, writing, maths 
and language skills, and at the age of 7 years with 
respect to reading, spelling and word formation 
skills. Mothers were classiﬁed according to when 
they entered employment within three years of 
childbirth and whether they had part-time (less 
than 30 hours a week) or full-time employment 21 
months after childbirth. If someone other than the 
mother looked after the child, types of daycare pro-
vision were classiﬁed as follows: 1 unpaid informal 
care (partner, grandparent, other relative, friend or 
neighbour), 2 paid individual care arrangements 
(for instance trained nanny, nurse, etc.), and 3 paid 
group care (nursery school, for instance). The ef-
fects of observed personal and household factors 
were controlled for in the model estimations.
The main conclusion of the study is that the 
mother’s full-time employment before the child 
reached 18 months of age has an adverse eﬀect on 
the child’s development and the eﬀect is usually 
signiﬁcant but not large.29 Part-time employment 
within 18 months and full-time employment after 
18 months has no negative impact on the child’s 
development. The observed negative eﬀect varies 
across social groups. It is negligible for mothers 
with the lowest educational attainment, since – as 
the authors suggest –the diﬀerence in the quality 
of maternal care as opposed to other care arrange-
ments is smallest, and the mother’s earnings are 
relatively more important in this case. At the other 
end of the scale, the gap in child development out-
comes attributed to maternal employment is largest 
29 Using a similar method of analysis on data from Canada, Ram 
et al (2004) ﬁnd that although early employment has a negative 
eﬀect on the child’s development, this only holds for verbal 
indicators and does not appear in maths skills.
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for mothers with the highest educational attain-
ment. A further important result of the analysis is 
that the negative eﬀect only appears if mainly un-
paid, untrained, informal childcare provision (e.g., 
grandparents or friends) was used as a substitute for 
the mother’s care. Where the child received trained 
care, the mother’s labour supply had no adverse ef-
fects on his or her development.
Neidell (2000) looked into patterns in non-cog-
nitive development (e.g., deviant behaviour, self-
conﬁdence, motivation). With individual diﬀer-
ences controlled for, the author ﬁnds that time 
spent with the mother in the ﬁrst year of the child’s 
life has a positive eﬀect on the child’s develop-
ment, while time spent together after the second 
year of life has no notable eﬀects.30 Interestingly, 
the mother staying at home over the second year 
of the child’s life tends to have a negative eﬀect 
on the child’s non-cognitive abilities. Neidell pro-
poses the explanation that establishing social rela-
tionships becomes an increasingly important part 
of the child’s life after his/her ﬁrst birthday and 
spending time with peers rather than parents may 
facilitate this process. In his analysis of the Behav-
ior Problems Index, Ruhm (2005) ﬁnds no long-
term negative relationship between the mother’s 
early return to work and the child’s non-cognitive 
development.
The common conclusion emerging from the vari-
ous studies is that the mother’s labour supply only 
presents a risk under certain circumstances and 
these circumstances can be precluded with the help 
of carefully planned regulations. It is beneﬁcial for 
the child if the parent does not work or works part-
time up to the ﬁrst birthday of the child, but in ad-
dition to longer statutory parental leave, the devel-
opmental disadvantage of children can be reduced 
by providing ﬂexible working conditions and part-
time employment opportunities and by ensuring 
that trained childcare is accessible to parents.
30 This refers to time spent together during the day on weekdays 
and not to extreme cases where the mother does not spend time 
with the child at all.
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3. LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
Réka Firle, Ágota Scharle & Péter András Szabó
Unemployment assistance is the only major transfer available to unemployed 
people who are no longer entitled to insured unemployment beneﬁt. It is 
paid to over 150 thousand people on average, which makes it the laregest 
cash transfer subject to means testing in Hungary. In this chapter we ﬁrst 
present an overview of the results of Hungarian and international empirical 
studies on the labour supply eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt programmes, 
and following this we investigate whether there is empirical evidence for the 
theoretical prediction that unemployment assistance has a negative impact 
on labour supply.31
3.1. Development of the unemployment assistance programme 
from 2000 to 2006
Regulations on the provisions for the unemployed were tightened repeatedly 
and substantially during the 1990s. As part of these measures, the means test-
ed unemployment assistance was phased out starting in May 2000 and was 
replaced by a less generous means tested scheme called “regular social assist-
ance”. The new scheme was assigned a dual function: ﬁrst, it has become the 
last resort for those not eligible for any other kind of support and secondly it 
provides welfare support and rehabilitation services for the long-term unem-
ployed. The entitlement conditions of the programme are formulated to in-
clude both target groups but the eligibility conditions unequivocally specify 
proof of availability for work and active job search.
Entitlement conditions and the cash value of the benefit
Act III of 1993 on social administration and welfare declares that as of May 
2000 those persons are entitled to social assistance who have poor health or 
who are unemployed, and have no other means of subsistence. The regula-
tions in eﬀect until April 2006 stated that the beneﬁt could be granted if 
the claimant’s monthly income did not exceed 70 per cent of the minimum 
pension rate, the family’s monthly income per person did not exceed 80 per 
cent of the minimum pension rate and neither the claimant nor his or her 
family had any savings. The amount of the social assistance is based on a top-
31 Firle & Szabó (2007) gives the 
details of our calculations and 
extends the analysis to the tar-
geting policy of the unemploy-
ment assistance programme.
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up rule that brings the claimant’s personal income up to 70 per cent of the 
minimum old-age pension rate.
The regulations were amended with eﬀect from April 1st 2006. The twofold 
condition on (family and personal) income was replaced by a system where en-
titlement and the amount of beneﬁt were determined on the basis of monthly 
equivalent income32 in the family. An unemployed worker is eligible for social 
assistance if the family’s equivalent income is below 90 per cent of the mini-
mum pension rate. The amount of beneﬁt tops up equivalent income to 90 
per cent of the minimum pension rate. Entitlement and the amount of social 
assistance are determined by local governments and it is in their discretion to 
grant a sum higher than the minimum rate speciﬁed by the regulations.
Entitlement conditions
Similarly to other support programmes for the unemployed, the claimant 
must present proof of active labour market status to qualify for social assis-
tance. Eligibility is granted if the claimant co-operates with the local job cen-
tre for 1 year preceding the claim and for the entire duration of the claim. 
An amendment in 2005 relaxed the previous conditions by adding a provison 
that proof of only three months rather than 1 year of co-operation must be 
provided by those who claim social assistance following a period of receiving 
nursing allowance, maternity beneﬁt, income support for the mildly disabled 
or other social support.
The rules of co-operation are speciﬁed by the local government and it is 
usually the responsibility of the local job centre to enforce compliance with 
the rules. Co-operation is initiated by registering the claimant with the local 
labour oﬃce where a programme of integration is worked out which is to be 
agreed by both parties. The programme speciﬁes frequency of contact with 
the job centre (usually a visit every 4–12 weeks) and the rules of accepting 
any suitable job oﬀer or participation in education or training schemes. Fail-
ure to keep appointments and the rejection of job or training opportunities 
may be penalised – for instance by the reduction of the beneﬁt or its tempo-
rary suspension – but the enforcement of sanctions varies greatly between 
individual centres.33
One of the objectives of the social assistance programme is to encourage 
return to work. In addition to uninterrupted co-operation with the labour 
oﬃce, the programme of rehabilitation therefore involves participation in a 
30 day community work scheme organized by the local government. This re-
quirement, on the one hand, ﬁlters out claimants who are only unemployed 
on paper and those who are not willing or able to work or are engaged in black 
labour while in receipt of the beneﬁt. On the other hand, it helps claimants 
to readjust to a lifestyle of regular work and moderates loss of working capac-
ity (which is usually a corollary of long-term inactivity).
32 The equivalence scale assigns 
a unit weight to the head of the 
household and smaller weights 
to other members of the fam-
ily, accounting for the fact that 
household expenses (e.g., utility 
bills) do not increase in exact 
proportion with family size. 
The Hungarian system assigns 
a weight of 0.9 to a spouse or co-
habiting adult; 0.8 to each of the 
ﬁrst and second children; and 
0.7 to any other children.
33 For a detailed discussion of 
the administration of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, see Koltayné 
(2002).
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Community labour is organised by the local government or the job centre 
and in most cases it is their responsibility to decide who should participate. 
A central government subsidy of 70 to 100 per cent may be claimed to fund 
charity or community work programmes and any remaining costs are ﬁnanced 
from local government sources. In most settlements, community workers are 
assigned to unskilled jobs, such as the maintenance of public places (parks, 
ditches or bus stops). Other, less frequent assignments may include tasks in 
social or health services (these are approved by the regulations as of 2003).
The number of people on benefit
Changes in the number of people on social assistance (Table 3.1) clearly reﬂect 
the amendment of regulations in May 2000. This is when the old unemploy-
ment compensation scheme was abolished and social assistance remained the 
only option for those who had used up their entitlement of unemployment 
beneﬁt. The number of recipients rose especially sharply in 2001 – although 
it also showed a major increase in 2000 – as the entitlement period of the old 
unemployment assistance scheme had expired for the last claimants.
Table 3.1: Number of people receiving social assistance between 1999 and 2005
Year
Number of 
claims
Average 
number of 
recipients
total expense 
in proportion 
to total welfare 
expenditure
Average monthly value  
per person
Nominal value 
(HUF)
Real value* 
(1999 = 100)
1999 22,305 34,480 0.14 10,588 100.0
2000 66,426 47,154 0.18 11,056 95.1
2001 126,213 94,779 0.37 13,019 102.5
2002 130,181 125,894 0.46 14,650 109.6
2003 121,324 138,127 0.46 15,010 107.2
2004 127,172 144,853 0.47 15,864 106.1
2005 130,995 158,565 0.47 16,991 109.7
* Based on the average annual consumer price index.
Note: The data include people claiming beneﬁt on grounds of poor health in addition 
to unemployed claimants. The former group constitutes around 5 to 7 per cent of 
the population on beneﬁt.
Source: CSO Yearbooks of Welfare Statistics, 2001–2005.
3.2. Labour supply eﬀects of the social assistance programme
The eﬀects of the social assistance programme on labour supply show a similar 
pattern to the trap situation presented in Chapter 1 (Part a) in Figure 1.5). 
Since its value is lower than that of unemployment beneﬁt, the disincentive 
eﬀect is smaller, but the reduction in labour supply may apply not only to the 
claimant but also to other adult members of the household due to the income 
threshold. The latter eﬀect is similar to that observed in the case of income-
tested transfers (which do not exclude employment) but without the trap: as 
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the hours of labour supply increase, the worker’s income remains higher than 
his/her wages for a while although the diﬀerence between wage and income 
gradually decreases (unlike in Part b) of Figure 1.5, the transfer does not cease 
abruptly). People receiving social assistance are required to co-operate with 
the job centre and may be expected to participate in community work: these 
requirements may encourage labour supply.
The results of international (mostly American) empirical studies tend to 
suggest that welfare programmes similar to the Hungarian social assistance 
scheme have a negative or a neutral eﬀect on labour supply. Multivariate esti-
mates relying on individual level data in the United States also ﬁnd a slightly 
negative eﬀect in their analysis of in-kind beneﬁts tied to an income thresh-
old (food stamps and health services). Moﬃtt (2003), reviewing American 
results, concludes that if no means-tested welfare programmes were available, 
the number of labour hours supplied by welfare participants would increase 
by 10 to 50 per cent.
The negative eﬀects of welfare beneﬁts on labour supply are conﬁrmed by 
analyses of the labour market eﬀects of the American welfare reform of 1996. 
As part of the reform, they set strict job search requirements as a condition of 
unemployment beneﬁt receipt, set a limit to beneﬁt duration at a maximum 
of ﬁve years and introduced in-work beneﬁts to strengthen ﬁnancial incen-
tives. The reform – beyond the overall improvement in the economy observed 
in the late 1990s – increased the labour supply of people previously relying 
on beneﬁts by 32 to 50 per cent and their rate of employment by 28 to 35 per 
cent (Bloom & Michalopoulus, 2001; Ellwood, 2000).
There are few studies of the work disincentive eﬀects of means tested un-
employment beneﬁt programmes in Eastern and Central Europe and most 
of these are comparisons with the eﬀects of insurance-based beneﬁts. Terrel 
& Sorm (1998) and Micklewright & Nagy (1998) analysed Czech and Hun-
garian data respectively to investigate changes in the likelihood of re-employ-
ment or in the duration of unemployment following an individual’s transfer 
from insured unemployment beneﬁt to social assistance. Their results indicate 
that the likelihood of re-employment increases as the expiry date of the un-
employment beneﬁt approaches, which more likely reﬂects the disincentive 
eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt (possibly relative to the eﬀects of social assis-
tance) rather than that of the assistance programme. The absolute eﬀects of a 
social assistance programme speciﬁcally targeting unemployed people are dis-
cussed by Terrel, Erbenova & Sorm (1998). The authors analysed data from 
the Czech labour force survey and found a signiﬁcant negative labour supply 
eﬀect but only among families with more than one child, who were entitled 
to a substantially higher social beneﬁt than other families.
In one of the ﬁrst empirical studies in the Hungarian literature,34 Mickle-
wright & Nagy (1998) estimated a duration model based on a longitudinal 
34 The relevant Hungarian lit-
erature is reviewed by Bódis et 
al (2005).
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survey.35 The results show no signiﬁcant eﬀect of social assistance on labour 
market participation; that is, no disincentive eﬀect could be observed. The 
authors conclude that “cutting beneﬁt rates would not signiﬁcantly boost the 
labour supply of unemployed workers”. (p. 423.)
Köllő (2001) investigated changes in the labour market chances of unem-
ployed people receiving unemployment beneﬁt between 1994 and 2000. The 
results show that the likelihood of employment was higher in 2001 than it had 
been seven years earlier, although the observed improvement was much more 
modest than suggested by the oﬃcial statistics. Also, the relative employment 
chances of participants living in disadvantaged regions substantially deterio-
rated over the period, especially with respect to people with upper secondary 
or higher education. The size of the diﬀerence between unemployment com-
pensation and previous income did not have an eﬀect on the probability of 
entering employment, which calls into question the appropriateness of tar-
geting policies solely on labour supply (by reducing beneﬁt rates and raising 
the minimum wage).
Galasi & Nagy (2003) looked into the eﬀects of the restructuring of wel-
fare programmes available to unemployed people who were not eligible for 
unemployment beneﬁt that took place in 2000. The study sought to ﬁnd out 
to what extent the transfer from the old unemployment assistance to the new 
social assistance programme altered take-up and re-employment probabili-
ties. The authors conducted a follow-up survey on two groups: those who ex-
hausted their entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt in April 2000 and those 
whose entitlement ended in May 2000. The group that lost entitlement to un-
employment beneﬁt in April 2000 entered the old unemployment assistance 
scheme, while a month later, the other group “only” had access to social as-
sistance. The results show that fewer people applied for social assistance and 
fewer claims were granted than under the previous unemployment compen-
sation programme. Also, while lower beneﬁt rates and loss of entitlement ac-
celerated re-employment rates, the welfare of those who could not ﬁnd em-
ployment was reduced.
Fazekas (2002) investigated the welfare administration at local govern-
ments following the abolition of the unemployment assistance programme 
and found a higher take-up in regions with higher unemployment rates and a 
lower take-up in regions where the community work requirement (the avail-
ability for work test) was enforced with greater rigour.
The incentive eﬀects of the eligibility conditions on unemployment bene-
ﬁt were measured by Bódis, Micklewright & Nagy (2004) in an experiment 
carried out at the job centres of six counties. The study randomly assigned 
unemployed people on beneﬁt to either of two groups: the members of the 
test group were subjected to more rigorous supervision by the labour oﬃce 
than the members of the control group. Although the results show a higher 
35 The sample included un-
employed people entering the 
support scheme in April or May 
1994 who had 11 to 12 months 
of entitlement. Respondents 
were monitored until they 
started work or for a period of 
3 to 4months after the expiry of 
their entitlement.
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likelihood of employment among the test group, the diﬀerence only reaches 
statistical signiﬁcance among women aged 30 or older. The likelihood of re-
employment among older women is sensitive to marital status and the local 
unemployment rate: married women are 60 per cent more likely to ﬁnd em-
ployment, and the employment advantage of the test group over the control 
group substantially decreases with the unemployment rate (and almost com-
pletely disappears at an unemployment rate of 8 per cent).
Strikingly little information is available on the eﬃciency of public works 
schemes and other experimental programmes intended to encourage labour 
supply funded by the National Labour Foundation (OFA) and other sourc-
es. Galasi, Lázár & Nagy (2003) ﬁnd that participants of public works 
schemes are less likely to ﬁnd employment than the participants of other ac-
tive labour market programmes (start-up allowance for entrepreneurs, wage 
subsidy or training) but this result is in part explained by the composition of 
the group (lower education levels and higher participation in income support 
programmes among the former group). Most studies publish raw employ-
ment rates only, on the basis of which the eﬀects of the programme cannot 
be separated from group composition or environmental factors.36 A survey 
by the Hungarian State Audit Oﬃce (ÁSZ) conducted in 2001 at 95 local 
governments and job centres concluded that no reliable data were available 
on the eﬃciency of public works schemes, while sporadic reports indicate a 
very low (1.3 per cent) re-employment rate (ÁSZ, 2002). Teréz Laky’s analy-
sis also points to the conclusion that while community work was introduced 
as a temporary resort, it has become the only job opportunity for the unedu-
cated long-term unemployed (Laky, 2005).
3.3. The labour supply eﬀects of social assistance and public 
works programmes
In addition to the amount of beneﬁt received and the requirement of job 
search, the labour supply of welfare participants is determined by several other 
factors, such as the range of available job oﬀers, the ﬁxed costs of employment 
and various personal circumstances (self-conﬁdence, health, family commit-
ments, etc.) that aﬀect participation and expected earnings. The impact of 
a welfare programme can only be measured accurately if the eﬀects of other 
factors are controlled for, which requires individual level data. The individual 
level analysis of regular population surveys (of the CSO) or administrative 
databases has some limitations as well, as these only collect easily measurable 
data on personal circumstances (such as age and education) and usually record 
the events of only one period or a few consecutive periods.
Keeping these constraints in mind, the following sections investigate wheth-
er social assistance has an impact on the likelihood of entering employment. 
The task requires a data source where the individual’s labour market status 
36 Data on the eﬃciency of cer-
tain public works schemes are 
published by e.g., Orsovai, Palo-
tai & Pálinkó (2000), Szabó & 
Bokor (2006) and Tamási (2005). 
For a discussion of the method-
ology of measuring results see 
Kézdi (2004).
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and welfare beneﬁt status are recorded at several points in time. Our analysis 
uses panel data from the quarterly reports of the CSO Labour Force Survey 
from 2001 to 2004, where the beneﬁt status and the labour market status of 
each individual can be followed over time.
The eﬀects of social assistance and public works schemes on the probabil-
ity of entering employment were estimated in two diﬀerent models. Both 
models were constructed for a population of unemployed people of an active 
age who were capable of work and excluded people not seeking employment 
due to poor health, incapacity, studies or because they were caring for a fam-
ily member. People employed on public works programmes were regarded as 
unemployed if they reported receiving social assistance. The ﬁnal sample in-
cluded in the panel consists of 15,844 persons.
Over the four years under analysis, on average almost 19 per cent of unem-
ployed people found employment in the next quarter, while only 9.5 per cent 
of welfare recipients and 11 per cent of those hired for some public works 
programme found an unsubsidised job after 3 months.
A multivariate analysis was carried out to reveal how much of the raw pro-
portions is explained by the beneﬁt or community work itself, controlling for 
observable variation in environmental and personal characteristics.37 Two 
estimates were made: the probability of exiting the welfare programme was 
ﬁrst measured relative to the total population of unemployed people available 
for work, and second, relative to the group of people who had just exhausted 
their unemployment beneﬁt entitlement.
Social assistance substantially reduced the likelihood of re-employment for 
both groups. Among the broader group, the beneﬁt decreased the labour mar-
ket prospects of both men and women in the next quarter by around 20 per 
cent. The eﬀect was even stronger among people with expiring entitlement: 
the probability of entering employment was 75 per cent lower among men 
and 85 per cent lower among women on beneﬁt compared to people not re-
ceiving beneﬁt. Welfare participants accordingly stayed longer in unemploy-
ment: they were out of work approximately 2 years (7 quarters) longer on av-
erage than those not participating in the welfare programme. Public works 
schemes also had an adverse eﬀect on labour supply: it reduced the likelihood 
of employment in the next quarter by 50 per cent among all unemployed men 
and by 30 per cent among all unemployed women.
The probability of entering employment among the unemployed
Table 3.2 displays the eﬀects estimated for each sex. The estimates indicate 
that, controlling for other observed factors, people on beneﬁt and those em-
ployed on public works jobs are less likely to ﬁnd non-subsidised employment 
in the next quarter compared to the inactive or unemployed population avail-
able for work and not in receipt of welfare beneﬁt. 
37 People on beneﬁt and people 
engaged in public works may 
diﬀer from the group of non-
workers along dimensions which 
are not recorded in the CSO 
Labour Force Survey (e.g., mo-
tivation). We here assume that 
the group of people who had 
just exhausted their unemploy-
ment beneﬁt entitlement is less 
divergent in this respect and 
our results will be less likely to 
be distorted by errors due to 
unobserved factors.
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Table 3.2: Average partial effects on the labour supply of unemployed women and men*
Exit
Men Women
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Social assistance –0.0679 0.000 –0.0530 0.000
Public works –0.0932 0.000 –0.0631 0.000
Active labour market programme –0.0615 0.006 –0.0615 0.000
Unemployment assistance for people  
approaching retirement age –0.0865 0.000 –0.0957 0.005
Unemployment benefit –0.0326 0.000 –0.0231 0.003
Spouse works 0.0777 0.000 –0.0021 0.678
Nobody works in household –0.0535 0.000 –0.0467 0.000
One person works in household –0.0229 0.002 –0.0145 0.038
No children –0.0267 0.000 –0.0235 0.000
Large family –0.0381 0.000 –0.0706 0.000
Young child (under 8) 0.0358 0.000 –0.0846 0.000
Reservation wage (thousand HUF) –0.0012 0.000 –0.000002 0.000
Aged 25–34 years 0.0332 0.000 0.0435 0.000
Aged 35–54 years 0.0245 0.003 0.0816 0.000
Aged 55–62 years (excluding pensioners) –0.0384 0.000 –0.0328 0.003
2–3 year vocational training 0.0823 0.000 0.0673 0.000
Upper secondary education 0.1077 0.000 0.1053 0.000
Higher education 0.3147 0.000 0.3393 0.000
Months registered as unemployed –0.0054 0.000 –0.0058 0.000
Months registered as unemployed (squared) 0.00004 0.000 0.00004 0.000
In full time education a year ago –0.0295 0.012 –0.0226 0.105
On military service a year ago 0.0136 0.476 –0.0809 0.278
Home-maker a year ago –0.0694 0.012 –0.0241 0.101
Maternity leave a year ago –0.1191 0.000 0.0394 0.004
Other inactive a year ago –0.0239 0.039 0.0101 0.543
Unemployment rate in county –0.5837 0.004 0.2597 0.228
Central Hungary –0.0578 0.000 –0.0383 0.000
Southwest Hungary 0.0114 0.304 –0.0172 0.107
Northeast Hungary 0.0108 0.338 –0.0067 0.489
Southeast Hungary 0.0157 0.125 –0.0121 0.178
Northern region –0.0045 0.698 –0.0175 0.095
1st quarter 0.0517 0.000 0.0056 0.464
3rd quarter 0.0691 0.000 0.1324 0.000
2001 –0.0535 0.000 –0.0136 0.195
2002 –0.0403 0.000 –0.0023 0.822
Number of observations 22,153 22,082
Pseudo R2 0.1015 0.1404
* Average partial eﬀects are computed by averaging the (partial) eﬀects of a given 
variable. The probability of entering employment for men, for instance, is 6.8 per-
centage point lower than the likelihood for the total sample.
Note: Probit regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable was em-
ployment (exit). Variables signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level are printed in italics. 
Reference groups: members of households with 2 or more people at work, house-
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holds with one or more children over the age of 8, people aged 18 to 24, 8 years of 
primary school or less, in employment one year before, and Mid-West Hungary.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 
2004.
Social assistance reduces the probability of employment on average by 5.3 
percentage points for women, and by 6.8 percentage points for man. Wom-
en employed on public works jobs are 6.3 percentage points less likely to ﬁnd 
unsubsidised employment in the next quarter and the corresponding ﬁgure 
is 9.3 percentage points for men. Given that the overall likelihood of ﬁnding 
employment is 18.7 per cent, the above results constitute a strong eﬀect: em-
ployment prospects are reduced by 30 to 50 per cent.38
We cannot be certain, however, that it is indeed the work disincentive ef-
fects of the beneﬁt and public works programmes that these ﬁgures reﬂect. 
In theory, an increase in the amount of beneﬁt is expected to be accompanied 
by an increased disincentive eﬀect. Contrasting with that, we estimated the 
eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁt to be smaller than that of social assistance, 
even though the former is higher in amount. This suggests that the parameter 
estimates on social assistance may not only capture the disincentive eﬀect of 
the transfer but could also be sensitive to other, unobserved characteristics 
speciﬁc to social assistance recipients. These may include ambition, assertive-
ness, self-conﬁdence, social connections or poor health, which are not recorded 
in our data but are known to inﬂuence the probability of employment. Stud-
ies based on in-depth interviews reveal that long-term unemployment – even 
with a secure family background – generates a feeling of hopelessness and 
personal and family tensions (Simonyi, 1995; Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Zeisel, 
2002). Also, a signiﬁcantly more pronounced deterioration can be observed 
in the health of people out of work for an extended period compared to other 
labour market groups (Tardos, 1998), which can further reduce the chances 
of employment. The actual work disincentive eﬀects of social assistance and 
public works programmes may thus be lower than our estimates if we allow 
for unobserved factors of this kind.
The estimated eﬀect of age – measured by age group dummies in the model – 
corresponds to expectations: returning to the labour market is most diﬃcult 
for non-employed people over the age of 55, compared to the reemployment 
probabilities of prime age workers (aged 35 to 54), the size of the negative eﬀect 
equals that of social assistance for men, and is twice as large for women (6.2 
and 11.4 percentage points respectively).39 Employment chances substantially 
increase with educational attainment for both sexes and show a decline with 
the duration of unemployment. Having a young child in the family aﬀects 
the behaviour of men and women diﬀerently: there is a positive eﬀect on the 
labour supply of men, which is half as strong as the eﬀect of social assistance, 
while women in these families are less likely to re-enter employment and the 
eﬀect is one and a half times as large as that of beneﬁt receipt.
38 Unemployment assistance 
reduces the likelihood of em-
ployment to 18.34 – 5.3 = 13.04 
per cent for women and to 18.98 
– 6.8 = 12.18 per cent for men, 
which is a reduction of 30 and 
35 per cent respectively. Public 
works programmes reduce the 
chances of re-employment to 
18.34 – 6.3 = 12.04 per cent for 
women and to 18.98 – 9.3 = 9.85 
per cent for men, which amounts 
to a reduction of 35 and 50 per 
cent respectively.
39 Men aged 25–34 are 3.3 per 
cent more likely to start work 
compared to men under 24, 
which means that their employ-
ment chances are 3.3 + 3.8 = 7.1 
per cent higher than those of 
men over 55. The correspond-
ing figure is 6.2 per cent for 
men aged 35–54. Compared 
to women over 55, the prob-
ability of employment is 7.5 per 
cent higher among women aged 
25–34 and 11.4 per cent higher 
among women aged 35–54.
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The probability of entering employment and duration of unemployment 
following the exhaustion of unemployment benefit entitlement
The above estimates may be distorted by the fact that previous work history 
and the duration of unemployment are disregarded in the model. For this 
reason, a modiﬁed model of the eﬀects of the welfare programme was con-
structed (Table 3.3). Conditional probabilities of employment (hazard rates) 
are expressed here as a function of observed personal characteristics of unem-
ployed people and duration of unemployment within the observed period. 
Estimates are computed only for those who exhausted their unemployment 
beneﬁt entitlement within the observed period, assuming that they consti-
tute a relatively homogeneous group with respect to work history and labour 
market attachment. Estimates based on variously speciﬁed duration models 
yielded very similar results.40
Compared to the total sample of the non-employed working age popula-
tion, the probability of re-employment within 3 months is far lower among 
those who just exhausted unemployment beneﬁt: it is 8 per cent among men 
and 6 per cent among women, compared to an average of 19 per cent for the 
non-employed.
The eﬀects of public works schemes cannot be estimated for this group as 
none of the participants (51 out of 1053 men and 31 out of 607 women) en-
tered non-subsidised employment over the observed period. The eﬀects of 
social assistance, however, are statistically signiﬁcant and negative: men re-
ceiving beneﬁt are 5.9, and women on beneﬁt are 5.6 percentage points less 
likely to start work compared to people not receiving beneﬁt, controlling for 
the length of time elapsed since the expiry of beneﬁt entitlement. The size of 
the eﬀect must be interpreted in the context that the average probability of 
employment in the next quarter is 7.9 per cent among men and 6.5 per cent 
among women. That is, the re-employment probability of those receiving social 
assistance is 75 per cent smaller for men, and 85 per cent smaller for women 
compared to non-recipients.41
Although to a lesser extent, selection eﬀects in this group are still a valid 
concern, with the possible consequence that parameter estimates reﬂect the 
eﬀects of unobserved factors beyond those of welfare participation.
The variables of the duration model show fewer signiﬁcant eﬀects. One ex-
planation may be the substantially smaller sample size or the greater homo-
geneity of the group. In contrast with education and household type, age has 
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of employment: compared to people 
over the age of 55, younger men are 7–10, and younger women are 4–8 per-
centage points more likely to ﬁnd work. The length of unemployment and, 
among men, the local unemployment rate have a negative eﬀect on the prob-
ability of employment.
40 Discrete and continuous 
time-duration, parametric and 
non-parametric models. Here 
we publish Jenkins estimates, 
which is an estimation method 
using a discrete time-duration 
model and a logit function.
41 The probability of employ-
ment among men on benefit 
is 7.9 – 5.9 = 2 per cent, and 
among women on beneﬁt it is 
6.5 – 5.5 = 1 per cent in the next 
quarter.
unemployment assistance
85
Table 3.3: The (conditional) probability of employment, average marginal effects
Employment
Men Women
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Social assistance –0.0596 0.005 –0.0557 0.077
Public works – – – –
Spouse or partner works 0.0236 0.209 –0.0027 0.891
Young child in the household 0.0109 0.560 –0.0011 0.967
Aged 18–24 years 0.0990 0.088 0.0827 0.000
Aged 25–34 years 0.0676 0.171 0.0647 0.000
Aged 35–54 years 0.0790 0.085 0.0406 0.000
Primary education 0.0152 0.666 0.0123 0.784
Lower secondary (vocational) 0.0321 0.433 0.0077 0.878
Upper secondary (general) – – –0.0159 0.709
Upper secondary (vocational) 0.0422 0.368 0.0425 0.494
Months registered as unemployed –0.0111 0.000 –0.0104 0.002
Months registered as unemployed (squared) 0.0001 0.000 0.0001 0.000
Local unemployment rate –0.2678 0.017 –0.2318 0.159
Time elapsed since expiry of unemployment benefit entitlement
  2nd quarter –0.1976 0.010 –0.5727 0.000
  3rd quarter –0.1597 0.003 –0.3593 0.000
  4th quarter –0.1266 0.000 – –
  5th quarter –0.1190 0.002 –0.3512 0.000
2001 0.0981 0.064 0.1438 0.066
2002 0.0633 0.068 0.0957 0.066
2003 –0.0048 0.924 0.0564 0.461
1st quarter (calendar time) 0.0014 0.953 –0.0506 0.080
2nd quarter(calendar time) 0.0072 0.730 0.0153 0.539
3rd quarter (calendar time) –0.0299 0.095 –0.0174 0.459
Number of observations 1023 607
Prob > χ2: 0.000 0.000
Note: Logit estimation, with employment as dependent variable. Variables statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level are printed in italics. Reference groups: aged 
55–62, incomplete primary education, the year 2004, the fourth quarter (of calen-
dar time), and the ﬁrst quarter following expiry of unemployment beneﬁt entitle-
ment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 
2004.
Using the above presented conditional probabilities, one may compute the 
average duration of unemployment after the exhaustion of insured beneﬁt 
entitlement. Adding this to the length of unemployment prior to exhaustion 
yields the total duration of unemployment since the last job (Table 3.4). Re-
sults indicate that among unemployed people with recently expired entitle-
ment, those receiving social assistance remain without jobs for an average of 
six quarters (18 months) longer than non-recipients.
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Table 3.4: Average duration of unemployment (quarters)
Receives social assistance Average Standard error N
No 9.8 5.96 567
Yes 16.2 7.24 355
Total 12.2 7.19 922
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 2004.
3.4. Ways to improve the employment prospects of welfare 
recipients
In our analysis of data from the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 2004 
we ﬁnd that unemployed people receiving social assistance and those employed 
on public works projects are both less likely to ﬁnd unsubsidised employment 
compared to other unemployed or inactive populations. People on beneﬁt are 
30 to 35 per cent less likely to ﬁnd employment and they remain unemployed 
for almost two years longer on average than people not receiving beneﬁt. This 
outcome, however, may in part be explained by unobserved characteristics. 
The results also suggest that this type of beneﬁt tends to function in practice 
as income support for the long-term unemployed and neither the availability 
conditions nor the work test element of public works programmes achieve 
the intended eﬀect of encouraging re-employment.
Although the eﬀects of unobserved personal characteristics cannot be reli-
ably controlled for, the results unequivocally point to the conclusion that so-
cial assistance and related public works schemes keep a sizable group of poorly 
educated unemployed people in a helpless and hopeless state with a prolonged 
period of poor employment chances and insecure incomes.
We believe that it is not a lack of good will, but deﬁciencies in the regula-
tions and the malfunction of the broad institutional environment that have 
given rise to this situation. The solution would involve the radical reform of 
the current regulations in four areas.
1. The ﬁrst task is to amend eligibility conditions. Regulations should clearly 
specify sanctions for refusal to cooperate, leaving room for considerations of 
equity (e.g. by allowing temporary suspension in place of termination) and 
clearly prescribe the responsible body and the procedures of enforcement. It 
must be ensured that the bodies responsible for enforcement have an inter-
est in and adequate administrative staﬀ for enforcing eligibility conditions. 
This approach has brought substantial success in some EU countries – Scharle 
(2002) gives a brief overview of these initiatives and their outcomes.
2. The second task is to create incentives for the institutions (local govern-
ments) responsible for administering the assistance scheme to give a priority 
to re-employment in the open labour market. As long as the costs of provid-
ing transfers are the same or lower than those of activation services, the local 
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government will be inclined to choose the former, so that they can please the 
claimant and also spare the hassle of organising public works projects. One 
way to correct incentives is to set the rate of subsidies from the central govern-
ment in proportion to the degree of activation exerted by each programme. 
Thus, the share of government ﬁnancing should be lowest for social assistance 
schemes, and highest for active labour market programmes that facilitate re-
employment in non-subsidised jobs. This would not necessarily imply a reduc-
tion in public funds available for activation programmes but would change 
the share of central versus local resources.
3. The above measures can only lead to success if the responsible bodies 
have the necessary expertise and tools to promote employment. This raises 
two additional requirements: ﬁrst, the availability of experts who are able to 
identify personal characteristics that may impede re-employment (poor social 
or cognitive skills, family problems, etc.) and to select the services best suited 
to removing or reducing any such obstacle. This may be feasible at the level of 
the 174 small regions (LAU1), since some measures have already been taken 
to build expert capacities in local public employment services (Busch, 2006). 
Second, an appropriate range of quality services must be available to local gov-
ernments – some relevant international experiences are discussed through an 
example in Chapter 6 of this volume. This may also require opening the mar-
ket of employment services to non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt providers.
4. The fourth task is to separate the two functions of the social assistance 
scheme. There will always be people among those in need of support who can-
not work temporarily or permanently. Both a commitment to human rights 
and social solidarity call for a solution that grants these groups access to some 
kind of support providing for basic needs. This is also essential for eligibility 
conditions to be enforceable, since – fortunately – there will always be com-
passionate oﬃcials who are reluctant to enforce sanctions when they are aware 
that the claimant may not expect help from any other source.
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ADMINISTRATION AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES
Péter András Szabó
At present there are three public works programmes 
for unemployed people.42 Scheme A was introduced 
in 1991: it is organised by job centres and usually 
involves community services provided by local gov-
ernments (cleaning public parks, ditches, etc.) As 
of 2000, Scheme A was extended to include any 
task that “aﬀects the local population or munici-
pality.” 50 to 70 per cent of all costs (as of 2002, 
90 per cent if Roma workers or people over the age 
45 are employed) are covered by the central budget, 
ﬁnanced from the Labour Market Fund. County 
labour oﬃces are authorised to allocate the budget 
(Laky, 2005).
Scheme B was introduced in 2000; organised 
by local government and serves as a work test for 
unemployed people claiming social assistance. The 
local government may claim 90 per cent of social 
assistance from the central budget. Workers on 
the scheme may be assigned to any local govern-
ment task.
Scheme C was started in 1996, with the objec-
tive of using nationwide or regional projects (ﬂood 
safety and emergency, clearing public areas of al-
lergenic vegetation, forestation tasks) to create job 
opportunities for the unemployed. Tenders are in-
vited by the Public Works Council and the work 
activity itself is organised by local governments or 
participating public utility companies (waterworks, 
forestry, national parks, etc.). 60 per cent of Pub-
lic Utility Programmes are ﬁnanced by the central 
government budget, the rest is funded by the con-
tracted provider (7 per cent) or other, regional or 
local sources (FMM, 2006). Table K3.1 shows the 
number of participants in the various public em-
ployment schemes and their costs.
As set out by the regulations, Schemes A and B 
are intended to encourage employment rehabili-
tation and a return to the primary labour market. 
Surveys on the administration and eﬃciency of the 
schemes were carried out in Budapest in 1999 (Or-
sovai, Palotai & Pálinkó, 2000) and in four coun-
ties in 2001 (Fazekas, 2001), and the Hungarian 
Audit Oﬃce assessed the public works projects of 
95 local governments in the same year (ÁSZ, 2002). 
The results of these surveys and administrative data 
on return to work following long-term unemploy-
ment agree in their conclusion that public works 
schemes have done little to reduce long-term em-
ployment. Orsovai, Palotai & Pálinkó (2000) ﬁnd 
that 28 per cent of workers hired on public works 
projects move back and forth between active and 
passive labour market programmes, and Kertesi 
(2004) argues that it is precisely these schemes 
which are responsible for large groups of untrained 
Roma workers being trapped in a situation with no 
way out: spending years in badly paid and insecure 
jobs alternating with social assistance.43
According to data from the Labour Force Sur-
vey of 2003–2004, the proportion of workers re-
turning to public works schemes is estimated at 
37 per cent (Table K3.2). The preliminary results 
of a research project of the Hungarian Institute of 
Economics led by Gyula Nagy in the summer of 
2007 indicate that the situation has not changed 
over recent years. Local governments tend to oﬀer 
temporary employment rather than work oppor-
tunities that facilitate rehabilitation and improve 
labour market chances.
Public works schemes – far from fulﬁlling their 
original functions – are also used as a supplemen-
42 The Hungarian titles are “Közhasznú” (Type A), “Közcélú” 
(Type B), and “Közmunka” (Type C).
43 According to data in the Roma survey of 2003, barely 30 per 
cent of the working-age Roma population is employed and the 
job loss and job entry rates are around 25 to 30 per cent among 
Roma people, compared to a rate of below 10 per cent among 
unskilled non-Roma workers (Kertesi, 2004).
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tary source of ﬁnancing municipal activities. The 
gradual extension of activities eligible for central 
government ﬁnancing, the ﬂexibility of the regula-
tions and the almost complete absence of supervi-
sion allows larger municipalities to have their basic 
tasks and other tasks that do not strictly serve the 
community performed by public workers (ÁSZ, 
2002). The Audit Oﬃce survey recorded a case, for 
instance, where teaching assistants in a Veszprém 
county primary school were employed on a Scheme 
B project from the start of the school year in Sep-
tember through to its end in June and were put on 
unemployment beneﬁt for the summer holiday – in 
full compliance with current regulations. Another 
example is the district council in Budapest which 
was brought into the media spotlight for employ-
ing a gypsy band for merry making and labelling 
them as community workers.
Table K3.1: Costs and participants of public works schemes (2002 and 2005)
Number of participants Public costs
(thousand people) (billion HUF)
2002 2005 2002 2005
Scheme A* 22 22 11.9 12.8
Scheme B* 12 17 9.4 14.4
Scheme C** 14 15 5.6 7.1
Social assistance** 113 159 22.1 32.3
* Monthly average. ** Annual average.
Note: Hungarian GDP was HUF 22,000 billion in 2005.
Sources: National Employment Service CSO, Finance Ministry, Ministry for Work 
and Welfare.
Table K3.2: Participation patterns among public works employees, 2004 (%)
Number of observed quarters
3+ 4+ 5+ 6+
Staying on scheme 28 21 18 17
Moving on and off 37 48 52 57
Exit from scheme 35 31 30 26
Total 100 100 100 100
Observations 98 75 50 23
Notes: Data were taken from Quarter I 2003 to Quarter II 2004 in the CSO Labour 
Force Survey. Those people were included who did not participate in public works 
schemes in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 but entered a scheme in the next quarter and 
were observed for at least 3–6 quarters. The Labour Survey records considerably 
fewer public workers than suggested by administrative data. Assuming that the 
majority of workers employed in these schemes by local governments for extended 
periods consider themselves to be “proper” employees, the above results overesti-
mate the proportion of people moving on and oﬀ the programme.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Survey of 2003–2004.
The explanation for the use of Scheme B in ways 
which are far removed from the original inten-
tions is that local governments are not motivat-
ed and not appropriately prepared for organising 
public works programmes that oﬀer rehabilita-
tion. Smaller settlements lack institutions which 
could arrange public employment schemes (Faze-
kas, 2001). The Audit Oﬃce report (ÁSZ, 2002) 
reveals that local governments rarely have an em-
ployment policy of any sort: only three out the 95 
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municipalities reviewed had a regular report on 
the employment situation and an action plan for 
necessary interventions.
Scheme A projects run by job centres have not 
proved to be any more successful in improving 
employment prospects, which suggests that lack 
of expertise cannot be the main reason behind the 
problems. The main causes are more likely to be 
found in the fact that neither the monitoring sys-
tem, nor the ﬁnancing arrangements create incen-
tives to improve the employment chances of com-
munity workers. Monitoring is the responsibility 
of job centres but they have insuﬃcient resources to 
cover this task as well as their expanding range of 
other functions. As a result, monitoring activities 
are limited to the audit of ﬁnancial accounts: it is 
often left unchecked, for instance, whether or not 
all workers report for work and the job centre may 
not even know the number of workers registered 
with the local government (ÁSZ, 2002).
Although the Ministry is aware of the poor eﬃ-
ciency of the schemes, it appears to have resigned 
itself to the situation. The recommendations of 
2002 of the Audit Oﬃce concerning the assess-
ment of programme results and the improvement 
of their eﬃciency were discarded by the Ministry 
for Employment on the grounds that “the most 
important function of public works schemes is to 
provide employment opportunities as a last resort 
for unemployed workers who would otherwise ﬁnd 
no jobs.” (ÁSZ, 2002).
The situation is not entirely hopeless, however, 
since a number of initiatives have been launched 
which could succeed in improving long-term em-
ployment chances even in multiply disadvantaged 
regions struggling with an unskilled workforce, 
scarce capital and isolation. An initiative of this 
kind is the Cserehát programme launched in 2005 
with support from the government and the Unit-
ed Nations. The programme seeks solutions which 
depart from traditional standardised development 
projects controlled by an external authority, and 
rests, instead, on the involvement of local part-
ners. Important elements of the programme are 
ﬁrst, that it targets small regions rather than single 
towns or villages and second, it relies on a collabora-
tion of non-proﬁt, private and public sector agents. 
It is based on the principle that a programme can 
only be successful if it relies on the participation of 
local stakeholders, if it is they who select the solu-
tions best suited for themselves and if external re-
sources and professional support needed for imple-
mentation is made available to them. As a ﬁrst step, 
the Cserehát Programme Oﬃce surveyed local de-
velopment partners and project ideas. Based on this 
they provided support to local actors, mostly from 
disadvantaged municipalities, to develop proposals 
for some large scale projects that may successfully 
bid for EU funds as they become available between 
2007 and 2013. The ﬁrst results of the programme 
were presented at a conference in May 2007, where 
the organisers reported that a network of around 
2500 active local development partners had been 
created from a hundred settlements in their small 
region in the ﬁrst year following the launch (Csere-
hát, 2007).
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4. A LABOUR MARKET EXPLANATION FOR THE RISE  
IN DISABILITY CLAIMS
Ágota Scharle
The number of people under retirement age in receipt of disability pensions 
stood at 233,000 in 1990, grew by one and a half by 1996 and doubled by 
2003. This process started well before the regime change. Annual inﬂow into 
disability pension had been stable at around 10,000 up to the mid-1960s, and 
then rapidly increased in two waves, so that by 1991 over 60,000 new disabil-
ity pension claims were granted a year. With the eﬀect of population ageing 
controlled for, we still see sudden surges in the late 1960s and towards the end 
of the 1980s (Figure 4.1 shows the number of new disability pension claim-
ants relative to the total number of people aged between 40 and 59). The total 
number of new applications has increased more rapidly and displayed greater 
ﬂuctuations than the number of successful claims (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1: New disability pension claims, 1960–2006
Source: 1960–1990: CSO Yearbooks of Health Statistics and data supplied by the 
Hungarian Rehabilitation and Social Assistance Oﬃce (ORSZI); 1991–2006: Year-
book of statistics of the Central Administration of Pension of Insurance (ONYF). 
Up to 1990, new claims are as reported by medical experts, and ONYF records 
thereafter. The former includes all claims ﬁled during the year, the latter exlcudes 
pending claims.
The upsurge in disability pension claims starting in the mid-1960s was ac-
companied by a clear and substantial decline in the general health of the 
population. The situation was diﬀerent in the late 1980s: the previous de-
clining trend seemed to be reversing. Although the indicators of mortality 
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only showed improvement from 1993 onwards (Sándor, 2003), Pauka and 
Tóth (2003) aﬃrm that negative health trends had come to a halt earlier than 
that. The proportion of people living with severe disabilities was stable in 
pre-retirement age groups between 1980 and 1994 and the self-rated health 
status of the population showed improvement.44 These data suggest that fac-
tors other than state of health must have also contributed to the changes in 
disability pension claims. Although at the beginning of the regime change, 
a generous pension policy could be justiﬁed by rational political arguments 
(Vanhuysse, 2004), it has imposed heavy costs both on society and on the 
individual. The majority of middle-aged pensioners leave the labour market 
permanently, which means they do not pay social contributions, while their 
pensions burden the social insurance fund. These pensioners lose most of their 
social connections with the workplace and may live for many years in idle-
ness and sometimes isolation. We are not aware of any attempts to compare 
these costs to the beneﬁts brought by the fact that the political regime was 
changed peacefully and the transition to a market economy could proceed 
relatively quickly with no major social resistance. The costs are undoubtedly 
signiﬁcant and, even more importantly, we continue to bear the burden today, 
since current disability pension schemes have retained most of the retirement 
incentives introduced 15 years ago.
Figure 4.2: Submitted and accepted claims for disability pension, 1960–2006
Source: See Figure 4.1.
4.1. Alternative explanations for the increasing trend in 
disability claims
The regime change involved several processes which could have induced 
an increase in disability pension claims, such as the decline in employment 
rates – including the employment of unskilled workers –, the expansion of 
the informal economy, changes in pension policies (the alternation of leni-
ent and stringent periods) and ﬁnally changes in the quality of rehabilita-
tion services.
44 Pauka and Tóth (2003) com-
pare a thorough medical sur-
vey of 1980 (Complex National 
Morbidity Survey, Komov) with 
a self-rated health survey from 
1994 and the demographic sur-
vey entitled “Turning Points of 
our Lives” of 2001. The latter 
two surveys show improving 
trends for both sexes in the age 
groups of 40–49 years and es-
pecially 50–59 years.
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The sudden and steep decline in the employment rate of unskilled workers 
and the rapid rise in returns to education are well documented facts. Multi-
variate analyses of wages and productivity by Kertesi and Köllő (1997), Kézdi 
and Köllő (2000) and Kézdi (2004) ﬁnd that the wage premium on second-
ary education and higher education increased greatly at the time of the re-
gime change. Older workers were found to be disadvantaged not only due to 
their low educational levels but also because of their age in the ﬁrst few years 
after the regime change (Kertesi and Köllő, 2002). Low levels of education 
are also accompanied by an increased risk of poor health (Tahin, Jeges and 
Lampek, 2000; Remák, Gál and Németh, 2006), which is partly related to 
physically more demanding work activities and partly to lifestyle.45
The informal economy continued to expand after the regime change, al-
though its structure had changed. Lackó (2000) and Semjén and Tóth (2002) 
claim that the size of the hidden economy showed a decrease after 1993 owing 
mostly to growing foreign capital investment. Data collected by Sik (2000) 
from local governments indicate however that the incidence of black labour 
was still on the increase in the second half of the 1990s. The study also re-
veals that illegal employment is signiﬁcantly more frequent in towns than in 
smaller settlements and – in contrast with the east-west divide in economic 
development – the incidence of black labour separates northern regions from 
southern regions.
While it is widely assumed that pensioners supplemented their incomes 
by taking up informal jobs, there is little empirical evidence supporting this 
claim. Studying entries into retirement observed in the CSO household budget 
survey, Cseres Gergely (2005) ﬁnds that the net incomes of retiring members 
of a typical family decrease by about a quarter: pensions and their favourable 
tax treatment largely compensate for the loss of wages. Retirement does not 
aﬀect the incomes of partners living with the pensioners, the overall incomes 
of the households therefore do not decrease dramatically. This could be one 
explanation for the fact that new sources of income or temporary employ-
ment (or changes in consumption indicative of new income) rarely appear in 
the year following retirement.
A number of sociographic analyses have described family-run farming ac-
tivities, which provide a means of subsistence for unskilled rural populations 
excluded from the labour market (Simonyi 1995, Laki, 1997, Rácz, 2003). 
Harcsa, Kovách and Szelényi (1998) observe that, in contrast to rapidly de-
veloping specialised large-scale farms, family-run home farms tend to produce 
for their own consumption rather than for market sale and supplement this 
with other, typically social, incomes. This practice is not without precedent: 
Gábor and Galasi (1985) and Oros–Schindele (1977) show that pensioners, 
wives (oﬃcial homemakers) and unpaid family helpers performed most of the 
work on home farms at the time of the communist regime.
45 Józan (2001) argues that the 
high level of mortality is primar-
ily explained by lifestyle, spe-
ciﬁcally, by unhealthy diets (in 
addition to smoking, alcoholism 
and lack of physical exercise). A 
lesser role is attributed to the 
quality of health services and 
the harmful eﬀects of the en-
vironment.
in focus
94
Act II of 1975, currently in eﬀect, states that people with a 67 per cent re-
duction in their work capacity are entitled to disability pension provided that 
no improvement is expected in their condition within a year.46 The entitle-
ment ceases if the claimant recovers and/or his or her income approaches the 
level at which it was before the onset of disability. The amount of pension is 
determined with reference to previous income, similarly to old age pension: 
at 25 years of service, it equals the amount of old age pension, with additional 
compensation for a total impairment of health. The entitlement to disability 
pension does not cease when retirement age is reached, the claimant contin-
ues to receive the disability pension.
Vanhuysse (2004) argues that the lenient pension policy introduced in 
order to forestall social discontent or resistance at the time of the regime 
change was a rational political decision and social insurance institutions were 
therefore willing to co-operate in granting early pensions to workers facing 
insecure prospects of employment (see also Gere, 1997). In view of the in-
creasing burden on the budget, however, international organisations recom-
mended the tightening of conditions of entitlement as early as the beginning 
of the 1990s.47 The regulations on disability pensions were ﬁrst tightened in 
1997–1998 with the aim to ensure that disability pensions were paid in ac-
cordance with the claimant’s actual state of health. The new act was put into 
practice in January 1998, when disability pensions ceased to be granted on a 
permanent basis and some of the previously acquired entitlements were also 
reassessed as temporary. Temporary entitlement was tied to more frequent 
medical assessment than before. Disability pension thus became a less secure 
source of income as a result of the new regulations. No further reforms were 
introduced until 2006, however, and the share of disability pensions has in-
creased in early retirement as the statutory age of retirement had been raised 
and the conditions on claiming old age pension before the standard retire-
ment age become more restricted. Furthermore, as discussed in the next sec-
tion, the conditions of the medical assessment of a possible reduction in work 
capacity have in eﬀect steadily deteriorated over the years.
Assistance in the labour market rehabilitation of unemployed people with 
reduced work capacity is provided by job centres in the form of advice and 
subsidies to employers. Current regulations place labour market rehabilita-
tion mostly in the hands of accredited, heavily subsidised sheltered workshops 
and factories. Most county level job centres operate a rehabilitation informa-
tion service. The government has also ﬁnanced pilot projects on increasing 
co-operation between job centres and non-proﬁt organisations in providing 
rehabilitation services. The few studies performed so far indicate that the 
rehabilitation activities of ﬁrms providing sheltered employment tend to be 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and training or services facilitating the return to the open labour 
market are rare (Krolify, 2004). There is considerable regional variation in the 
46 Additional conditions in-
clude minimum years of service 
and a fall in earnings by at least 
20 per cent as a result of the dis-
ability. The required minimum 
years of service are determined 
with respect to age and range 
from 2 to 20 years.
47 The 1995 World Bank report 
on Hungary, for instance, rec-
ommended tighter regulations 
on disability pensions as the 
most eﬃcient means to reduce 
social insurance fund deﬁcits 
in the short term provided 
that a substantial proportion 
of workers thus excluded from 
the disability pension scheme 
found employment in the formal 
labour market.
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quality and eﬃciency of rehabilitation services provided by job centres and 
average results remain poor (Gere, 2000; OSI, 2005; FRSZ, 2006). A recent 
government decree of August 2007 on disability policy48 sets the objective of 
developing rehabilitation services to facilitate open labour market participa-
tion by the end of 2009 and preparing job centre staﬀ for performing associ-
ated tasks by the end of 2010. Services provided by non-proﬁt organisations 
are more successful but are not widely accessible – partly due to their limited 
capacity and partly because of short term ﬁnancing arrangements, which in-
crease ﬁnancial insecurity (FRSZ, 2006).49
The above factors contributing to disability pension claims aﬀect the Roma 
population of Hungary even more severely, with the various factors reinforc-
ing each other. Kertesi (2000) analyses detailed work histories from the Roma 
survey of 1993–1994 and ﬁnds that the proportion of pensioners had already 
signiﬁcantly increased in the period from 1984 to 1989 among the older Roma 
population (men aged 45–54 and women aged 45–49). The Roma survey of 
2003 showed no signs of trend reversal at the end of the millennium. The 
incidence of early retirement among the Roma has now been stabilised: the 
proportion of pensioners below the statutory retirement age remains around 
9 per cent among men and 8 per cent among women (Kertesi, 2004).
The general health of the Roma population is poorer than the national aver-
age (Mladovsky, 2007, Kósa et al, 2007) partly because a greater proportion of 
Roma work in occupations causing health damage (Kertesi, 2000) and partly 
due to the fact that health care services are less accessible to the Roma population 
because of their disadvantaged position in terms of place of residence, ﬁnancial 
circumstances and, on occasion, ethnic discrimination (Gyukits, 2000).
In his analysis of labour market chances, Kertesi (2000) concludes that early 
retirement was a dominant form of exclusion from the labour force, which is 
explained by low levels of education and poor health on the one hand and by 
labour market discrimination against the Roma on the other.50
The expansion and stabilisation of government ﬁnanced public works 
schemes has led to an increase in the instability in Roma employment rather 
than facilitating return to the primary labour market, which indicates the 
failure of the current approach to rehabilitation services (Kertesi, 2004). This 
is reﬂected in the striking gap between transition rates: while the average an-
nual exit and entry rates are under 10 per cent for the Hungarian population 
with low levels of education, the corresponding rates are around 25 to 30 per 
cent for the Roma minority.
It does not follow from the above however, that the incidence of disability 
claims is speciﬁcally a problem of the Roma: the scale of the problem is far 
too large to be explained by a decline of the employment rate in the Roma 
population. The number of people receiving disability pension under retire-
ment age was over 460,000 in 2003, while Kertesi’s (2004) data suggest that 
48 Government Decree 1062 of 
2007 (August 7.) on the prepa-
rations for the implementation 
of the new National Disabil-
ity Programme for the period 
2007–2010.
49 The Salva Vita Foundation, 
established in 1993, is one of 
the most successful non-proﬁt 
organisations, which provides 
extensive services to assist the 
open labour market participa-
tion of workers with altered 
work capacity and which has 
made eﬀorts to propagate its 
methods across the country 
since 2001. (OSI, 2005 and www.
salvavita.hu).
50 Otlakán (2007) has measured 
employer discrimination using 
an experimental method based 
on job advertisements. The re-
sults show that 10 per cent of 
Roma applicants were explicitely 
rejected and 18 per cent got some 
reaction from the employer sug-
gestive of discrimination.
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the number of Roma pensionerss under retirement age was at most 50,000 
in the same year.
4.2. The eﬀect of demographic and labour market factors on 
disability claims
Labour market factors may mostly aﬀect applications for disability pension 
since claims are evaluated with reference to the state of health, i.e., the num-
ber of new claimants in receipt of disability pensions should in theory reﬂect 
the decline in the state of health only. We can isolate the two eﬀects by ana-
lysing the data on ﬁled applications. As no individual level data are available 
on applications,51 our analysis is based on county level panel data. 18 counties 
are included in the panel,52 with ten observations between 1996 and 2005 for 
each. Estimates have been computed in various model speciﬁcations, only one 
of which will be discussed here.
The estimates were computed using a random eﬀects model with the as-
sumption that unobserved characteristics are independent of the eﬀects of ob-
served variables. The dependent variable is the number of submitted disability 
pension claims relative to the size of the adult population. State of health is 
measured as the proportion of people aged 40 to 59 years and as the number 
of visits to the family practitioner relative to the size of the population. La-
bour market conditions are characterised in terms of the employment rate of 
the population aged 15 to 74 years as indicated by the labour survey data of 
the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce and in terms of the share of the Roma pop-
ulation (computed after Hablicsek [2000] based on the census of 1990 and 
the 1993–1994 Roma survey). The size of the informal economy is measured 
as the proportion of people living in cities: a low share of the urban popula-
tion indicates a possibility of home farming while a high share indicates op-
portunities for black labour. This U-shaped relationship is captured by two 
variables: the linear term (share of urban population) measures the eﬀects of 
home farming and the quadratic term (share of urban population squared) 
measures the eﬀects of black labour. The eﬀects of regulations are signalled 
by sudden and large deviations from the long term trend in the number of 
claims observed around the date of a change in rules. What we are interest-
ed in is whether the observed leaps were associated with poor health or with 
poor labour market prospects, i.e., which group was most motivated to ﬁle a 
claim fearing that they would not be able to do so following the changes in 
regulations. This is indicated by the interaction between the state of health 
or employment rate and the years from 1996 to 1998. The results summarised 
in Table 4.1 correspond to our expectations.
These results indicate that the relative number of disability pension appli-
cations is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by labour market conditions in addition to 
factors related to the state of health. Relatively more applications are submit-
51 Population surveys only 
register accepted claims while 
administrative data, where all 
applications are shown, do not 
indicate labour market status 
– it has not yet been possible to 
link the two sources of informa-
tion at the individual level.
52 The Hungarian Pension 
Insurance Authority publish 
annual statistics on claims 
and evaluations initiated or 
completed in the given year. 
This source merges data from 
Budapest and the surrounding 
Pest county, and therefore both 
were excluded from our analysis. 
The incidence of claims shows a 
substantial degree of dispersion 
but the diﬀerence between the 
minimum and the maximum 
values displays a decreasing ten-
dency: the number of claims in 
proportion to the size of the 
population was 3.7 times higher 
in the eastern county of Szabolcs 
than in the western county of 
Győr-Moson-Sopron in 1996, 
while the ratio for Tolna county 
was barely twice as high as the 
ratio for Fejér county in 2006.
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ted in counties with lower employment rates and where black employment is 
more accessible. A high share of the Roma population tends to dampen the 
negative eﬀect of good labour market conditions on disability claims, sug-
gesting that the Roma minority are disadvantaged due to their places of resi-
dence as well as discrimination.
Table 4.1: Health and labour market causes of disability pension claims
Coefficient Standard Error P > z
40–59 years of age 0.069 0.048 0.154
Poor health 3.907 1.118 0.000
Poor health/higher ed. –0.399 0.165 0.015
Poor health × Roma –0.399 0.082 0.000
Employment rate –0.022 0.009 0.021
Employment rate × Roma 0.007 0.001 0.000
Urban population –0.129 0.051 0.012
Urban population squared 0.204 0.085 0.017
Poor health × 1996 3.474 0.674 0.000
Poor health × 1997 1.252 0.614 0.041
Poor health × 1998 –0.582 0.109 0.000
Employment rate × 1996 –0.030 0.007 0.000
Employment rate × 1997 –0.015 0.006 0.012
Constant 0.017 0.016 0.272
R2 within 0.553
  between 0.396
  overall 0.422
Wald χ2 (df.) 194.08 (13)
σ(u) 0.0034
σ(e) 0.0016
ρ  0.8308
prob>χ2 0.0
Observations = 180.
4.3. The relationship between state of health and receipt of 
disability pension
Individual level data allow us to investigate the eﬀectiveness of disability pen-
sion claim evaluations in ﬁltering out applications submitted for reasons re-
lated to labour market prospects. Data for the ﬁrst and the second quarters 
of 2002 from the labour force survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce are 
linked to identify individuals who were granted disability pension in the sec-
ond quarter but not in the ﬁrst quarter of the year. The data for the second 
quarter include additional information on state of health. The estimation is 
carried out in two steps: ﬁrst we estimate the likelihood of being in employ-
ment and predict a probability of employment for each individual.53 In the 
second step we use this predicted probability as an indicator of labour mar-
53 This estimate uses age, level 
of education, state of health and 
regional unemployment rate as 
explanatory factors.
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ket prospects and estimate its eﬀects on receiving a disability pension. The 
results of the second step are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Probability of entry into disability pension
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t
Employment prospects –1.49 1.08 –1.38 0.17
Limb or back problem 1.19 0.19 6.16 0.00
Mental illness 0.76 0.32 2.38 0.02
Heart or lung disease 1.16 0.20 5.87 0.00
Other problem 1.21 0.22 5.56 0.00
Years in employment –0.01 0.01 –1.04 0.30
Constant –1.69 1.08 –1.57 0.12
Probit estimates, Number of observations = 17,079, LR χ 2(6) = 90.68; Prob > χ2 = 0,
Log likelihood: –224.724 4; Pseudo R2 = 0.1679.
With the eﬀects of health controlled for, poorer employment prospects in-
crease an individual’s chances of receiving a disability pension. The eﬀect is 
not statistically signiﬁcant but this could be due to the relatively small number 
of observed entries into disability pension status in the sample.
Multivariate models analysing the entire pensioner population – and using 
a larger sample size – show similar and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Cseres 
Gergely (2005) investigates the probability of changes in labour market status 
in the period between 1993 and 2002. The author ﬁnds that the likelihood 
of retirement increases with poorer health (measured by sickness payments) 
while it signiﬁcantly decreases with expected earnings. Köllő and Nacsa 
(2006) estimate the likelihood of pension receipt for men aged 44–62 years 
and women aged 44–58 years using the 2000 Q4 CSO labour force survey. 
According to their results, the probability of a man retiring ﬁve years before 
the statutory retirement age was 37 per cent for the entire sample, ranging 
from 18 per cent in the region with the best labour market conditions to 56 
per cent in the region with the worst employment prospects. The likelihood 
of pension receipt was higher for the low educated and for people living in 
low-wage small regions.
4.4. Alternative approaches to easing labour market tensions
It is safe to conclude then that the rising incidence of disability pension re-
ceipt was largely a consequence of labour market tensions and it served to 
ease that tension. This raises the question of whether the government could 
turn to alternative solutions for soothing labour market disruptions without 
imposing lasting negative eﬀects on the budget, the competitiveness of the 
country and lives of the workers aﬀected.
The task is twofold: on the one hand, the current system needs to be restruc-
tured in order to reduce incentives to leave the labour market permanently and 
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on the other hand, alternative solutions need to be oﬀered to those with low 
chances of ﬁnding secure jobs in the primary labour market. A number of West-
ern European governments have faced a similar problem and starting from the 
1990s, some have implemented policy measures which appear to be viable.
British, Danish, Dutch and Swedish experiences suggest that the solution 
has three key components. The ﬁrst two components are aimed at reducing in-
centives: tighter regulations on eligibility conditions and a reduction in beneﬁt 
amounts. The third component oﬀers an alternative: active labour market poli-
cies or social services which enhance productivity and employment prospects.
The tightening of eligibility conditions involves the requirement that the 
claimant should make eﬀorts to regain work capacity and re-enter the labour 
force and failure to do so will lead to the suspension or reduction of the disabil-
ity beneﬁt. The job centre provides continuous assistance in these eﬀorts and at 
the same time monitors progress: they oﬀer individual rehabilitation services 
and job opportunities but impose sanctions if co-operation is refused.
The amount of potentially available beneﬁt is reduced by making access to the 
full pension amount conditional on previous participation in a series of reha-
bilitation attempts. The income gained on retirement is also lowered as the risks 
associated with fraudulent claims are increased by improving the eﬃciency of 
detecting abuse and applying stricter sanctions both for doctors and applicants. 
In addition, in the case of Hungary, old-age pensions received at early retirement 
should be substantially lowered as compared to the amount of regular old-age 
pensions (at least until the statutory age of retirement is reached).
The alternative oﬀered is the improvement of employment prospects. This 
task requires a wide range of eﬀective rehabilitation services, from among 
which the personal adviser assigned to the claimant can select the services 
deemed most appropriate. These are funded by the public employment ser-
vice but may be operated by non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt private organisations. This 
scheme may be supplemented by a system of income support which compen-
sates for the expected drop in earnings resulting from the reduction in work 
capacity and by communication tools mitigating labour market discrimina-
tion or information gaps.
The British “Pathways to Work” programme discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 6 of this volume is a good example of such an approach. In a nutshell, the 
programme requires claimants of a disability pension to attend monthly in-
terviews starting within 8 weeks following the ﬁling of their claim, they are 
assigned to a personal advisor who oﬀers job opportunities and recommends 
a programme of maintaining the applicant’s physical and emotional condi-
tion. Participants who enter into employment are entitled to a small wage 
subsidy covering travel costs and incurred clothing expenses and are assigned 
to a mentor who helps them with any problems that may arise. The scheme is 
fairly expensive but has proved to be very successful: employment rates among 
in focus
100
disability pension claimants increased by a quarter over a period of one and a 
half years in regions where the scheme was introduced.
The reform of July 2007 of Hungarian regulations on disability pension was 
prepared in the spirit of the approach discussed above but it focuses on just one 
of the three components, that of improving employment prospects, and leaves 
incentives essentially untouched. The new regulations prescribe a detailed as-
sessment of the state of health and the remaining work capacity of the claimant 
and health-related, social and labour market rehabilitation services are oﬀered in 
accordance with the results of the assessment. The claimant receives rehabilita-
tion beneﬁt for the duration of the rehabilitation programme but for no longer 
than three years. The amount of beneﬁt given is, however, eﬀectively the same 
as the amount of disability pension. The new regulations state that the claimant 
is required to co-operate with the local job centre but do not give precise details 
of the sanctions applied in case of refusal to actively participate.
Disincentives to labour market participation could be reduced within the 
new framework as well by tightening sanctions and by reducing income gains. 
One way to do this would be to adjust the amount and the taxation of reha-
bilitation beneﬁts to match those of unemployment beneﬁts rather than dis-
ability pensions. Also, the pension received before retirement age could be 
substantially lower in value (in proportion to the missing number of years of 
service) than old-age pension. The likelihood of detecting beneﬁt fraud should 
also be enhanced in order to lower the pontential income gains from claiming 
beneﬁt.54 As long as the probability of disclosure is low, disability pension in 
combination with black labour remains the most lucrative option.
The new regulations take the ﬁrst important step towards the improvement 
of employment prospects by focussing on the assessment of remaining work 
capacity rather than on health impairment. The next step is to make a well-in-
formed choice of the necessary rehabilitation services and to assure the quality 
and eﬃciency of these services. Some steps have already been taken towards 
this goal: a large scale pilot has been carried out to introduce a simple screen-
ing tool at job centres (see Busch, 2006) and a number of smaller projects have 
been launched in the framework of the National Labour Foundation (OFA) 
or the EQUAL Initiative of the EU to develop and use various rehabilitation 
services (e.g., FRSZ, 2006). For the successful operation of public employment 
services, these experimental programmes should be systematically assessed to 
identify best practices and the conditions for nation-wide implementation. 
Programmes that pass both tests should than be systematically introduced. 
A similar intention is expressed in the government decree of August, 2007 
mentioned above, which prescribes that a system of basic and social rehabili-
tation services should be developed by June, 2008 in order to facilitate access 
to the employment rehabilitation scheme.55
54 A claimant is considered to 
abuse the scheme if he or she 
obtains a medical report cer-
tifying a greater reduction in 
work capacity than is justiﬁed by 
his or her state of health, if the 
claimant works in the shadow 
economy or fails to notify the 
authorities of received wages 
(in excess of the limit speciﬁed 
by the regulations).
55 Government Decree 1062 of 
2007 (August 7.) on the prepa-
rations for the implementation 
of the new National Disabil-
ity Programme for the period 
2007–2010.
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ASSESSING WORK CAPABILITY
Ferenc Juhász
Disability pension claims are submitted for evalu-
ation to the claimant’s local pension insurance au-
thority. Claims must be supported by a medical 
diagnosis of disability and proof of the number of 
years of service. The local GP or the specialist who 
issues the diagnosis usually attaches to the claim 
their detailed opinion and some documentation of 
the health condition. Based on this information, a 
panel of medical experts examines the claimant and 
issues a medical certiﬁcate/assessment.
Currently there are almost 70 such panels in-
volved in the assessment of disability pension 
claims operating under the supervision of six re-
gional centres and one in the capital city (the seven 
county centres have been reorganised into six re-
gional centres).56 Up until the late 1990s, decent 
professional conditions were secured: a panel was 
made up of two physicians, the typical medical as-
sessment lasted 45 minutes and a second round 
of assessments (following an appeal) lasted 50 to 
60 minutes on average. Panels had access to vari-
ous kinds of specialist advice from contracted or 
– mainly in Budapest – full-time specialists, as well 
as to diagnostic tools, x-ray facilities and medical 
laboratories. Tools and equipment later became in-
creasingly diﬃcult to access, while the number of 
disability claimants substantially increased. While 
expert capacities have not expanded, work load has 
considerably increased: the case load increased to 
10 to 15 patients per day for each physician and in 
some cases now claims are assessed on the basis of 
written documentation only.
The assessment centre in Budapest currently em-
ploys 140 to 150 specialists carrying out around 
300 to 330 thousand examinations each year. Ap-
peal cases are assessed by a panel of two senior phy-
sicians. For initial claims the physical examination 
of the patient may be done by one doctor only, but 
the written assessment has to be made by a team of 
two experts. An examination session usually lasts 
approximately 30 minutes, while in the Nether-
lands, for instance, the average length of an exam-
ination is 3 to 3 and a half hours.
Panels issue assessments on claims for 21 diﬀer-
ent types of welfare provision and receive patients 
referred to them by any of 12 diﬀerent authorities 
and organisations. The majority of assessments are 
requested in connection with new disability pen-
sion claims or disability pension claim revisions. 
The medical assessment always sets a date for the 
next reassessment in view of the patient’s health 
condition. Reassessment is typically prescribed at 
two or three year intervals.
In the assessment process, the panel collates the 
relevant medical records, arranges them in chron-
ological order and according to the type of condi-
tion, quickly scans the details (in about 10 minutes) 
and ﬁnally, makes a record of the information sup-
porting their assessment.
The documentation supporting a claim always 
includes a referral issued by the local GP or special-
ist. These referrals describe all health conditions for 
which the claimant has been treated or which have 
been diagnosed, but in most cases only 15 to 20 per 
cent of these documents contain information of 
any value to the panel. A typical ﬁle includes doz-
ens of often contradictory, occasionally untruthful 
reports and documents compiled in an ad hoc man-
ner. No information is provided on the claimant’s 
56 The central administration of specialist assessment services, 
named the Institute of Medical Expert Services, was overseen 
by the Hungarian Health Insurance Fund (OEP) up to the end 
of 2006. Currently it is under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Welfare and Employment. When a claim is made for the new 
employment rehabilitation beneﬁt introduced in July 2007 to 
encourage return to work, the claimant’s unimpaired work ca-
pabilities and social circumstances are also assessed in addition 
to the state of health. The institute responsible for the central 
administration of assessment was renamed to reﬂect the new 
function and is now called the Institute of Rehabilitation and 
Social Expert Services (ORSZI).
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current or previous occupations, employment his-
tory, education, or living conditions.
The health condition of a substantial proportion 
of referred claimants is not properly investigated, 
their treatment is far from comprehensive and only 
around 10 per cent of them have had access to medi-
cal rehabilitation. Most claims do not include a rec-
ommendation by a rehabilitation expert, nor the 
assessment of an occupational health expert.
For claimants in an acute phase of their condi-
tion at the time of the consultation (e.g. immedi-
ately after an operation and before going through 
rehabilitation procedures), the loss of work capac-
ity cannot be appropriately determined, since the 
patient is not in a stable state. Nevertheless, the 
physician must make a decision as to the extent of 
the reduction in the patient’s work capacity if the 
claimant has no other income and could not have 
his or her basic needs covered for the duration of 
the rehabilitation. The decision on the patient’s 
work capacity is made for at most one year in this 
situation.
Claimants can request to have their work capac-
ity evaluated on the basis of documents – certiﬁed 
by the local GP or specialist – on grounds of health 
problems. This usually occurs in cases of severe dis-
ability. If the information submitted with the claim 
is not suﬃcient for the issuing of the medical certif-
icate/assessment, the expert panel may request fur-
ther examination results or, if justiﬁed, can request 
to see the patient for examination. In certain cases 
the patient may be visited by the physician in their 
home. A claim can only be rejected on the basis of 
a face-to-face examination, with the exception of 
some claims for mental disability beneﬁt and cer-
tain international cases.
The physical examination of the claimant is car-
ried out using traditional medical equipment (pho-
nendoscope, reﬂex hammer, ECG). This suits the 
minimum requirements concerning the availabil-
ity of equipment in an outpatient clinic but is in-
suﬃcient to assess unimpaired or restorable capa-
bilities. Until recently medical panels did not use 
the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning 
and Disability (ICF) standards in making their as-
sessment and the reduction in work capacity was 
evaluated in accordance with guidelines issued in 
1989. Assessments/certiﬁcates issued by the medi-
cal panel usually include suggestions for rehabilita-
tion but do not specify concrete procedures lead-
ing to rehabilitation or to facilitate employability. 
Recommendations for rehabilitation mostly in-
volve negative or prohibitive statements (such as 
“patient cannot work standing up,” “patient can-
not perform tasks requiring sustained walking,” 
etc.). In summary, current practice tends to focus 
on health problems rather than the functional ca-
pabilities of the claimant.
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5. INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN THE PENSION SYSTEM OF HUNGARY
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
Pension (and disability or old-age pension by themselves) constitutes the high-
est expenditure in the budget among all welfare programmes. This holds for 
every country with a developed welfare system, not only for Hungary. The is-
sue of pensions is a major concern of an army of economists – starting with the 
question of optimal regulations through to the analysis of unintended eﬀects 
reaching beyond old-age support. A number of researchers have investigated the 
pension programme of Hungary on the basis of aggregate data and theoretical 
constructions (see for instance, Augusztinovics, 2000; Augusztinovics et al, 
2002; Simonovits, 2006). We are not aware, however, of analyses using indi-
vidual level data which are aimed at isolating the eﬀects of incentives arising 
from the nature of the system from the eﬀects of individual traits. This chapter 
undertakes to ﬁll this gap with the help of a simple empirical model of the de-
cision to retire. Data collected on individuals in two consecutive periods will 
be used to examine the eﬀects of the accessibility of pensions, the size of the 
diﬀerence between incomes expected from a pensioner and a non-pensioner 
status, and other individual factors on the decision to claim a pension.
The question of the decision to retire deserves special attention: following 
its relative consolidation in 1997, the pension fund is once again struggling 
with serious problems of balance over the long run. According to estimates 
by Burniaux, Duval & Jaumotte (2004), the eﬀective (including disability 
pension participation) retirement age of Hungarian men is the lowest after 
Luxembourg among the EU countries. Vanhuysse (2006) explicates and sub-
stantiates the hypothesis described by Gere (1997) that there are deﬁnite so-
cio-political objectives behind the rapid expansion of the pension programme. 
The process of political and economic transition gave rise to a situation where 
former socialist countries had to face signiﬁcant political risks as they prepared 
for privatization. The restructuring or, in several cases, total closure of state 
owned companies led to a complete loss of security among the often unskilled 
workforce on such a large scale which, as indicated by historical experiences, 
tends to lead to major discontent, demonstrations and other forms of protest. 
That this essentially did not happen in the former socialist countries is un-
doubtedly due to the fact that the governments had largely anticipated this 
danger and found eﬀective methods of forestalling it. It must be this strategic 
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social policy, argues Vanhuysse (2006), that has led to a situation in Hungary 
and Poland where the increase in the expenses of the pension programme ex-
ceeds population ageing by far and pensioners are granted a ﬁnancial status 
far above that of the poor strata of society.
In its pure form, the pension system is an insurance service made compul-
sory. As long as the condition of payment to the social security system over a 
given period of time is met, it provides life-long cash support from the time 
when the “loss event” of attaining a pre-deﬁned age occurs. The intended ef-
fect of pension, then, is to secure a ﬁxed, guaranteed income to the insured 
party after a certain age.
If participation in the pension programme was only tied to the age require-
ment and stringent rules applied with no exceptions, we would “only” need 
to face the problem of deﬁning eligibility conditions and the pension rate. 
In practice, however, most pension systems allow for several exceptions. The 
Hungarian system includes many of these, such as a provision that the statu-
tory age limit may be relaxed if certain conditions are met provided that the 
claimant agrees to a lower pension rate. Conversely, a higher pension rate may 
be attained by delaying retirement. Also, the old-age pension programme 
makes exceptions in the case of occupations classiﬁed as having outstand-
ingly high health risk factors and on the basis of other social considerations: 
these allow a preferential retirement age without a reduction in pension rate. 
Thirdly, other, highly similar programmes are available in parallel with the 
old-age pension scheme: these include pensions for widowed or orphaned 
people and disability pension. With respect to labour supply eﬀects, disabil-
ity pension is the most signiﬁcant type of welfare in this group.
In contrast with other countries, participation in the disability pension pro-
gramme usually means permanent absence from the labour market in Hunga-
ry.57 For this reason, our analysis treats disability and old age pensions as parts 
of a coherent welfare programme with two, formally distinct components: their 
accessibility and entitlement conditions diﬀer but the pension rates are deter-
mined in eﬀectively the same way. With respect to labour supply eﬀects, the 
most important feature of the pension system is the incentive system which is 
embodied in the regulations specifying eligibility and the amount of pension to 
be paid. With reference to the categories discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume, 
this is a secure transfer of a predetermined amount [see Figure 1.4a)] which 
substantially enhances the ﬁnancial circumstances of the recipient (the payment 
almost always ensures “a decent living standard,” assuming a complete absence 
of labour activities and taking the needs of an elderly person who owns his or 
her home). This outcome has an unequivocal negative eﬀect on labour supply, 
since the pension grants an income necessary for subsistence without the need 
to work or in combination with part-time employment. If the availability of 
part-time work is limited, complete inactivity is the (second) best choice.
57 The number of exits not due 
to death is so low that it is not 
included in the annals of the 
Hungarian Central Admin-
istration of National Pension 
Insurance (ONYF). According 
to the Health Annual of 1981, 
the combined proportion of exits 
due to death, rehabilitation or 
other causes is 5 to 6 per cent 
(KSH, 1981).
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The simple model and ﬁgures in Chapter 1, however, cannot show all the 
eﬀects of the system. If the programme allows early entry at the cost of certain 
ﬁnancial sacriﬁces, the promise of a secure income will have an eﬀect before 
the start of entitlement, not only following it. The attractiveness of the oﬀer 
depends on the expected utility of the pensioner and non-pensioner status, 
which can be characterised by three factors: the ratio of the pension to labour 
income (substitution rate), the security of obtaining and retaining either type 
of income, and the possible use of available leisure time. Let us consider the 
following simple examples as an illustration.
If no major changes occur in the individuals’ life courses – i.e., people who 
are successful in the labour market have always been successful, and those who 
are unsuccessful have always been unsuccessful –, the substitution rate will be 
roughly the same for diﬀerent people (regardless of the number of years taken 
into consideration in calculating the pension). If, however, someone is hit by 
adversity at a given point in life – loses a previously secure job, for instance, and 
the chances of ﬁnding a job in the labour market with an income comparable 
to his/her earlier income are close to zero –, the substitution rate may be above 
average. The availability of this option encourages early retirement even if labour 
supply is possible. When there are signiﬁcant obstacles to employment, however, 
pension remains the only source of income and the eﬀect will be multiplied.
For our second example, let us assume that the worker is in employment 
but expects to lose his/her job shortly. The worker also knows that job seek-
ing will require some eﬀort and will have an uncertain outcome. The worker’s 
income has not yet changed but its future availability is highly insecure. This 
threat alone makes pension an attractive option.
Finally, let us consider a worker who has worked in a windowless oﬃce with 
neon tube lighting for 30 years, has permanent backache and overstressed eyes. 
This is a person who enjoys gardening and being outdoors and has no signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnancial commitments. Retirement will be quite an attractive option 
for this worker, even if it means ﬁnancial sacriﬁces.
While even these simple examples involve more than one factor, it is quite 
conceivable that these eﬀects are accumulated. Our imaginary worker has been 
sitting in a dark oﬃce or standing in an assembly line for years, their low, but 
so far suﬃcient, wages are about to be lost because of privatization or the sale 
of the business. The worker’s specialised training means that only unskilled 
work would be accessible to them in the village and they would be in compe-
tition with young and far more capable workers. All our worker needs to do 
is get a certiﬁcate of disability to secure a decent living. This would not only 
guarantee an income, but would also allow the worker to help their daughter, 
who would like to commute to the town 80 miles away but has a two year old 
child to care for. The story could be further coloured in various ways, includ-
ing a threat of losing the job, the diﬃculty of employment and other factors. 
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Our imagination, however, does not tell us anything about the weights of the 
individual factors in making the decision. To measure that, we need a large 
number of observations and multivariate methods of estimation.
5.1. Data
To estimate the factors inﬂuencing a pension claim, we need a database which 
supplies information on income as well as data on individual circumstances. 
Only one such large database is available in Hungary, the Household Budget 
Survey, for which data have been collected by the Hungarian Central Statisti-
cal Oﬃce (CSO) for several decades and which has been made available in a 
virtually unchanged format commencing with the years following the regime 
change up to the present day. Households participating in the survey supply 
data every year on their incomes and expenditures for the given year and for a 
single month of the year,58 as well as on various demographic and other traits. 
Data on people living in the same household can be linked and the details of 
individual household members can be included with individual traits.
In addition, the panel allows data to be linked over time as well as within 
a given year. One third of the households in the sample is replaced each year, 
with the result that (in theory) each household can be followed for three years. 
Since however people move or, more frequently, drop out, the number of house-
holds and individuals that can be linked in practice is smaller than theoreti-
cally possible – this phenomenon and the details of linking are described by 
György Molnár, the person responsible for developing the panel data (Molnár, 
2005). In an attempt to counter-balance the loss of data due to drop-out for 
the present analysis, two periods were linked in so-called stacked panels, which 
were then ordered “successively” such that the ﬁrst and the second periods of 
each pair could be treated the same way, as if data were collected during the 
same time period. The procedure was carried out for each start year between 
1993 and 2000 with the exception of 1995, where this was not possible. The 
method has the consequence that the time of individual observations is “lost,” 
which we attempt to compensate for by including eﬀects typical of the given 
years and some characteristics of the environment which vary over time (such 
as regional employment rate). Income measured in cash is expressed in terms 
of its value in 2001 for the same reason. After linking the data, people claiming 
and receiving pension in a given year are identiﬁed as those who did not have a 
pension income in the ﬁrst period but had one in the next period.59
5.2. Diﬀerences between pensioners and non-pensioners
The decision to retire depends on the relative weights of the advantages and 
disadvantages of pensioner and non-pensioner status. It is assumed to be a 
genuine decision, although – some may rightly object – there may be no al-
58 With the exception of food 
expenditure, which only appears 
in monthly data.
59 This working deﬁnition of 
start of retirement is clearly 
not perfect and, although it 
is suitable for our purposes, it 
cannot be used to enumerate 
people entering retirement in 
the given period. Since in theory 
there is no seasonal effect in 
retirement, people may enter 
the pension programme in any 
month of the year. If, however, 
people are only observed in one 
month of the year, the odds of 
someone retiring without the 
change being observed is exactly 
0.5 (the month of retirement is 
smaller than the month of the 
observation). The fact that half 
of the retiring events are left 
unobserved may be a signiﬁcant 
loss, but unfortunately, we have 
no other option. The main rea-
son for this is that a method of 
almost complete capture would 
require the use of yearly income 
data, which would not allow 
us to determine pensioner and 
non-pensioner incomes over the 
entire period with reasonable 
accuracy.
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ternative to retirement under the given circumstances due to various pres-
sures. Strictly speaking, it is the diﬀerent forces of the various constraints 
which are investigated in this case. Financial incentives are important, but 
of course not the only factors that contribute to the level of welfare that may 
be attained in either of the two situations. Other considerations include ﬁrst 
of all the temporal distance from retirement age, as well as leisure activities 
and family commitments.
If we are to estimate the probability of pensioner status (i.e., the eﬀects of 
individual factors on the probability of an arbitrarily selected person being 
retired), we can use cross-section data from a given period. The probability 
of pensioner status (the state, being part of the stock), however, may deviate 
substantially at a given point of time from the probability of entering retire-
ment (the change, being part of the ﬂow). Since, however, in most cases only 
cross-section data are available, for reasons of comparability, we shall ﬁrst use 
a simple model with cross-section data to investigate the eﬀects of individual 
factors on someone being retired or not. The set of independent variables used 
in the equations includes the usual human capital type variables and also oth-
ers which may have an eﬀect on labour market success due to diﬀerent condi-
tions on regional labour markets.
Table 5.1: Estimate of the probability of pensioner status among people aged 25–64  
based on cross-section data (average marginal effects from probit regression)
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Activity rate of region of residence (%)  –1.043*** (0.17) –0.846*** (0.17) –0.342** (0.15)
Activity rate of region of residence squared  0.761*** (0.16) 0.612*** (0.16) 0.238* (0.14)
Education: vocational training   0.00216 (0.0058) 0.0283*** (0.0042)
Education: upper secondary   –0.0333*** (0.0059) 0.0237*** (0.0047)
Education: higher education   –0.0844*** (0.0057) 0.00152 (0.0054)
Female   –0.0512*** (0.0025) –0.0390*** (0.0021)
Partner is retired   0.0893*** (0.0032) 0.0691*** (0.0027)
Working    –0.311*** (0.0034)
N  113,348 112,854 112,854 112,854
R2 0.461 0.472 0.496 0.645
Control variables not shown + control vari-
ables of distance 
from retirement 
age
+ control vari-
ables of distance 
from retirement 
age, region, set-
tlement type and 
year
+ control variables of 
distance from retire-
ment age, region, set-
tlement type and year
+ control variables of 
distance from retire-
ment age, region, 
settlement type and 
year
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence of observation units (clus-
tering) are given in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The estimates over the observations of every person between the ages of 25 and 
64 in the sample are shown in Table 5.1 using four diﬀerent speciﬁcations. 
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The ﬁgures in the table indicate the magnitude of change in the probability 
of an arbitrarily selected person being retired due to a change in a given vari-
able, independently of the eﬀects of every other observed trait. Column (2), 
for instance, shows that given a group of people of the same age, the same ed-
ucational attainment and living in regions with similar unemployment rates, 
the probability of being retired is 8 per cent lower for a female member of the 
group than it is for a male member. Individual eﬀects appear independently 
of each other. Thus, the eﬀect of temporal distance from retirement age, for 
instance, is not mixed with the eﬀects of educational diﬀerences in the com-
position of various age cohorts.
It is clear that the distance from retirement age is perhaps the most impor-
tant indicator that distinguishes pensioners from non-pensioners. The expo-
nentially rising curve alone (shown in Figure 5.1) accounts for 46 per cent 
of variability in pensioner status. To achieve the greatest possible ﬂexibility, 
this curve was estimated with a non-parametric method (using a diﬀerent 
indicator variable for each distance in number of years). As it is highly space-
consuming to display the results in a table, this information is not shown in 
the data columns of Table 5.1, although it was included in each estimation. 
The outcome of this estimation alone can be seen in Figure 5.1. The variable 
has such a strong explanatory power that the model’s success in predicting 
retirement only improves by one percentage point if we add the variables of 
local activity rate, region, settlement type and year of observation (see Col-
umn [2] in the table). Including the variables of education, sex and partner’s 
activity in the model has a more signiﬁcant but still moderate eﬀect (Column 
[3]). The results indicate that relatively highly educated people and women are 
less likely to be pensioners, similarly to those who live in a region with better 
employment prospects or whose partners are not pensioners. The observed 
eﬀects of these factors correspond to our expectations to some extent, since 
employment prospects are related to training, and partners or spouses often 
synchronize their retirement. It may come as a surprise, however, that wom-
en are less likely to be pensioners than men. The explanation is that although 
the statutory retirement age is lower for women (which should increase the 
odds), there is a lower incidence of disability pension among women compared 
to men (which decreases the odds) and there is a large number of untrained 
women, the eﬀects of which are captured by the inclusion of the variable of 
education. With these eﬀects controlled for, the probability of pensioner sta-
tus is reduced. A major change can be observed with the inclusion of indi-
viduals’ employment status (Column [4]): working people are less likely to 
be pensioners compared to non-working people. Now we are in a much bet-
ter position than before to explain pensioner status; it is not clear, however, 
what was ﬁrst: the pension or the lack of employment.
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Figure 5.1: Probabilities of pensioner status and retirement as a function  
of the number of years left until retirement age  
(differences are relative to retirement age as reference value)
Source: Author’s computations based on cross-section and panel data from the 
HCSO Household Budget Survey.
There are two reasons why a cross-section analysis is not suitable for assessing 
the incentive eﬀects of the pension programme. First, it shows the cumulative 
result of factors motivating retirements over a relatively long period of time 
(which is also inﬂuenced by deaths) and therefore it cannot provide a reliable 
estimate of the incentive eﬀects of the current pension system. Secondly, it 
does not allow us to measure the eﬀects of considerations arising before the 
decision to retire is made (which is our main concern). To measure that, panel 
data are needed and ﬂows rather than status need to be observed.
The results of a simple estimation concerning entry into retirement are 
shown in Table 5.2. In the simplest model, only the factor of temporal dis-
tance from retirement age is included as a variable predicting the probability 
of entering retirement. Similarly to the cross-section estimation, the eﬀects of 
this factor are only shown in Figure 5.1, together with the raw cross-section 
probability of retirement. Although the explanatory power of the model us-
ing panel data is smaller (accounting for around 6 per cent of variability), the 
curve displays an exponential shape similarly to the raw cross-section data and 
corresponding to our expectations based on the standard duration model.60 
A notable diﬀerence between the two curves is that while the probability of 
pensioner status based on stocks peaks at retirement age, the raw probability 
of entering retirement based on ﬂows peaks three years before, at exactly the 
point when early retirement becomes available without any penalties. The de-
terminants of entering retirement are added to the model gradually. 
–0.8
–0.6
–0.4
–0.2
0.0
Raw probability of transition to pensioner status
Raw probability of pensioner status
Probability of pensioner status purged of the effect of individual characteristics
0–10–20–30
0.2
–40 10
60 Note that we do not expect 
equivalence: the two curves 
could only be equivalent un-
der highly exceptional circum-
stances.
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Table 5.2: Estimate of the probability of entering retirement among people aged 25–64 years  
based on panel data (average marginal effects from probit regression)
Explanatory variable
25–64 year old 40–64  year old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Activity rate  –0.0242 –0.0193 –0.0238 –0.0439* –0.0418* –0.0669
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) (0.041)
Education: vocational training   –0.00191 –0.00415 –0.00232 0.0335* 0.0484
    (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0079) (0.019) (0.033)
Education: upper secondary   –0.00740** –0.00911*** –0.00409 0.0611 0.0733
    (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0078) (0.045) (0.065)
Education: higher education   –0.00941** –0.0121*** –0.00459 0.169 0.133
    (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.14) (0.16)
Female   –0.00732*** –0.00804*** –0.0230*** 0.0915 0.0619
    (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.10) (0.12)
Partner is retired   0.00703*** 0.0215*** 0.0296*** 0.0240*** 0.0311***
    (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0054)
Partner is retiring    0.142*** 0.168*** 0.140*** 0.121***
     (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
On sick leave in base period    0.0377*** 0.0313*** 0.0289*** 0.0426***
     (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0065)
Net income (log)     –0.159*** –0.157*** –0.275***
      (0.049) (0.045) (0.094)
Net income (log) squared     0.00652*** 0.00684*** 0.0119***
      (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0044)
Work experience (years, potential)      0.00726** –0.00528
       (0.0034) (0.0071)
Work experience squared      0.0000  0.000194***
       (0.000019) (0.000059)
Net income (log) × female      –0.00535 –0.00482
       (0.0049) (0.0091)
Number of years before retirement age     –0.000795 –0.0132**
       (0.0032) (0.0056)
Number of years before retirement age squared     0.000151*** 0.000652***
       (0.000020) (0.000074)
Over retirement age      –0.0126 –0.0360***
       (0.012) (0.013)
Working    0.0184***
     (0.0025)
N  45,385 45,385 45,385 45,385 21,264 20,834 10,298
R2 0.064 0.072 0.076 0.14 0.23 0.223 0.195
Each equation includes the control variables of year, region and settlement type, which are not shown here. With 
the exception of the last two, each estimation includes a row with the indicator variable measuring the diﬀerence 
between age and retirement age, i.e., people’s temporal “distance” from the eﬀective retirement age. The ﬁnal 
equation also includes year indicators which interact with income.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence of observation units (cluster-
ing) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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The explanatory value of the model is substantially improved when individu-
al traits are added which capture temporal changes and motivations predict-
ing the decision – this is shown in Columns (2)–(4) in the table. Factors in 
this group include sick leave status in the ﬁrst period of observation, which 
approximates health status, the partner entering retirement and the net in-
come received over the ﬁrst period. Since labour income will also be taken 
into account in later analyses, the models shown in Columns (5)–(6) use the 
sub-sample of people in employment. Disregarding the fact that the eﬀect 
of education disappears, the results are qualitatively similar to our previous 
ﬁndings. The eﬀect of education is replaced by a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of 
income. The last column shows a re-estimation of model (6) where the ﬁnd-
ing that the incidence of entering retirement displays a steep increase from the 
age of 40 is taken into account and the sample is reduced to people in the age 
cohort of 40 to 64 years. The results indicate that the eﬀects of most of the 
variables are highly similar to those observed before. One exception is work 
experience, which displays a linear eﬀect for this age group.
5.3. A more complete model estimation of entering retirement
Our previous models do not reveal the eﬀects of the income that may be at-
tained under pensioner or non-pensioner status. Although some of the vari-
ables have an indirect eﬀect on income, their combined indirect eﬀects on 
rate of income cannot be determined and cannot be isolated from their di-
rect eﬀects. In this section the model is modiﬁed to address this problem.61 
Since the estimation hinges on the observation of labour income in the ﬁrst 
period, only those people are analysed who worked at the time.62
The estimation procedure needs to bypass the problem that pensions remain 
unobserved for people who work in the second period, while wages remain 
unobserved for people who enter retirement. The ﬁnal model measuring the 
relationship between expected income and the decision to retire is therefore 
built in three steps. First, the income expected without entering retirement 
is estimated – this will be primarily, but not exclusively, labour income. The 
estimation is based on the section of the population who are not retired. Sec-
ond, the level of income expected after retiring is estimated on the basis of the 
data on people who are observed to enter the pension programme. The two 
income estimates together cover the population of people in employment in 
the ﬁrst period of observation and indicate how much income each of them 
can expect as a function of the decision whether to retire or not. These values 
can then be included in the equation explaining the decision.
Estimation of income in the second period as a non-pensioner
Table 5.3 lists the results of classic Mincer wage equations augmented by the 
income measured in the previous period. It is an important diﬀerence compared 
61 The modiﬁcation is motivated 
by the option value model of 
Stock & Wise (1988). The option 
value model describes the deci-
sion to retire made at a given 
point as a decision which takes 
future costs and gains into ac-
count in addition to immediate 
consequences. At each point, the 
decision maker considers the im-
mediate and all future gains of 
retiring. If the gains are greatest 
in the present, the individual 
will retire, if greater gains are 
expected in the future, he or 
she will wait. The estimation is 
greatly simpliﬁed by the assump-
tion that retiring is typically 
accompanied by inactivity and 
both are irreversible once the 
decision has been made. One of 
the important consequences of 
the Stock & Wise model is that 
if this condition is satisﬁed, the 
incomes expected in retirement 
and outside of retirement can be 
used directly in the estimation. 
Lumisdale, Stock & Wise (1990) 
demonstrate that if motivations 
are speciﬁed with suﬃcient de-
tail, the model can be built using 
a simple econometric procedure, 
binary probit estimation. Our 
circumstances unfortunately 
do not allow speciﬁcations at 
the required level and we are 
not in a position to use Stock & 
Wise’s procedure directly. To be 
able to regard our equation as an 
estimation of the option value 
model, we must assume that the 
income expected in the next pe-
riod is indicative of all successive 
future periods. In this case, an 
expectation of higher pension 
means that the total income 
of the entire pensioner period 
is expected to be higher than 
the total income of the entire 
non-pensioner period.
62 Also, based on the data dis-
played in Figure 5.1, the group 
under analysis was restricted 
to people over 40 years of age 
– the upper age limit of 64 years 
was kept.
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to the estimation of earnings that although the majority of pensioners work as 
employees, a lot of them also receive income from other sources, which supple-
ments or substitutes for labour income. These include casual payments, second 
jobs, premia and even unemployment beneﬁt. As these are taken into account 
in predicting income, the result is a good approximation of the income to be 
expected in the next period corrected for the risk of changing status. Similarly 
to the Mincer equations, our equation shows the impact of education on wag-
es but with the parameter of delayed income assigned the value of 0.7, it is the 
growth of income rather than its level that we predict (subtracting 0.7 times the 
income expected in the next period from both sides of the equation, the relevant 
element is cancelled on the right and we get an outcome variable approximat-
ing the growth of income on the left). A notable result is that the coeﬃcient of 
the delayed income is rather small, which to a large extent can be attributed to 
our decision to include every possible activity status to estimate the income of 
the second period rather than only people in employment.
Table 5.3: Net personal income expected in the second period without pension 
(monthly, log) as a function of individual traits – sample:  
people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income (log) in first period 0.707*** (0.017) 0.699*** (0.020)
Work experience (years, potential) 0.0144 (0.014) 0.00454 (0.013)
Work experience squared –0.000313 (0.00023) –0.000109 (0.00022)
Education: vocational training 0.0813 (0.053) 0.102 (0.082)
Education: upper secondary 0.181*** (0.055) 0.204** (0.084)
Education: higher education 0.288*** (0.059) 0.318*** (0.085)
Female –0.0593*** (0.014) –0.0563*** (0.015)
Local activity rate 0.273** (0.13) 0.254** (0.11)
Constant 2.702*** (0.29) 2.909*** (0.28)
Lambda 0.165** (0.079)
N  10,062 9474
R2 . 0.27
Both equations include the control variables of year, region and settlement type, not 
shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
A shortcoming of the simple estimation using the method of least squares 
(OLS, second column) is that it disregards the possibility that a pensioner 
may not become a pensioner at random, but under some pressure where fac-
tors determining future success play a major role. If this is the case, there may 
be factors which have not been observed but have an impact both on expected 
income and on labour market success. What we have in mind are traits such 
as creativity, motivation, assertiveness or communication skills. Our model 
corrects for the eﬀects of these features using Heckman’s (1979) two step 
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method. The ﬁrst data column of the table shows the corrected values. The 
eﬀect to be corrected for is measured by the “lambda” variable; the impor-
tance of the correction is indicated by its level of signiﬁcance.
Estimation of income in the second period as a pensioner
The equation predicting future pension is formally similar to the labour in-
come equation. Here, however, pension is the function of personal income, 
which is a relationship that approximates the formula used to compute pen-
sions. The degressive nature of the pension formula is to be captured by in-
come squared in addition to income, while diﬀerences assumed to hold be-
tween women and men mainly in the number of years of work are captured 
by allowing the eﬀects of income to diﬀer between the sexes. The estimation 
allows us to predict what income could be expected by people who delay re-
tirement if they chose to retire.
Table 5.4: Net personal income expected in retirement in the second period 
(monthly, log) as a function of individual traits – sample:  
people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income (log) –1.003 (0.91) –1.383* (0.71)
Net income (log) squared 0.0677 (0.043) 0.0853** (0.034)
Net income (log) × female –0.00953** (0.0044) –0.00844** (0.0038)
Work experience (years, potential) 0.0305 (0.034) 0.0183 (0.022)
Work experience squared –0.000544 (0.00051) –0.000243 (0.00032)
Constant 13.17*** (4.78) 15.08*** (3.66)
Lambda –0.127* (0.066)
N  10,298 588
R2 .. 0.19
Both equations include the control variables of year, region and settlement type, not 
shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
As we can see in Table 5.4, the equation once again has a moderate explana-
tory power, and the eﬀect of net income does not appear to be statistically 
signiﬁcant. One reason is that one of the variables not shown here which cap-
tures those eﬀects of net income that vary between years is highly signiﬁcant. 
Another reason is the strong signiﬁcance of the lambda variable, which cap-
tures selection bias and shows a strong correlation with net income. It is clear, 
however, that although the results of the estimation where there is no correc-
tion for unobserved eﬀects (OLS in the second data column) are qualitative-
ly similar, the parameters of the key variables are greater, as we expected. A 
somewhat surprising result is that the quadratic term indicates growth rather 
than degression63 – we have no explanation for this phenomenon.
63 The apparent negative eﬀect 
is due to the fact that the data 
points are on the ascending part 
of the function.
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Estimation of the decision to retire as a function of expected income
With the pensioner and non-pensioner incomes expected in the next year avail-
able for each person observed, their eﬀects can be directly estimated. Variables 
previously included as an indication of income type (such as education) are now 
replaced by the estimated values of incomes and only those variables remain in 
the model which exclusively aﬀect retirement – partner’s retirement status, part-
ner’s transition to pensioner status, sick leave in the ﬁrst period and distance from 
retirement age. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.5, corrected 
and uncorrected as before. Similarly to previous results, we can see that there 
is no substantial diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀects, although the results 
of the model controlling for selection eﬀects are more pronounced, which is, 
again, what we expect considering the eﬀects of unobserved factors.
Table 5.5: Average effect of income incentives on the probability of entering the 
pension programme – sample: people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income if working (predicted, log) –0.134*** (0.022) –0.115*** (0.017)
Net monthly income if retired (predicted, log) 0.186*** (0.038) 0.161*** (0.030)
Partner is retired 0.0292*** (0.0053) 0.0292*** (0.0053)
Partner starts retirement 0.123*** (0.018) 0.123*** (0.018)
On sick leave in the base period 0.0416*** (0.0065) 0.0415*** (0.0065)
Number of years before retirement age –0.0234*** (0.0015) –0.0223*** (0.0015)
Number of years before retirement age2 0.000815*** (0.000067) 0.000796*** (0.000067)
Over retirement age –0.0169 (0.018) –0.0200 (0.017)
N  10,298 10,298
R2 .. ..
Structural probit estimation. Each equation includes the control variables of year, 
region and settlement type, not shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
The above estimation indicates that the ﬁnancial incentives have a signiﬁcant 
eﬀect. A one per cent increase in expected non-pensioner income decreases 
the probability of entering retirement by 0.11–0.13 percentage points, while a 
similar increase in pension income increases it by 0.16–0.18 percentage points. 
As before, having a retired or retiring partner also increases the probability 
of entering retirement, by 3 and 12 percentage points respectively. Consid-
ering that the raw proportion of people entering retirement is around 6 per 
cent in the sample, this eﬀect appears to be fairly important. The probability 
of entering retirement continues to increase with a decrease in the temporal 
distance from retirement age, independently of other factors.
What is the interpretation of the results? Two strong conclusions of practi-
cal relevance can be drawn. 1. The number of years left before retirement age is 
reached and the respective incomes that can be expected as a pensioner and a 
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non-pensioner both have a strong impact on the decision to retire. The higher 
the income that can be expected in retirement, the more likely it is that pen-
sioner status will be the chosen option and the higher the income expected 
from work, the less likely it is. Since the values of the two coeﬃcients are not 
substantially diﬀerent, we would get similar results if we replaced incomes by a 
single variable: the substitution rate of pension. In this case, the results indicate 
that retirement becomes an increasingly attractive option as the substitution 
rate increases, i.e., as pension income becomes a better substitute for labour 
income. 2. Besides individual traits, unobserved factors presumably related to 
labour market success also have an eﬀect on retirement. These skills increase 
the expected non-pensioner income and reduce the probability of retiring. If 
the goal of economic policy is to delay average retirement age, the impact of 
expected income and personal skills needs to be considered.
Let us start with skills. In many countries, adult education is an active 
labour market intervention aimed at improving employment chances, but 
there are indications that these programmes are moderately eﬃcient (at least 
in comparison with programmes enhancing human capital at a younger age, 
as argued by Carneiro & Heckman (2003) for instance). Köllő (2006) ﬁnds 
that the most pressing problem of people who have diﬃculty adjusting to the 
labour market is a lack of basic skills of literacy and other skills needed to ab-
sorb and process information. While this conclusion may well hold for our 
data as well, in the absence of accurate measurements, we can only speculate. 
This important issue can only be settled on the basis of targeted data collec-
tion focussing on the relationship between skills and retirement.
Among politicians and economists alike, a general consensus appears to 
emerge now that given the phenomena of population ageing and improving life 
chances, raising retirement age is inevitable. The results of the analysis indicate 
that raising the age of retirement is an eﬃcient tool. It must be emphasized, 
however, that we do not know either the indirect eﬀects of a delayed retirement 
age on the labour market success of aﬀected people or its direct eﬀects on other 
economic actors. The investigation of these is a research question, while the as-
sistance of people in disadvantaged situations is the task of social policy.
Finally, a discussion of possible ways of regulating expected pension incomes 
is in place. A sensible policy would not aim at reducing the incomes of people 
entering the pension programme at or after retirement age. This would in fact 
be diﬃdult to do in a fully or at least partially insurance based pension sys-
tem. Reducing the level of pension income attainable before retirement age 
is reached is, however, all the more important. One method may be to lower 
pensions granted before retirement age to a greater extent than previously, 
or reduce the probability of access to early pensions. We have seen in Chap-
ter 4 of this volume that there is a fairly wide margin of freedom to do that, 
especially with respect to disability pensions.
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CHANGING CONDITIONS OF EARLY RETIREMENT
Mária Augusztinovics & János Köllő
Over the few years immediately before and after 
the regime change, large numbers of people chose 
early retirement as an escape from imminent or ex-
pected job loss. The incidence of early retirement 
remained high after the transitional recession, de-
spite the gradual rise in the statutory retirement 
age and the abolishment of the special early pen-
sion scheme previously introduced to ease labour 
market tensions. To illustrate the orders of magni-
tude: of the cohort born between 1945 and 1959, 
23 per cent had retired by 2005 – when they were 
46 to 60 years old. Within this cohort, the ratio of 
pensioners was only 8 per cent among graduates, 
20 per cent among people with secondary educa-
tion and 35 per cent among people who had only 
completed 8 years of primary education.
The chapters discussing disability pension and 
early retirement have shown that an important fac-
tor to consider is that the pension programme pro-
vided a relatively high and secure income compared 
to potential – insecure – wages. The choice of early 
retirement was not constrained by “penalty” deduc-
tions in the old-age pension scheme and in the case 
of disability pensions was facilitated by the – well 
documented – tacit consideration of poor labour 
market prospects in the evaluation of claims.
Over the next few years, the conditions impact-
ing choice between employment and early retire-
ment are expected to change profoundly, quite in-
dependently of changes in early retirement rules 
or in disability assessment procedures. The avail-
able (imperfect and incomplete) data suggest that 
large groups of people will be unable to obtain suf-
ﬁcient years of service required for a pension by the 
time they reach retirement age. Or, if the current 
requirement of 20 years of accumulated service 
were lifted they could expect a pension so small 
in amount that it would not present an attractive 
alternative to incomes oﬀered by casual labour or 
welfare beneﬁt programmes. This is a new phenom-
enon in the pension system and, in a broader sense, 
in the entire system of social transfers.
The analysis of administrative data in Augusz-
tinovics and Köllő (2007) indicates that, in the 
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the new millennium, each year 
about 37 to 40 per cent of the cohorts born be-
tween 1945 and 1950 failed to have accumulated 
the service time required for pension eligibility as 
speciﬁed by the current regulations. The ratio is 
somewhat lower, at 32 per cent, when considering 
the total of the ﬁve year period, owing to the fact 
that people move between eligible and non-eligi-
ble status. As the degree of mobility is practically 
unknown however, and predictions on the future 
always contain some uncertainty, it is diﬃcult to 
estimate the number of people who will not obtain 
pension eligibility. According to a cautious estimate 
with very broad margins, there will be 250 to 500 
thousand people over the next decade and a half 
who will not attain pension eligibility by the time 
they reach retirement age because they will fail to 
meet the requirement of 20 years service. Taking 
the median of the top and the bottom values of the 
estimated range, around a third of the population 
will fail to be eligible potentially reaching 50 per 
cent among people with only primary education. 
People in this subgroup are not only threatened by 
the prospect that they will not be able to retire if 
they wish to, but can also expect very low pension 
rates of barely 40 per cent of the average pension 
of university or college graduates.
These circumstances will gradually reduce the 
role of the old-age pension scheme in social and 
unemployment assistance aquired over the past 
twenty years, since they block the escape route pre-
cisely for those with the worst employment pros-
pects. While the long years of service accumulated 
– by almost everyone – over the period of socialism 
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held the door open well after the end of the full em-
ployment era, it will soon be shut by the persistenly 
low employment rate and low wage rates of unedu-
cated workers.
The trend described above will put unprecedent-
ed pressure on the disability pension programme. 
However, tightening the regulations on disability 
pension claim evaluation cannot solve this prob-
lem by itself; it can at best steer claimants who are 
denied employment and old-age pension towards 
other welfare programmes. What is needed, in-
stead, is a rehabilitation programme of the kind 
presented in Chapter 6 of this volume – and a race 
against time. These developments also make it im-
perative to make a decision on how the old-age pen-
sion scheme should handle those not attaining eli-
gibility or only to very low pensions: whether they 
should be granted a basic or minimum pension or 
be provided for by an old-age welfare programme 
outside the pension system.
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6. EVIDENCE-BASED SOCIAL POLICY: AN EXAMPLE OF A WORK 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMME
Ágota Scharle64
The number of people receiving disability pension has almost tripled since 
the 1970s, reaching a proportion of 7.5 per cent of the working-age popula-
tion in 2001. With the decline of heavy industry, the proportion of people 
on disability pension is twice the national average in regions with scarce job 
opportunities and much of this group have permanently left the labour mar-
ket. The government has made substantial progress in reducing unemploy-
ment and welfare dependence but the labour market prospects of people on 
disability pension have not improved.
The above summary of the situation in Great Britain may sound familiar to 
Hungarian readers. This chapter describes the reaction of the British govern-
ment to the challenge of such a situation as an example of the implementation 
of evidence based policy making. The ﬁnal section of the chapter points out 
some lessons for Hungarian policy making, highlighting some bottlenecks 
and promising initiatives as well.
6.1. Good governance and evidence based policy making
The cooperation between government decision makers and researchers has a 
long history in Great Britain, and the Labour government taking power in 
1997 under Tony Blair’s leadership has placed an even greater emphasis on 
this cooperation. In its modernisation programme announced in 1999, the 
government pledged to be “forward-looking in developing policies to deliver 
outcomes that matter, not simply reacting to short-term pressures” (Cabinet, 
1999). Evidence-based policy making was highlighted as one of the most im-
portant tools in achieving this goal (Davies, Nutley & Walter, 2003).
The task of improving government eﬃciency has recently received increas-
ing attention in the European Union, at international organisations and in 
certain countries.65 Better Regulation initiatives are especially strong in Brit-
ain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries. The common element in the ini-
tiatives ranging from cutting red tape through to introducing systematic im-
pact analyses is that they seek methods for improving eﬃciency and attempt 
to integrate these into the daily practice of policy making.
64 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely con-
tributed to the writing of this 
chapter.
65 At an international conference 
in June 2007, the representatives 
of the European Committee, the 
OECD, the World Bank and the 
UN issued a common statement, 
where they call for governments 
to support the propagation of an 
evidence based culture of policy 
making in every aspect and state 
that transparent and responsible 
policy making makes a substan-
tial contribution to the growth 
of welfare (Istanbul...,2007).
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In Britain, the need for change and the modernising agenda were outlined 
in two reports published by the Cabinet Oﬃce in 1999 (Bullock, Mountford 
& Stanley, 2001). The report on Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-
First Century identiﬁed nine core features of modern policy making: outward 
looking, innovative and creative, forward looking, evidence-based, inclusive, 
joined up, learns lessons, evaluates and reviews (Cabinet, 1999). An eﬃcient 
process of policy making involves the regular and systematic assessment of 
delivery, the recognition and dissemination of implications for policy, and the 
correction of existing measures as needed. Every eﬀort is made throughout 
the process to rely on the most accurate evidence available: facts and research 
ﬁndings and the opinions of professional organisations and stake-holders. Fi-
nally, co-operation between government institutions is sought from the start 
of the policy making process through to its delivery.
Evidence-based policy making was given an especially strong emphasis in 
the British modernisation programme. New units and working groups were 
set up under the supervision of the Cabinet Oﬃce, The Treasury, the Audit 
Oﬃce and the Economic and Social Research Council and commissioned to 
develop various areas of organisational culture and expert capacities. Train-
ing programmes were organised for government experts and politicians, a na-
tionwide publicity campaign was launched to raise awareness and support for 
evidence-based policy making, and new forms of cross-departmental collabo-
ration between working groups, secondment of specialist staﬀ and collabo-
ration with external experts were introduced. A resource and management 
centre was established to co-ordinate the collaboration between academic 
research centres engaged in developing management tools. These initiatives 
were strengthened by legislation and the requirement to support government 
decisions by evidence and make background studies publicly available is sys-
tematically enforced in government policy making (Bullock, Mountford & 
Stanley, 2001).
6.2. The British Pathways to Work programme
The implementation and success of the new approach to governance is aptly 
illustrated by the launch of Pathways to Work in 2002, a new programme 
aimed at helping unemployed people with reduced work capacity to return 
to work. The success of the scheme rests on its carefully designed structure as 
well as on the method of its introduction, where the ﬁrst pilots were followed 
by gradual expansion and thorough impact assessment after each step, with 
corrections made as necessary.
The Green Paper – problems, proposals and consultation
Plans for the Pathways to Work programme were published in a green paper 
by the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP, 2002). The green paper 
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surveyed the labour market participation of the population living with reduced 
work capacity, reviewed the experiences of the existing New Deal scheme for 
disabled people and concluded that it had brought no major improvement 
in comparison with other programmes, as the employment rate of the target 
group had not increased signiﬁcantly. The last chapter of the paper outlined 
a proposal for a programme which was expected to improve results.
The new government coming into power in 1997 introduced a range of wel-
fare to work schemes targeted at various groups in 1998. On top of general 
active labour market programmes, three measures were introduced to encour-
age the re-employment of people with reduced work capacity:
1. people making a claim for incapacity beneﬁt are required to attend an 
interview where employment opportunities are discussed; the interview is 
repeated at least every three years;
2. people actively seeking work are assisted by job brokers who specialise 
in disabled workers;
3. people over 50 entering long-term part-time or full-time employment are 
eligible for additional ﬁnancial support for a year, also available to partici-
pants of training programmes for a month.
The Green Paper of 2002 found that while the overall employment rate 
increased and unemployment decreased from 1999 to 2000, there was an 
increase in the number of people on incapacity beneﬁt, claimants stayed on 
welfare for an average of eight years66 and most of them did not work during 
this period. The evaluation of the operation of the employment programme 
led to the conclusion that although people with impaired health conditions 
received more help than previously, this was not suﬃciently focused or suf-
ﬁciently intensive.
Standard job centre services are suﬃcient for the average unemployed go-
ing through a rough phase in their career but people applying for incapacity 
beneﬁt have more speciﬁc needs. Health problems are usually accompanied 
by other impediments: low educational attainment and a lack or insuﬃciency 
of basic skills (such as literacy, communication, adaptation). These cases re-
quire personalised assistance that ﬁrst helps to compensate for these missing 
skills and then helps to acquire them. Assistance needs to be supplemented 
by close supervision: one of the most frequently absent skills is in fact mo-
tivation itself, which can be encouraged by a requirement of regular checks 
and by ﬁnancial incentives.
The ﬁrst programme introduced in 1998 needed to be amended in a num-
ber of ways: the three year interval of mandatory interviews proved to be too 
long, the staﬀ at job centres were not appropriately trained to deal with cus-
tomers with special needs, job brokers did not have suﬃcient information 
on appropriate job opportunities, the diﬀerent schemes were not suitably in-
tegrated and failed to cover the entire range of problems that came up. The 
66 The work capacity of claim-
ants is reviewed every three years 
and permanent entitlement is 
granted in very rare cases.
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2002 Budget allocated supplementary resources to piloting new methods in 
an eﬀort to correct these deﬁciencies.
The Green Paper was published on the DWP web site on 20th November 
2002 and the proposal was open to public debate until 10th February 2003. 
Several professional and interest groups commented on the paper – its recep-
tion was on the whole positive. The Department published its response in June 
2003 summarising the main reactions and explaining how the original propos-
al was to be modiﬁed to accommodate the new suggestions (DWP, 2003).
The structure of the new programme
The new programme outlined in the Pathways to Work Green Paper con-
sisted of four main elements: 1. claimants attend interviews and a screening 
tool is used to determine whether they need the special service provided by 
the programme; 2. those who do are required to attend further work focused 
interviews to discuss an action plan of return to work activity; 3. the service 
most suited to the needs of the claimant is selected from a wide range of pro-
grammes aimed at improving employability and labour prospects; and ﬁnally 
4. people returning to work are given improved ﬁnancial incentives (Riddell, 
Banks & Tinklin, 2005).
The new programme was built on the existing scheme introduced in 1998 
and necessary changes were decided on the basis of previous programme eval-
uations. Most of the modiﬁcations involved the administrative procedures, 
the timing of services and the improvement of collaboration between the 
various experts involved.
The work capacity and health of claimants are assessed in a series of tests 
usually taking 12 weeks before a decision is made on their entitlement. Eli-
gible claimants who are found capable of work attend a work-focused inter-
view within eight weeks after making the claim.
The ﬁrst work-focused interview is thus held two months into the pro-
gramme rather than at the time of making the claim: this ensures that par-
ticipants’ attention is not occupied by the outcome of their claim and thus 
they can better concentrate on job search. The capability assessment is spread 
over a number of sessions to allow the activity programme to proceed on the 
basis of interim results. Claimants had previously had to wait six months for 
the results of the capability assessment and had not been able to start seeking 
employment during this period.
Clients complete a questionnaire at the ﬁrst interview: their replies are 
evaluated by a computer programme that estimates the client’s prospects of 
ﬁnding employment within a year without special assistance. Those with low 
employment chances are required to attend follow-up interviews, while others 
have access to further services on a voluntary basis. A series of ﬁve follow-up 
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sessions are held, one every four weeks, where the client’s progress in return-
ing to work is discussed.
The screening tool helps identify the appropriate target group of the ser-
vices: people with little chance of return to the labour market without special 
support and encouragement are given more attention. The purpose of hav-
ing more frequent interviews is twofold: ﬁrst, the sessions help identify and 
address the obstacles to work faced by claimants and second, they serve as a 
test of availability for work. Attendance is mandatory and failure to comply 
is sanctioned by a reduction in beneﬁt.
New clients of the welfare provision are assigned to the same personal advis-
er for the entire duration of the programme. Advisers help select the services 
which are best suited to helping the client return to work. These are grouped 
into 16 packages, each targeting a life event or problem commonly hinder-
ing re-employment and may include work trials, internet access, job interview 
skills training, vocational retraining, lifestyle advice and other support. A new 
Condition Management Programme has been developed for people living 
with disabilities: these 6 to 13 week programmes help claimants manage the 
physical symptoms of their health condition or disability (such as pain).
Unemployment and incapacity beneﬁts are administered by the same insti-
tution, Jobcentre Plus, which has an extended range of functions, but several 
services are contracted out to non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt organisations. Staﬀ re-
ceive training in identifying the complex problems of workers with reduced 
work capacity and in selecting the services best suited to them.
Financial incentives are enhanced by oﬀering a small return-to work credit 
for one year (40 pounds per week, which is 20 per cent of the minimum wage, 
in the form of a tax credit) to people who enter employment of at least 16 hours 
per week if their earnings are below 15,000 pounds per year (one and a half 
times the minimum wage). People participating in work-focused rehabilita-
tion programmes can be given ﬁnancial support of 20 pounds per week (to 
compensate for travel costs, for instance). The tax credit is paid in cash directly 
by the job centre rather than as a refund from the tax authority.
Programme pilots, evaluation and roll out
The ﬁrst pilots of the Pathways to Work programme were launched in October 
2003 in three job centre districts with local unemployment rates substantial-
ly higher than the country average (Derbyshire, Renfrewshire and Bridgend 
all used to be industrial areas). At pilot job centres, programme participation 
was compulsory for new claimants and existing incapacity beneﬁt recipients 
could join on a voluntary basis. The programme was subsequently rolled out 
to further districts. Four new districts joined in April 2004, and the next ex-
pansion was implemented in February 2005, when the programme was ex-
tended to all incapacity beneﬁt claimants in the pilot districts. Another four 
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areas joined in October 2005 and in January 2006 the programme was ex-
tended to all highly disadvantaged districts (the bottom third of all districts 
in terms of unemployment rates).
19 million pounds were invested in the experiment in its ﬁrst year and 47 
million in its second. The latter ﬁgure corresponds to 0.3 per cent of all bud-
get expenditure spent in connection with people with reduced working ca-
pacity (House of Commons, 2006).
In her reply to a House of Commons interpellation, the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions said in June 2007 that the programme was active in 
40 per cent of job centre districts (Flint, 2007). Further roll out is planned 
to be implemented through contracting private sector and non-proﬁt or-
ganisations. The contracts are tendered in two waves: the services of the pro-
gramme will be available in a further 15 districts by the end of 2007 and in 
the remaining 16 districts by April 2008. Contracts had been signed with six 
private sector providers by September 2007. Participation in the programme 
is voluntary for existing provision recipients and mandatory for new claim-
ants. Trials of compulsory participation for everyone were started in 2007 
in seven districts.
The DWP regularly surveys the operation of the programme and assesses 
outcomes with the help of a purpose built evaluation database. The database 
contains data from various administrative sources: Jobcentre Plus data on 
registered unemployed people and on the participants of active labour mar-
ket programmes, data from the registry of people on welfare beneﬁts, data 
from the screening procedure, and data on the clients of the old (but still 
available) incapacity beneﬁt scheme. The database records information on 
every client of the programme and their participation can be followed at all 
phases of the procedure.
Most of the programme evaluation is undertaken by a consortium of in-
dependent research centres. The ﬁrst evaluation used qualitative methods 
of assessment and was conducted by researchers from the National Centre 
for Social Research (NatCen) at the beginning of 2004 (Dickens, Mowlam 
& Woodﬁeld, 2004). Its main purpose was to provide rapid feedback on 
the experiences of the ﬁrst phase of the experiment (the ﬁrst three pilot dis-
tricts) and to identify problems in implementation. The evaluation involved 
interviews with job centre staﬀ, external experts participating in the pilots 
and clients. Apart from their experience with the programme, respondents 
were also asked for suggestions as to what could be improved and how. This 
formed the basis of recommendations to amend the programme with respect 
to the training of personal advisers, avoiding staﬀ overload, the quality of the 
screening tool and the coherence of work availability requirements and sup-
portive services.
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A second wave of evaluations was prepared by three research centres in 
collaboration and used a longitudinal panel survey design to analyse the be-
haviour of participants (clients) of the pilot programme (Corden, Nice & 
Sainsbury, 2005). These investigated attitudes towards the new services and 
the compulsory interviews and assessed claimants use of the range of services 
provided. The data was then used to evaluate the impact of the programme on 
employment chances and to identify areas where amendments were needed.
A total of 11 surveys were conducted using diﬀerent methodologies between 
2004 and 2007: the ﬁrst qualitative interviews were followed by quantitative 
data collection on a larger sample and the administrative data of the Depart-
ment were analysed. The pilots were launched in several districts and at dif-
ferent times, which made it easier to isolate external inﬂuences from the ef-
fects of the programme (Blyth, 2007).
The evaluations covered every component of the programme and several 
factors that may have inﬂuenced outcomes. They covered the various medi-
cal examinations, the screening tool, the eﬀects of withholding the beneﬁt, 
employment diﬃculties speciﬁc to older people, adult education opportuni-
ties for people with learning diﬃculties, the ambitions and attitudes of old-
er people, attitudes towards disability, the functioning of integrated service 
provision, the costs and beneﬁts of motivating non-proﬁt service providers, 
the experiences of the return-to work tax credit administered by Jobcentre 
Plus, methods of paying pensioners’ beneﬁt entitlements, moves between sick 
leave and work, the relationship between employers and people with long-term 
health conditions and potentials for self-employment.
The latest evaluation report was completed in June 2007 on the basis of 
a questionnaire survey and administrative data (Bewley, Dorsett & Haile, 
2007). The results of the multivariate analysis indicate that one and a half 
years into the programme the proportion of clients successfully returning to 
work increased by 7.4 per cent. The number of people exiting the programme 
increased by 6.3 percentage points in the ﬁrst six months but this eﬀect di-
minished to 1.5 percentage points after one and a half years. The probability 
of employment primarily increased among the group who had left the scheme. 
The programme reduced the incidence of health impairment seriously limiting 
clients’ ability to carry out everyday activities by 10.8 percentage points.
Publicity and professional networks
The UK Department for Work and Pensions publishes the entire text and a 
summary of up to four pages of every completed report on its website (http://
www.dwp.gov.uk), by both internal and external researchers. In addition, a 
separate report on Pathways to Work summarising existing evaluations and 
results has also been published (Blyth, 2007). The results of programme eval-
uations have also been published by researchers in working papers and jour-
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nal articles. The studies are available to download from the web pages of the 
Department and the research centres involved. Wide publicity serves several 
purposes. First, it allows the government and the scientiﬁc community to 
have access to the body of knowledge emerging from the research results and 
to the conclusions and lessons learnt from the exercise. Second, it encourages 
researchers to keep to high quality standards in their analyses. Finally, by pub-
lishing brief summaries accessible to the media and to a wider audience, the 
Department can gain or enhance public support for its goals and policies.
To ensure high standards and enduring co-operation, research is commis-
sioned from experts carefully selected through competition and research 
contracts are signed for several years. The Department established a research 
procurement framework to allow the straightforward and uniform handling 
of commissioned external research activities. The framework ensures that mi-
nor research projects need not be individually handled in the public procure-
ment process. The research contract system further allows the Department 
to support the activities of research centres in certain cases. This practice has 
the advantage that with long-term collaboration, the supported organisa-
tion gains better insight into the needs of the Department. It also carries the 
risk, however, that support may be diﬃcult to withdraw should the chang-
ing needs of the Department require the expertise of other research centres. 
According to the head of the Social Research Division, this type of co-opera-
tion is successful provided that it is limited to well-deﬁned research activities 
(Bridgwood, 2003).
The heads of units responsible for commissioning research usually have di-
rect experience of research institutions: one of the senior research oﬃcers at 
the Social Research Division, for instance, held previous positions at the In-
stitute for Employment Studies of Sussex University and the Social Survey 
Methodology Unit at the Oﬃce for National Statistics and worked on policy 
evaluation methodology at the Cabinet Oﬃce.
The Department itself also employs researchers and encourages the second-
ment of its employees to conduct research at academic or other research cen-
tres (Bridgwood, 2003). The DWP in turn admits researchers and experts 
from other government departments or research centres on secondment. The 
separate research unit of the Department provides services concerning mea-
surement, methodology and analysis for the entire organisation. The unit is 
responsible for the research budget of the Department and supervises dozens 
of external research projects in parallel. The Department not only commis-
sions secondary analyses and small-scale surveys but also participates in ma-
jor endeavours, such as the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA), 
where tens of thousands of respondents are involved.
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6.3. Lessons for practices in Hungary
The majority of experts and decision makers involved in the formulation of 
employment policy in Hungary have a thorough knowledge of their ﬁelds 
and are committed to build an eﬃcient welfare system which provides social 
security and encourages labour supply at the same time. They seek to ensure 
that job centres oﬀer quality services and are open to using the results of aca-
demic research – the very existence of this volume being the perfect proof. 
The web pages of the Ministry of Welfare and Employment and the Hungar-
ian Employment Agency publish a growing body of up-to-date and relevant 
information; the National Employment Fund (OFA) ﬁnances innovative ex-
perimental projects. The Ministry maintains an in-house research centre, ﬁ-
nances policy-relevant research activities and regularly invites researchers to 
participate in the policy making process.
However, the impact of employment policy has been very limited in the 
past 15 years and has failed to bring substantial improvement in the activity 
rate. One of the main reasons appears to be the inattention to four functions 
which – as exempliﬁed by the British model – are essential for eﬃcient policy 
making. Eﬃcient policy making is based on evidence, is able to learn, evalu-
ates and revises. It evaluates results, identiﬁes mistakes, makes the experiences 
available to others, tries new, better solutions and improves existing ones.
Each of the individual components of a model of learning-based policy 
making appears somewhere in Hungarian social policy but they are not in-
tegrated into a uniﬁed whole. In the current practice of government policy 
making, ex-ante impact analyses are usually formal or completely missing 
and policy outcomes are not regularly monitored (OECD, 2007b; Kovácsy, 
2005).67 The impact of active and passive labour market programmes is not 
assessed regularly, programmes that prove to be unsuccessful are not removed 
from the system (Gere & Szellő, 2006). Experimental projects are either not 
subjected to a review process where the best tools could be identiﬁed or, if as-
sessments are made, their results are not easily accessible to stakeholders and 
programmes that prove to be successful are not rolled out on a national scale 
(FRSZ, 2006). Monitoring and evaluation reports are either completely in-
accessible to the public or are published sporadically, on the websites of dif-
ferent institutions or in other diﬃcult-to-reach formats.
The new system of rehabilitation services and provisions for unemployed 
people with reduced work capacity also includes several features which have 
proved to be successful in the British Pathways programme. An assessment 
procedure focusing on unimpaired capacities is available and there is some ex-
pertise and experience available in job centres concerning screening tools, the 
special services required by clients with reduced work capacity and methods 
for successful workplace rehabilitation (Juhász, 2004; Busch, 2006; Dávid, 
67 Improving government ef-
ﬁciency has been on the gov-
ernment’s agenda and as of 
2005, the Justice Department 
and the Public Administration 
Reform Committee has expert 
groups and divisions which are 
assigned the task of maintaining 
high standards of law making 
and propagating better gov-
ernance. The requirement of 
impact assessment and evalua-
tion receives special emphasis in 
the New Hungary development 
plan. These initiatives, however, 
have so far had little practical 
impact.
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Móricz & Szauer, 2007). There are also good examples of collaboration be-
tween job centres, local governments and non-proﬁt service providers (HE-
FOP, 2005; Progress, 2005; FRSZ, 2006). A framework for collecting data 
that would allow precise measurements and the methodology of evaluation 
are also available (Kézdi, 2004).
The British experiences suggest that three further steps are needed for suc-
cess. First, the outcomes of completed pilot schemes and existing nationwide 
programmes should be systematically assessed and evaluated, in order to iden-
tify best practices and also the factors that contribute to the success or failure 
of the various schemes. The results should be summarised in a publicly avail-
able report and oﬀered to professional groups for consultation. In the second 
step, a new system of provisions can be outlined, building on the comments 
and suggestions that emerged in the consultations. The new scheme should 
integrate the isolated initiatives into a uniﬁed system which takes the client 
from the point of claiming beneﬁt, through the screening procedure, to in-
work mentoring, and should encourage lasting return to the labour market. 
The third step is to plan the pilot and evaluation procedures of the new scheme 
and then the national roll-out of the system corrected in accordance with the 
results of the evaluation. At this stage the Ministry would also need to collect 
data, regularly assess the working of the scheme, commission researchers to 
evaluate the results and regularly publish results on its website. The European 
Union allocates ample resources to projects of this type, thus we hope that 
Hungarian policy makers will soon take these steps leading to success.
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